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Chapter 1
Introduction
Logical reasoning is something that humans and other animals often do intuitively. Given
the information that Vladimir is taller than Nicolas and Nicolas is taller than Silvio, we
naturally infer, using our knowledge that the relation . . . is taller than . . .  is transitive,
that Vladimir is taller than Silvio.
Logic, as a ﬁeld of study, concerns itself with inferences of this kind, but where the
content is abstracted away and only the structure of the inference is considered. The
abstract structure of the inference above is then as follows: if R is a transitive relation,
a stands in relation R to b, and b stands in relation R to c, then a stands in relation R
to c. We might even say that it has an even more abstract structure: if A, B, and from
A and B follows C, then C. In this sense, logic can be seen as the study of the structure
of valid inferences.
By studying logic, we aim to gain new insights into our way of reasoning, which in
turn provides us with tools to advance our knowledge in many ﬁelds. In particular, logic
has proved to be an especially powerful tool in sciences where there is no or very limited
empirical input, such as philosophy and mathematics. Furthermore, by analysing our
way of reasoning, capturing it formally, and automating it, logic has become a vital tool
in the quest to advance technology further and push back the boundaries of artiﬁcial
intelligence.
Unless stated otherwise, we will talk about propositional logics here, that is, logics
based on a language where formulas are built inductively over a set of propositional vari-
ables p, q, r, . . . by propositional connectives, usually including the binary connectives
∨ (weak disjunction), ∧ (weak conjunction), & (strong conjunction; coincides with weak
conjunction in classical logic), and → (implication) and the unary ¬ (negation). Fur-
thermore, in this dissertation, we will use the terms inference and logic in a rather
speciﬁc sense. An inference is a pair 〈Γ, ϕ〉, where Γ is a set of formulas, called the set
of premises, and ϕ is a single formula, called the conclusion. A logic L is a consequence
relation L relating sets of formulas and single formulas, that is, it is a set of inferences
satisfying certain conditions. In this sense, an inference 〈Γ, ϕ〉 is called valid in L if
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〈Γ, ϕ〉 ∈ L, often written in inﬁx notation: Γ L ϕ. A formula ϕ is called a theorem of L
if it is the conclusion of a valid inference without premises, i.e. if ∅ L ϕ.
The two most common approaches to specify a logic in this sense are by deﬁning a
semantics or an axiom system. The semantic approach usually speciﬁes a class of models,
such that an inference from Γ to ϕ is valid if ϕ is true in every model where all members
of Γ are true. The axiomatic approach speciﬁes a set of axioms and deduction rules
such that an inference from Γ to ϕ is valid if ϕ is provable using only those axioms,
deduction rules, and members of Γ. These approaches to deﬁning consequence relations
reﬂect truth-oriented and deduction-oriented perspectives on logic.
Classical logic is the name we use nowadays for the logic developed around the turn
of the twentieth century by Gottlob Frege, Betrand Russell, and others. One reason to
call this logic classical is that it has roots reaching all the way back to ancient Greece
and Aristotle, but perhaps a more important reason is that classical logic is very much
the standard logic. One reason for this is that classical logic may be viewed as the
strongest non-trivial propositional logic. Non-classical logics, are usually either weaker
than classical logic (e.g. many-valued logics) or they make use of an expanded language
(e.g. modal logics)
Let us to point out two aspects of classical logic from which the non-classical logics
studied in this dissertation depart. Firstly, classical logic obeys the principle of bivalence,
that is, a formula is either true or it is false, there is no middle ground. This is why
classical logic is seen as a two-valued logic. Secondly, all propositional connectives of
classical logic, such as negation ¬, conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨, and implication →, are
truth-functional, i.e. the truth value of a compound formula is determined entirely by the
truth values of its subformulas.
1.1 Many-Valued Logics
Many-valued logics depart from classical logic in the sense that they abandon the principle
of bivalence. Characteristically, in many-valued logics, a formula is not always true or
false, but might have one of at least three diﬀerent truth values. The ﬁrst to propose
a many-valued logic was Jan Łukasiewicz in [89, 90], namely the three-valued logic L3
where the third truth value is called possible. The name of the third value was inspired
by Łukasiewicz's goal to model future contingents with this logic. Today, most logicians
agree that this goal was not achieved, as future contingents and other modalities are
widely held not to obey truth-functionality. Nevertheless, Łukasiewicz initiated in this
way the still very much active ﬁeld of many-valued logics.
In fact, Łukasiewicz considered many-valued logics with arbitrary numbers of truth-
values, including the n-valued Łukasiewicz logics Ln and the inﬁnite-valued L, which
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he developed in [91]. Many other many-valued logics followed, famously including the
three-valued Kleene logic K3, where the third truth value is usually dubbed unknown or
undeﬁned. This logic was originally designed by Stephen Kleene in [82] to model partial
functions and relations in mathematics, but later became popular in philosophy as a tool
to determine ﬁxed points in the revision theory of truth, a theory of truth introduced
by Saul Kripke in [83]. A popular four-valued logic is ﬁrst-degree entailment logic FDE,
where there are two additional truth values: neither true nor false and both true and
false. FDE is also known as Dunn-Belnap logic, as its usefulness was emphasised by
Nuel Belnap in the context of information bases stored on a computer in [12] and by
J. Michael Dunn in the context of relevant entailment in [51]. FDE is philosophically
very interesting as it is both a paraconsistent logic, that is, a logic where contradictory
formulas do not necessarily imply every other formula (cf. e.g. [106]), and a relevance
logic, i.e. if an implication-formula is a theorem of FDE, its antecedent is relevant in a
speciﬁc sense to the consequence (see e.g. [52]). During his investigation of intuitionistic
logic (see e.g. [45]), Kurt Gödel came up in [62] with a whole family of many-valued
logics, one for each natural number n ≥ 2 of truth values. These logics are now called
n-valued Gödel logics. Gödel used this logics to simultaneously prove that intuitionistic
logic is not a ﬁnite-valued logic and that there are inﬁnitely many so-called intermediate
logics, i.e. logics intermediate in strength between intuitionistic logic and classical logic.
Gödel's approach was later generalized by Michael Dummett in [50], where he introduced
the inﬁnite-valued Gödel logic G (therefore also frequently called Gödel-Dummett logic)
as the intersection of all ﬁnite-valued Gödel logics (seen as sets of valid formulas) and
provided an axiomatization.
Logics are often designed with a certain intended semantics in mind, which is often
an algebra or a class of algebras. For example, classical logic has as intended semantics
the two-element Boolean algebra. In this sense, many-valued logics have as intended
semantics an algebra (or a class of algebras) with three or more elements. E.g. L3 has
as intended semantics the three-element chain and FDE the four-element diamond lat-
tice. In particular, speciﬁc (classes of) residuated lattices (i.e. lattices with an additional
monoidal operation that has unique left and right adjoints) are often chosen as inten-
ded semantics, as their monoidal operations provide suitable interpretations of strong
conjunction and their residua (adjoints) are adequate interpretations of implication.
The term fuzzy logics is typically used to denote many-valued logics where truth
values are to be understood as degrees of truth, e.g. when the intended semantics is
based on the real unit interval [0, 1]. Unfortunately, as logicians do not always agree on
what is the characteristic property of fuzzy logics, it is diﬃcult to be more precise in their
delimitation. Nevertheless, it is at least widely accepted that if a logic has as intended
semantics a (class of) residuated lattice(s) with the real unit interval [0, 1] as universe
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(often called standard semantics), then this is a fuzzy logic.
The development of fuzzy logics is motivated from many diﬀerent perspectives, per-
haps the most prominent originating from the context of vagueness. Natural languages
contain vague concepts, i.e. concepts that lack clear boundaries in their denotation, such
as young, bald, green, or drunk. It seems obvious that there are clear cases of
people being either drunk or not drunk, but we might also have experienced cases where
it was not clear if someone was drunk or not, we might in this case have referred to the
person as slightly drunk or quite drunk. Such a classiﬁcation becomes especially import-
ant when it comes to traﬃc laws, for example. One might argue that such imprecision is
a necessary aspect of languages used in communication about reality, made unavoidable
by the nature of reality itself and our sensory and cognitive abilities. Be this as it may,
the undeniable existence of vague concepts poses challenges to the logical analysis of
natural languages, for example when Sorites paradoxes are considered.
While classical logic seems unsuitable for dealing with vagueness, it has been proposed
that assigning degrees of truth to propositions containing vague concepts, as we would do
to formulas in fuzzy logics, can lead to a better understanding of the nature of vagueness
in natural languages and help us overcome the challenges posed by it (see e.g. [117]).
However, it is more widely held in the philosophical community today that fuzzy logics,
for a variety of reasons, are inadequate tools to reach such an understanding of the nature
of vagueness or to deal with Sorites paradoxes (see e.g. [122], [81], or [116]). This is not
to say, however, that fuzzy and other many-valued logics are not very suitable tools for
dealing with vagueness and imprecision in applications in ﬁelds other than philosophy.
With the development of fuzzy set theory, proposed by Lofti Zadeh in [123], a whole
new research area evolved for dealing with imprecision, uncertainty, and gradual change
in engineering and computer science. Many technological applications and tools have
emerged from this line of research, including fuzzy controls (which e.g. fully automatic-
ally regulate the speed of the subway trains in Sendai, Japan), fuzzy image processing,
methods in soft-computing, and applications in artiﬁcial intelligence. This application
driven line of research is often denoted as fuzzy logics in the broad sense in order to
distinguish it from the connected but more mathematically oriented ﬁeld we will call
fuzzy logics in the narrow sense, i.e. the mathematical investigation of logics based on
residuated lattices with universe [0, 1].
Fuzzy logics in the narrow sense, or mathematical fuzzy logics (in short: MFL),
emerged from the eﬀort to provide solid mathematical foundations for the study of fuzzy
logics in the broad sense. However, the study of MFL quickly evolved into a ﬁeld of great
interest in its own right with a very active research community, making it an important
and well-studied subﬁeld of mathematical logic. The state of the art of MFL can be
found in the recent handbook series consisting of [39], [40], and [38].
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Perhaps the most important monograph in the ﬁeld of MFL was Petr Hájek's [67],
where he laid the foundation for a systematic mathematical investigation of these logic.
In this work, Hájek deﬁnes semantics for many diﬀerent fuzzy logics by considering resid-
uated lattices on the real unit interval [0, 1] where the monoidal operation (interpreting
strong conjunction &) is a continuous t-norm, i.e. a continuous binary operation on [0, 1]
that is commutative, associative, monotone, and has unit element 1. Fuzzy logics based
on continuous t-norms include the inﬁnite-valued Łukasiewicz logic L [91], Gödel logic
G [50], and product logic P [72], as well as Hájek's basic logic BL [67], of which the three
former logics are axiomatic extensions. While the intended semantics of BL is the class
of all residuated lattices where the monoidal operation is a continuous t-norm, L, P, and
G each has exactly one of these algebras as intended semantics.
Francesc Esteva and Lluís Godo generalized Hájek's approach by introducing mon-
oidal t-norm logic MTL in [54], which has as intended semantics the class of all residuated
lattices where the monoidal operation is a left-continuous t-norms, i.e. a t-norm that is
only continuous with respect to suprema but not necessarily inﬁma. A further general-
ization was presented by George Metcalfe and Franco Montagna in [94], where uninorm
logic UL was introduced and proved to be sound and complete with respect to the class
of all residuated lattices where the monoidal operation is a residuated uninorm, i.e. a
binary operation on [0, 1] that is commutative, associative, monotone, has a unit element
e ∈ [0, 1] and a right adjoint. Note that a residuated uninorm with e = 1 is in fact a
left-continuous t-norm.
While L and P are most regularly used for applications where the notion of magnitude
is important, as their t-norms depend on how far the two arguments are apart, G is usually
employed if the important notion is the order of values. This is because the Gödel t-norm
depends only on the relative order of its arguments. With this in mind, we introduce the
more general class of order-based logics in Chapter 3, of which G is a member.
For BL, L, P, and G, the validity problem is known to be coNP-complete (see e.g.[74]
for an overview). While coNP-hardness is immediate, as classical propositional logic (for
which the validity problem is also coNP-complete) can be interpreted in those logics,
inclusion in coNP can be quite complicated to show. For MTL, upper complexity bounds
are still unknown for the validity problem, while it is known that it is decidable (see
e.g. [74]). Furthermore, decidability of UL is still open.
1.2 Modal Logics
Modal logics expand classical logic by adding non-truth-functional connectives, thus de-
parting from the truth-functionality property of classical logic. Typically, two unary
non-truth-functional connectives (often called modal connectives or modal operators) 
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and ♦ are added to the language of propositional classical logic. Historically, in philo-
sophy, the aims of expanding classical logic in this way was to logically model the notions
of necessity (ϕ is interpreted as ϕ is necessary) and possibility (♦ϕ is interpreted as
ϕ is possible; see e.g. [60]). It seems clear that these notions cannot be appropriately
modelled truth-functionally: while the sentences the number 27 is smaller than the num-
ber 141'107 and Bern had 141'107 citizen in April 2016 are both true, the sentence it
is necessary that the number 27 is smaller than the number 141'107 is true and it is
necessary that Bern had 141'107 citizen in April 2016  is false.
Even though modal logics have a long tradition in philosophy, dating back far into
past centuries, it was only with the development of relational semantics in the 1950s and
1960s by Saul Kripke and others (see [80, 8487]), that the study of formal modal logics
really took oﬀ. What is now called a Kripke frame is a relational structure comprised
of a set of so-called worlds and a binary accessibility relation on this set of worlds. A
Kripke model is a Kripke frame together with a valuation function assigning to each
propositional variable a (classical) truth value at each world. On the one hand, formulas
that do not contain modal connectives are then, locally at each world, assigned truth
values truth-functionally as in classical logic. On the other hand, a formula ϕ is true at
a world x if and only if ϕ is true at all worlds that are connected to x by the accessibility
relation and a formula ♦ϕ is true at a world x if and only if ϕ is true at some world
that is connected to x. At this point, it becomes clear that ♦ can be deﬁned by ¬¬. A
formula is called valid in a Kripke model if it is true at all worlds of the model, and it is
called valid in a class of Kripke models, if it is valid in all Kripke models in the class. An
inference is called (globally) valid in a class of Kripke models if the conclusion is valid in
all Kripke models of that class where all the premises are valid.
In fact, this only describes a speciﬁc kind of modal language and Kripke model, where
only two unary modal connectives are added to the language and where both of them are
interpreted by the same accessibility relation. It is straightforward to generalize to any
number of modal connectives of any ﬁnite arity: we have an (n + 1)-ary relation in the
Kripke frame for each n-ary modal connective in the language. Modal logics including
more modal connectives than just  and ♦ are often called multi-modal logics.
Besides necessity and possibility, many other interesting notions have been modelled
by modal logics. Among the possible readings of the - and ♦-connectives are the
following:
• Alethic Reading: ϕ stands for ϕ is necessary and ♦ϕ stands for ϕ is possible
• Epistemic Reading: ϕ stands for ϕ is known and ♦ϕ stands for ϕ is consistent
with the available information (see e.g. [49])
• Temporal Reading: ϕ stands for ϕ will always be true and ♦ϕ stands for ϕ
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will be true at some point in the future (see e.g. [120])
• Deontic Reading: ϕ stands for ϕ is obligatory and ♦ϕ stands for ϕ is permitted
(see e.g. [93])
• Provability Reading: ϕ stands for ϕ is provable and ♦ϕ stands for ϕ is con-
sistent (see e.g. [20])
Understanding  and ♦ in diﬀerent ways might have implications for which formulas
and inferences we would like to be valid in a modal logic. For example, if we adopt an
epistemic reading, we will probably want that the formula ϕ→ ϕ is valid, as something
that is known should also be true. On the other hand, the same formula should probably
not be valid if we adopt a deontic reading. It would seem strange that everything that
is obligatory is automatically also the case.
While the formula (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ) and the inference from ϕ to ϕ are
valid in all Kripke models, the formula ϕ→ ϕ is only valid in Kripke models where the
accessibility relation is reﬂexive. Furthermore, ϕ → ϕ or ϕ → ♦ϕ is valid in all
Kripke models where the accessibility relation is transitive or symmetric, respectively. In
fact, this natural correspondence between formulas and properties of Kripke models is one
of the most important features of these relational semantics. The modal logic determined
by the class of all Kripke models is called K, while T denotes the logic determined by
the class of all Kripke models with a reﬂexive accessibility relation and S4 or S5 denotes
the logic determined by the class of all Kripke models where the accessibility relation is
either reﬂexive and transitive or an equivalence relation, respectively.
Even though Kripke models are very nice in many respects, they are not ﬂexible
enough to provide semantics for logics weaker than K. When we adopt an epistemic
reading for example, we might not want the inference from ϕ to ϕ (which is valid in
K) to be valid, as its validity would imply that all propositional tautologies are known,
presupposing a logically omniscient knower. For this reason, other semantics have been
developed for modal logics. Among the most popular of these are the so-called neigh-
bourhood semantics, introduced independently by Richard Montague in [97] and Dana
Scott in [115]. In this semantics, as in Kripke models, formulas not containing modal
connectives are interpreted locally at worlds (the set of worlds denoted by W ) as in
classical logic, but the modal connectives are not interpreted via an accessibility relation
on W , but rather via a function assigning to each world x a set of subsets of worlds
N(x) ⊆ P(W ), called the neighbourhood of x. A formula ϕ is true at a world x if
and only if the set of worlds where ϕ is true is a member of N(x). The modal logic
determined by the class of all neighbourhood models is often called E and is considered
to be the weakest sensible modal logic that expands classical logic, as the only thing we
really know about  in this setting is that the inference from ϕ ↔ ψ to ϕ ↔ ψ is
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valid in E.
Even though modal logics based on Kripke-style semantics can also be captured by
the neighbourhood approach, it is still the former approach that is most popular. This
is probably because of the natural correspondence between properties of Kripke frames
and certain formulas and because most modal logics based on Kripke models enjoy the
so-called tree-model property, i.e. a formula is valid in a certain class of Kripke models if
and only if it is valid in all Kripke models of that class that have a tree structure.
With this in mind, it is understandable that even though relational semantics were
developed with the aim of obtaining a better understanding of modal logics, today the
view is often held in the mathematical logics community that conversely modal logics
provide a better understanding of relational structures such as partially ordered sets,
directed and undirected graphs, and tree structures (see e.g. [15]).
In computer science, modal logics have grown increasingly popular since the 1970s.
They are applied for many purposes, including the veriﬁcation of programs [44], data-
bases [30], artiﬁcial intelligence [23], and knowledge representation, using so-called de-
scription logics (see e.g. [4]). Description logics, understood as multi-modal logics, take
the set of worlds as the domain of discourse (worlds might then be objects, or people, or
individual hairs on Mary's head) and the accessibility relations are taken to be binary
relations on the domain (in this setting usually called roles) such as . . . is the mother of
. . . " or . . . is longer than . . . . Formulas are taken to represent properties (in this setting
usually called concepts) such as . . . is a table, . . . smells nice, or if . . . is a table then
it smells nice. If a formula is true at a particular world x, this is taken to mean that
the object x in the domain satisﬁes the property represented by the formula.
A large part of the popularity of modal logics in computer science is based on the
fact that modal logics present an ideal compromise between expressive power and com-
putational complexity. As classical propositional logic is a fragment of any propositional
modal logic and any propositional modal logic can in turn be seen as a fragment of
ﬁrst-order logic (see e.g. [15]), propositional modal logics lie in between these two logics
concerning expressibility and complexity. While ﬁrst-order logic is undecidable, very
many propositional modal logics are decidable, e.g. the validity problems for K, T, and
S4 are PSPACE-complete, and for S5, it is coNP-complete (see [88]). This robustness in
decidability is mostly due to the tree-model property (cf. [119]).
1.3 Many-Valued Modal Logics
Given the popularity of the two approaches towards non-classical logics presented above,
it makes sense to combine them in order to obtain logics that enjoy the positive aspects
of both approaches. In this spirit, many-valued modal logics abandon the principle of
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bivalence and at the same time add non-truth-functional connectives such as  and ♦ to
the language. The most favoured way in the literature to deﬁne such logics, stemming
from the popularity of Kripke-style relational semantics, is by considering a many-valued
logic based on a residuated lattice A and generalizing Kripke frames to consist of a
set W of worlds and a many-valued accessibility relation R on W , that is, a function
R : W ×W → A (A denoting the universe of A), sometimes just called an accessibility
relation. We also generalize Kripke models to consist of a Kripke frame together with
a many-valued valuation function that assigns an element of A to each propositional
variable at each world. Propositional connectives are then interpreted, locally at each
world, truth-functionally by the operations of A and ϕ and ♦ϕ are interpreted at
a world x as inﬁmum and supremum, respectively, of values of ϕ at worlds that are
accessible from x to some degree. When a many-valued accessibility relation only takes
values in {⊥A,>A} ⊆ A, we call it crisp. We sometimes also call a Kripke frame or model
many-valued or crisp if its accessibility relation is many-valued or crisp, respectively.
Among the ﬁrst to consider many-valued modal logics in this way was Melvin Fit-
ting in [57, 58], studying many-valued modal logics based on ﬁnite Heyting algeb-
ras. Numerous many-valued modal logics were subsequently developed to cater to the
needs of applications where non-truth-functional notions such as knowledge, belief, tense,
spatio-temporal relations, and program termination are to be modelled in the presence
of vagueness, imprecision, or uncertainty. Such applications include modelling fuzzy
belief [63, 66], spatial reasoning with with vague predicates [114], many-valued tense
logic [47], fuzzy similarity measures [64], and substantial work on many-valued descrip-
tion logics, which are, understood as many-valued multi-modal logics, based on Kripke
frames with arbitrarily many binary many-valued accessibility relations (see e.g. [18] for
an overview).
With this growing landscape of logics designed for various applications, a more sys-
tematic investigation of many-valued modal logics was called for. At the heart of this
investigation lies the article [21] by Felix Bou, Francesc Esteva, Lluís Godo, and Ricardo
Rodríguez, where the box-fragments of many-valued modal logics are studied based on
Kripke models over ﬁnite residuated lattices. While most earlier approaches considered
crisp S5-like modalities, that is, based on the class of crisp Kripke frames where the access-
ibility relation is an equivalence relation, [21] was one of the ﬁrst to consider (non-crisp)
K-like modalities, i.e. where the class of all Kripke frames is considered. Furthermore,
after Hájek had considered many-valued crisp S5 logics based on continuous t-norms
in [67], many authors did the same for many-valued modal logics with K-like modalities.
Xavier Caicedo and Ricardo Rodríguez axiomatize Gödel logic G expanded with K-,T-,
S4-, and S5-like modalities (and others) in [28, 29] based on Kripke frames with a many-
valued accessibility relation. In [95], George Metcalfe and Nicola Olivetti use analytic
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Gentzen-style calculi to establish the decidability, indeed PSPACE-completeness, of the
validity problem for the box- and diamond-fragments of Gödel modal logics based on
Kripke frames with a crisp or a many-valued accessibility relation. Moreover, using tools
from abstract algebraic logic, Georges Hansoul and Bruno Teheux consider ﬁnite- and
inﬁnite-valued Łukasiewicz modal logics based on the class of all crisp Kripke models
in [75] and provide axiomatizations in the ﬁnite-valued cases and an inﬁnitary axiomat-
ization (including an inﬁnitary deduction rule) for the inﬁnite-valued case. Furthermore,
in [121], Amanda Vidal, Francesc Esteva, and Lluís Godo consider inﬁnite-valued product
modal logics (expanded with rational constants and the Delta operator) based on diﬀerent
classes of crisp Kripke frames, providing inﬁnitary axiomatizations and algebraizability
results.
In [68], Hájek considers fuzzy description logics based on continuous t-norms and
establishes decidability of the validity and satisﬁability problem for these logics with
respect to all witnessed interpretations, i.e. interpretations where each supremum or
inﬁmum is actually a maximum or minimum, respectively. As fuzzy modal logics can be
understood as fragments of fuzzy description logics, these results imply the decidability
of the validity and satisﬁability problems for the fuzzy modal logics based on continuous
t-norms determined by the class of all witnessed Kripke models, immediately implying
the same for these logics determined by ﬁnite Kripke models (where the set of worlds
is ﬁnite) and for many-valued modal logics based on a ﬁnite subalgebra of the standard
semantics.
Furthermore, as Łukasiewicz modal logic (based on the class of all Kripke models) is
complete with respect to the class of all witnessed Kripke models (see [68]), the decid-
ability of the validity and satisﬁability problem follows. Unfortunately, the same is not
true for product modal logics and Gödel modal logics. However, for product modal logic
based on all Kripke models with a many-valued accessibility relation, decidability of the
validity and positive satisﬁability problem was established in [31]. This was achieved
by studying product description logic and reducing it to propositional product logic in
exponential time. Moreover, Hájek was able to prove in [67] that the validity problem
for the crisp S5 version of Łukasiewicz modal logic is decidable using its correspondence
to the one-variable fragment of ﬁrst-order Łukasiewicz logic.
Interestingly, many-valued modal logics based on neighbourhood semantics, rather
than Kripke's relational semantics, have received only very limited attention. After
all, when considering non-truth-functional notions such as knowledge, belief, or high
probability (see e.g. [103]) in the presence of imprecision or vagueness, one might not
want to accept formulas and inferences valid in all many-valued Kripke models, such as
e.g. the formula (ϕ ∧ψ)↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ) or the inference from ϕ to ϕ.
Given a residuated lattice A, a many-valued neighbourhood frame consists of a set
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of worlds W and a many-valued neighbourhood function N , assigning to each world x
a function N(x) : AW → A. A many-valued neighbourhood model consists of a many-
valued neighbourhood frame and a valuation function V assigning values V (p, x) ∈ A
to each propositional variable p at each world x. This valuation function is extended to
formulas inductively by interpreting the propositional connectives by the operations of
A and by assigning to ϕ, at a world x, the truth value N(x)(V (ψ, . . .)) ∈ A, where
V (ψ, . . .) ∈ AW is understood as the function that maps each world y to V (ϕ, y). Put
in terms of fuzzy sets, the truth value of ϕ at a world x is the value of how much the
fuzzy truth-set of ϕ (i.e. the fuzzy set to which a world y belongs to the degree V (ϕ, y))
belongs to the fuzzy set of fuzzy sets N(x). In this sense, the deﬁnition of a many-valued
neighbourhood model corresponds closely to its deﬁnition in the classical setting, except
that the valuation function is now many-valued and sets are now fuzzy sets.
Rodríguez and Godo studied many-valued modal logics under neighbourhood se-
mantics in [110, 111] with the intention of modelling non-truth-functional notions such as
uncertainty and belief in a many-valued setting. Among many other results, they proved
a correspondence between many-valued Kripke models and certain kinds of many-valued
neighbourhood models and provided axiomatic systems for which they proved weak com-
pleteness with respect to certain classes of neighbourhood models.
Despite all of these results, there still remain many open question in the ﬁeld of
many-valued modal logics based on relational semantics or neighbourhood semantics.
The following is an incomplete list of some of these questions that is inspired by the
exposition so far:
(1) Is there an elegant ﬁnitary Hilbert-style axiomatization of the crisp counterparts
of the Gödel modal logics studied in [29]?
(2) Are the Gödel modal logics with both  and ♦ decidable? If yes, which complexity
bounds can be obtained? (cf. [28, 29, 95])
(3) Are there suitable analytic proof systems for Gödel modal logics with both 
and ♦? (cf. [95])
(4) Can we ﬁnd a broader framework to cover logics based on order and in this way
generalize results obtained for Gödel (modal) logics?
(5) Are there elegant ﬁnitary axiomatizations of inﬁnite-valued Łukasiewicz modal
logics? (cf. [48, 75])
(6) Are there (ﬁnitary) axiomatizations of the product modal logics studied in [121]
based on Kripke frames with a many-valued accessibility relation? Can these results
also be obtained without adding rational constants and 4?
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(7) Is the product or Gödel modal logic based on crisp Kripke frames where the ac-
cessibility relation is an equivalence relation decidable? Equivalently, are the one-
variable fragments of their ﬁrst-order counterparts decidable? If yes, which com-
plexity bounds can be obtained? (cf. [67, Problem (13)])
(8) Are there other fragments of the ﬁrst-order Łukasiewicz, product, or Gödel logic
that are decidable?
(9) Is there a suitable correspondence between many-valued Kripke frames and certain
kinds of many-valued neighbourhood frames (as opposed to the correspondence on
the level of models)? (cf. [110])
(10) Are the axiomatizations of the many-valued modal logics based on many-valued
neighbourhood models presented in [110] also strongly complete in certain cases?
Can this be proved by algebraic methods?
(11) Are the many-valued modal logics based on many-valued neighbourhood models
decidable?
1.4 Aims and Outline of the Dissertation
This dissertation mainly aims to extend the existing knowledge on decidability issues of
many-valued modal logics based on Kripke models. In particular, it answers positively
the open questions (2) and (7) for the case of Gödel logic. In fact, the results obtained are
not restricted to Gödel modal logics, but they cover the larger class of order-based modal
logics, of which Gödel modal logics are examples. In this way, we also answer question
(4) positively. Moreover, question (3) is positively answered by providing tableau calculi
for the Gödel modal logics GK, GKc, and GS5c. Furthermore, considering many-valued
modal logics over MTL-chains based on many-valued neighbourhood models, we answer
positively the questions (9) and (10) above for the box-fragments of these logics. Let us
give a few more details below.
Decidability and complexity results are proved for modal expansions with  and ♦ of
so-called order-based logics, i.e. many-valued logics based on a sublattice of 〈[0, 1],min,
max, 0, 1〉 with additional operations deﬁned based only on the order. More precisely,
PSPACE-completeness is shown for the validity problem for order-based modal logics
based on the classes of all Kripke frames with a crisp or many-valued accessibility relation,
in cases where the underlying sublattice satisﬁes certain homogeneity properties. This
broad class of logics includes the Gödel modal logics GK and GKc (where for the latter
only crisp accessibility relations are considered) and many-valued modal logics based on
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certain subalgebras of the standard Gödel algebra, e.g. subalgebras with the universe
G↓ = {0} ∪ { 1n+1 | n ∈ N} or G↑ = {1− 1n+1 | n ∈ N} ∪ {1} .
Furthermore, if only many-valued Kripke frames are considered where the accessibility
relations is a crisp equivalence relation, the complexity is reduced to coNP-completeness.
This means e.g. that the validity problem for the Gödel modal logic GS5c is coNP-
complete, which in turn entails coNP-completeness for the validity problem for the one-
variable fragment of ﬁrst-order Gödel logic, solving a long standing open problem ﬁrst
explicitly formulated by Hájek in [67, Problem 13]. These results are based on joint work
of the author of this dissertation with Xavier Caicedo, George Metcalfe, and Ricardo
Rodríguez in [26, 27].
Based on independent work by the author of this thesis, we also provide tableau
calculi for the sample cases GK, GKc, and GS5c. They could be extended to cover other
order-based modal logics without much diﬃculty. We note that these tableau calculi do
not provide algorithms of optimal complexity, but they do provide decision procedures
that are easy to handle and might be implemented.
Moreover, we extend Rodríguez and Godo's results from [110] on many-valued neigh-
bourhood semantics by providing a correspondence between many-valued Kripke frames
and certain kinds of many-valued neighbourhood frames (while in [110], this corres-
pondence was on the level of models) and providing axiomatizations that are proved by
algebraic methods to be (ﬁnitely) strongly complete. Thus, we can answer three of the
open problems posed in [110]. This is joint work of the author of this dissertation with
Petr Cintula and Carles Noguera in [43].
Chapter 2 will set the stage by introducing the many-valued logics considered in this
work as well as some closely related logics, giving a general framework of substructural
logics in which they embedded. Moreover, many-valued modal logics are deﬁned and a
short survey on what is known about these logics concerning axiomatization, decidability,
and complexity is provided.
In Chapter 3, order-based modal logics are deﬁned and some crucial properties of
these logics are established. This sets up Chapter 4, where an alternative semantics
is deﬁned for these order-based modal logics, based on Kripke-like models where the
values of box- and diamond-formulas are restricted to certain subsets of the algebra. As
one of the main contributions of this dissertation, it is shown that the new semantics
determines the same valid formulas as the usual Kripke models, and by relying on the
(bounded) ﬁnite model property with respect to this new semantics, decidability, indeed
PSPACE-completeness, is proved for the validity problem for order-based modal logics
based on all Kripke frames with a crisp and many-valued accessibility relation, in cases
where the underlying sublattice satisﬁes some local homogeneity properties. This implies
PSPACE-completeness of the Gödel modal logics GK and GKc.
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A similar procedure to that followed in Chapter 4 is used in Chapter 5 to show coNP-
completeness of the validity problem for order-based modal logics based on Kripke frames
where the accessibility relation is a crisp equivalence relation. The coNP-completeness
of the validity problem for the Gödel modal logic GS5c follows and thus, by a standard
translation, also the validity problem of the one-variable fragment of ﬁrst-order Gödel
logic is coNP-complete.
In Chapter 6, we present tableau calculi for the logics GK and GS5c. These calculi
do not provide algorithms of optimal complexity (as opposed to the algorithms in the
Chapters 4 and 5), but they provide decision procedures that are easy to handle and
might be readily implemented.
In Chapter 7, neighbourhood semantics are studied for the box-fragments of many-
valued modal logics over MTL-chains. A correspondence between many-valued Kripke
frames and particular kinds of many-valued neighbourhood frames is presented and (ﬁ-
nite) strong completeness is proved for certain axiomatizations using algebraic methods.
Concluding remarks can be found in Chapter 8, where we will mention ongoing work
that was not ready to be included in this thesis, as well as suggestions for further work
in the fascinating ﬁeld of many-valued modal logics.
Chapter 2
Many-Valued Modal Logics
In this chapter, we set the stage for the new results presented in this dissertation. This
includes embedding the relevant many-valued logics, which will later be studied under
the expansion by modal operators, in a broader landscape of substructural logics.
In Section 2.1, we present a general framework of substructural logics, based on the
one hand on axiomatic extensions of a basic Hilbert-style calculus, and on the other hand
on varieties of certain algebras. This section also provides the opportunity to ﬁx certain
notations and conventions needed later in the thesis. In Section 2.2, we brieﬂy discuss
the most relevant many-valued logics for this dissertation, namely monoidal t-norm logic
MTL and some of its most prominent axiomatic extensions, speciﬁcally, Petr Hájek's
basic logic BL as well as Łukasiewicz logic L, product logic P, and Gödel logic G. Their
expansions with modal operators are deﬁned in Section 2.3, along with a short survey of
previously known results about these many-valued modal logics.
2.1 Substructural Logics
We denote by L a ﬁnite algebraic language, containing a ﬁnite number of operation
symbols of ﬁnite arity. FmL is the set of formulas for L, denoted by ϕ,ψ, χ . . ., deﬁned
inductively over a countably inﬁnite set Var of propositional variables, denoted by p, q, . . ..
If the language is clear from the context, we drop the subscript L from FmL.
For a language L, we deﬁne an L-substitution to be a mapping σ : Fm → Fm such
that for all n-ary ? ∈ L and all formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Fm:
σ(?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) = ?(σ(ϕ1), . . . σ(ϕn)) .
A (single-conclusion) consequence relation for L is a binary relation R ⊆ P(Fm) × Fm
(P denoting the power-set operator), also written Γ R ϕ, that satisﬁes the following
properties for all Γ ∪ Σ ∪ {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ Fm:
(i) reﬂexivity: {ϕ} R ϕ,
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(ii) weakening: Γ R ϕ implies Γ ∪ Σ R ϕ,
(iii) transitivity: Γ R ϕ and Σ ∪ {ϕ} R ψ together imply Γ ∪ Σ R ψ, and
(iv) structurality: Γ R ϕ implies σ[Γ] R σ(ϕ) for all L-substitutions σ.
Such a relation is called ﬁnitary, if for any (inﬁnite) set of formulas Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ Fm, Γ R ϕ
implies that Γ′ R ϕ for some ﬁnite subset Γ′ ⊆ Γ. For a general discussion about the
notion of a consequence relation, see [78] by Rosalie Iemhoﬀ.
We deﬁne a logic L for a language L to be a consequence relation L for L, which
can be speciﬁed in many ways, for example syntactically by a Hilbert-style calculus or
semantically through a class of models, which in our case will either be a class algebras
or a class of many-valued Kripke models.
While we postpone the discussion of many-valued modal logics to the following sec-
tion, we now present a general framework which will cover many substructural logics and
most many-valued logics relevant for this thesis. The framework is based on axiomatic
extensions of a basic Hilbert-style calculus (MAILL) on the syntactic side and on vari-
eties of bounded pointed commutative residuated lattices on the semantic side. There is
a natural interplay between these two sides and some very general completeness results
can be obtained.
For this, let us ﬁx an algebraic language L containing the four binary propositional
connectives, ∧, ∨, &, and →, and the four constants e, f, ⊥, and >. Denote by Fm
the set of formulas for L deﬁned inductively over Var. We frequently make use of two
deﬁnable symbols: ¬ϕ = ϕ → f and ϕ ↔ ψ = (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). Furthermore, we
inductively deﬁne the following useful notation: let ϕ0 = e and for every natural number
n ≥ 1, ϕn = ϕn−1 & ϕ.
The Syntactic Side
A Hilbert-style calculus C for L is a set of axioms and derivation rules. Axioms are
selected formula schemas. Rules are pairs 〈Γ, ϕ〉 consisting of a ﬁnite set of formula
schemas Γ (called the premises of the rule) and a single formula schema ϕ (called the
conclusion of the rule), often written as follows:
ϕ1 . . . ϕn
ϕ
,
if Γ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}. By formula schema, we understand formulas in Fm containing
placeholders (e.g. ϕ or ψ) to be uniformly replaced by arbitrary formulas in Fm. When
it is clear from the context, we will blur the distinction between formulas and formula
schemas.
A proof of a formula ϕ from a set of formulas Γ in a given Hilbert-style calculus C is
a ﬁnite sequence of formulas whose last member is ϕ and whose every member is either
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(B) (ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ)) (C) (ϕ→ (ψ → χ))→ (ψ → (ϕ→ χ))
(I) ϕ→ ϕ
(&1) ϕ→ (ψ → (ϕ& ψ)) (e1) e
(&2) (ϕ→ (ψ → χ))→ ((ϕ& ψ)→ χ) (e2) ϕ→ (e→ ϕ)
(∧1) (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ (∨1) ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(∧2) (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ψ (∨2) ψ → (ϕ ∨ ψ)
(∧3) ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ϕ→ χ))→ (ϕ→ (ψ ∧ χ)) (∨3) ((ϕ→ χ) ∧ (ψ → χ))→ ((ϕ ∨ ψ)→ χ)
(⊥) ⊥ → ϕ (>) ϕ→ >
ϕ ϕ→ ψ
(MP)
ψ
ϕ ψ
(ADJ)
ϕ ∧ ψ
Table 2.1: Axioms and Rules ofMAILL
(i) an axiom of C, (ii) an element of Γ, or (iii) is derived from previous members of the
sequence by a rule (R) of C (i.e. it is the conclusion of (R) and all premises of (R) are
members of the initial sequence before the conclusion). If there is such a proof, we will
say that ϕ is provable in C from Γ and write Γ `C ϕ. If for some formula ϕ ∈ Fm, ∅ `C ϕ,
we will say that ϕ is a theorem of C, written `C ϕ, and denote the set of all theorems of
C by Thm(C) = {ϕ ∈ Fm | `C ϕ}.
Note that any Hilbert-style calculus C for L deﬁnes a ﬁnitary consequence relation
`C for L, and thus a logic L for L is deﬁned by setting L = `C . In this case, we say that
C axiomatizes L, and if ϕ ∈ Thm(C), we also say that ϕ is a theorem of L.
Given a Hilbert-style calculus C for L, we say that a Hilbert-style calculus C′ for L is
an axiomatic extension of C, if C′ results from adding a (possibly empty) set of axioms
A (no rules) to C, that is C′ = C ∪A. Moreover, given a logic L for L such that L = `C
for some Hilbert-style calculus C, we also say that a logic L′ is an axiomatic extension of
L, if L′ = `C′ , for some axiomatic extension C′ of C.
Let us now deﬁne the Hilbert-style calculus MAILL (axiomatizing Multiplicative
Additive Intuitionistic Linear Logic MAILL) as the set of axioms and rules in Table 2.1.
Furthermore, in Table 2.2 we list some common axioms that are frequently added to
MAILL in order to deﬁne axiomatic extensions ofMAILL.1 Many prominent logics can
be deﬁned as axiomatic extensions ofMAILL, including the examples in Table 2.3. In
this table, we list the Hilbert-style calculi with the additional axioms added toMAILL,
name the axiomatized logics and give some references. Note that many of the logics listed
were originally formulated in diﬀerent languages. Noting that e.g. in the presence of (W),
the connectives e and >, as well as f and ⊥, collapse, we will ignore these diﬀerences
here for the sake of a uniform presentation.
1The axioms and most of the labels are taken from [96].
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Label Axiom
(W) (ϕ→ e) ∧ (f → ϕ)
(DIS) (ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ))→ ((ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ χ))
(INV) ¬¬ϕ→ ϕ
(PRL) (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ)
(DIV) (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (ϕ& (ϕ→ ψ))
(Cn) ϕ
n−1 → ϕn
(CAN) ¬ϕ ∨ ((ϕ→ (ϕ& ψ))→ ψ)
(NC) ¬(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)
Table 2.2: Further Axioms
In Figure 2.1, we picture the logics of Table 2.3 in a diagram (except the logics
MTLn) where the lines represent a strict containment relation, such that the lower of two
connected logics is contained in the one above.
The Semantic Side
After looking at the syntactic side, where we talked about provability and theoremhood,
we now turn to the semantic side, where we talk about consequence and validity. For this,
let us denote by BPCRL the class of bounded pointed commutative residuated lattices.
That is, an algebra
A = 〈A,∧A,∨A,&A,→A, eA, fA,⊥A,>A〉
belongs to BPCRL if
• 〈A,∧A,∨A,⊥A,>A〉 is a bounded lattice, deﬁning a lattice order by setting for all
a, b ∈ A: a ≤A b iﬀ a ∧A b = a,
• 〈A,&A, eA〉 is a commutative monoid, and
• &A and →A form a residuated pair, i.e. a &A b ≤A c iﬀ a ≤A b →A c, for all
a, b, c ∈ A.2
In fact, BPCRL is a variety, as these three conditions can be expressed by equations,
thus deﬁning an equational class (see e.g. [96]).
For an A ∈ BPCRL, we deﬁne an A-evaluation to be a mapping v : Var → A
that extends to v : Fm → A by interpreting the connectives in L by the corresponding
2An excellent reference book for notions of universal algebra is [24].
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Calculus Additional Axioms Name Logic References
ML (W) Monoidal Logic ML [77, 101]
UL (DIS), (PRL) Uninorm Logic UL [94]
IUL (DIS), (PRL), (INV) Involutive Uninorm Logic IUL [94]
IL (W), (C2) Intuitionistic Logic IL
MTL (W), (PRL) Monoidal T-Norm Logic MTL [54]
SMTL (W), (PRL), (NC) Strict MTL SMTL [54]
IMTL (W), (PRL), (INV) Involutive MTL IMTL [54]
MTLn (W), (PRL), (Cn) N-Contractive MTL MTLn [33]
BL (W), (PRL), (DIV) Hájek's Basic Logic BL [67]
SBL (W), (PRL), (DIV), (NC) Strict BL SBL [55]
L (W), (PRL), (DIV), (INV) Łukasiewicz Logic L [25, 91]
P (W), (PRL), (DIV), (CAN) Product Logic P [72]
G (W), (PRL), (CON) Gödel Logic G [50]
CL (W), (INV), (C2) Classical Logic CL
Table 2.3: Prominent Axiomatic Extensions ofMAILL
operations of A, that is,
v(e) = eA v(f) = fA
v(⊥) = ⊥A v(>) = >A
v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = v(ϕ) ∧A v(ψ) v(ϕ ∨ ψ) = v(ϕ) ∨A v(ψ)
v(ϕ& ψ) = v(ϕ) &A v(ψ) v(ϕ→ ψ) = v(ϕ)→A v(ψ)
In other words, an A-evaluation is a homomorphism from the algebra of formulas to
A. If the algebra is clear from the context, we will omit superscript A's, but note that
usually when we denote elements of the algebra, we will use lower-case letters a, b, c, . . .,
which make them easily distinguishable from formulas ϕ,ψ, χ, . . . ∈ Fm.
Given a subset Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm and an A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→, e, f,⊥,>〉 ∈ BPCRL, we
say that ϕ is an A-consequence of Γ, written Γ |=A ϕ, if e ≤ v(ϕ) for all A-evaluations
v such that v[Γ] = {v(ψ) ∈ A | ψ ∈ Γ} ⊆ {a ∈ A | e ≤ a}. Given a subclass of algebras
U ⊆ BPCRL, we say that ϕ is a U-consequence of Γ, written Γ |=U ϕ, if Γ |=A ϕ, for all
algebras A ∈ U. If ∅ |=U ϕ, we will say that ϕ is U-valid, also denoted by |=U ϕ, and the
set of U-valid formulas will be denoted by Val(U), i.e. Val(U) = {ϕ ∈ Fm | |=U ϕ}.
Noting that for any subclass U ⊆ BPCRL, |=U is a consequence relation, we can
deﬁne a logic L by setting L = |=U. In this case, if a formula ϕ is in Val(U), we will also
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MAILL
UL
IUL
ML
MTL
IMTLSMTL BL
SBL
LPG
CL
IL
Figure 2.1: Some Axiomatic Extensions of MAILL
say that ϕ is valid in L or L-valid, setting Val(L) = Val(U).
Given a logic L for L, we say that L is (ﬁnitely) strongly sound with respect to a class
U ⊆ BPCRL, if for any (ﬁnite) set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm, Γ L ϕ implies Γ |=U ϕ.
L is called (ﬁnitely) strongly complete with respect to U, if L is (ﬁnitely) strongly sound
with respect to U and for any (ﬁnite) set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm, Γ |=U ϕ implies
Γ L ϕ. If for some axiomatic extension C ofMAILL, L = |=U = `C , we also say that
C axiomatizes U, and if for all (ﬁnite) sets Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm, Γ `C ϕ iﬀ Γ |=U ϕ, we call
C (ﬁnitely) strongly complete with respect to U. In both cases, it is obviously true that
Val(L) = Val(U) = Thm(C). If the class U is a singleton class {A}, we just replace {A}
by A in the above deﬁnitions.
In this way, many substructural logics can be deﬁned by subvarieties of BPCRL, which
in turn may be deﬁned by restricting the variety BPCRL by adding further conditions
(expressible as equations). A list of commonly added conditions is given in Table 2.4,
where all conditions are to be understood as quantiﬁed over all a, b, c ∈ A, and a0 = ⊥
and for any natural number n ≥ 1, an = a& . . .& a (n times). A list of the subvarieties
deﬁning the logics in Table 2.3 is given in Table 2.5, along with the required additional
conditions. Note that each condition listed in Table 2.4, corresponds to an axiom in
Table 2.2, as indicated in Table 2.4.
Remark 2.1. Let us note that many of the varieties listed in Table 2.5 were originally
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Name Label Condition Axiom
integrality (int) e ≤ (a→ e) ∧ (f → a) (W)
distributivity (dis) a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) (DIS)
involution (inv) a = ¬¬a (INV)
prelinearity (prl) e ≤ (a→ b) ∨ (b→ a) (PRL)
divisibility (div) a ∧ b = a& (a→ b) (DIV)
n-contraction (cn) a
n ≤ an+1 (Cn)
cancellation (can) e ≤ ¬a ∨ ((a→ (a& b))→ b) (CAN)
strictness (str) e ≤ ¬(a ∧ ¬a) (NC)
Table 2.4: Further Conditinos
introduced over diﬀerent algebraic languages. Moreover, we will discuss some of them
later over a restricted language. This problem can be circumvented by the notion of term
equivalence. Two algebras are term equivalent if the operations of one are deﬁnable by
the operations of the other (e.g. if (int) is satisﬁed, e and > collapse, as well as f and ⊥,
and vice versa). In this sense, the varieties in Table 2.5 should be understood as being
term-equivalent to the varieties usually denoted by these names in the literature.
Remark 2.2. Note that by considering subvarieties of BPCRL, we cover almost all
many-valued logics considered in this work3 and many other interesting substructural
logics. However, there are also many interesting substructural logics left out. While
originally motivated by removing structural rules from Gentzen systems for intuitionistic
logic or classical logic, it was suggested by Hiroakira Ono in [102] to delimit substructural
logics as the logics of varieties of residuated lattices.
For some more examples, taking the present setting as the starting point and ignoring
complications of diﬀerent languages, we could remove conditions like boundedness of the
lattice, commutativity of the monoidal operation, or the presence of the constant f in
order to obtain substructural logics weaker than MAILL.
The choice to limit our framework to bounded pointed commutative residuated lat-
tices was a compromise between ease of presentation and the range of logics we wanted
to cover. For much broader overviews of substructural logics, see e.g. [102], [109], or [96].
3Note that the order-based logics deﬁned in Chapter 3 might have an extended language. However,
if the language is L, order-based algebras are members of BPCRL.
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Variety Conditions Logic
ML (int) ML
UL (dis), (prl) UL
IUL (dis), (prl), (inv) IUL
H (int), (c2) IL
MTL (int), (prl) MTL
SMTL (int), (prl), (str) SMTL
IMTL (int), (prl), (inv) IMTL
MTLn (int), (prl), (cn) MTLn
BL (int), (prl), (div) BL
SBL (int), (prl), (div), (str) SBL
MV (int), (prl), (div), (inv) L
P (int), (prl), (div), (can) P
G (int), (prl), (c2) G
BOOL (int), (inv), (c2) CL
Table 2.5: Prominent Subvarieties of BPCRL
Completeness
We will now present a series of completeness results, properly relating the semantic and
syntactic sides above, which will become increasingly stronger.
It is easy to check that the rules and axioms ofMAILL are valid in anyA ∈ BPCRL.
For an axiomatic extension C of MAILL, we will therefore call an A ∈ BPCRL a C-
algebra if all axioms of C are valid in A. We will then denote the class of all C-algebras
by Gen(C). The following completeness theorem with respect to general algebras can be
proved via Lindenbaum constructions (see e.g. [96]):
Theorem 2.3 (Strong General Completeness). For any axiomatic extension C ofMAILL
and set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm:
Γ `C ϕ iﬀ Γ |=Gen(C) ϕ .
Note also that Gen(MAILL) = BPCRL and, by the close correspondence between axioms
in Table 2.2 and conditions in Table 2.4, we have that any variety L in Table 2.5 is the
subvariety Gen(C) ⊆ BPCRL for the corresponding axiomatic extension C ofMAILL in
Table 2.3.
Remark 2.4. In general, any axiom ϕ added to MAILL can be translated into an
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equation e ∧ ϕ = e, and each equation ϕ = ψ deﬁning a subvariety of BPCRL can
be translated into an axiom ϕ ↔ ψ, with the eﬀect that for the resulting Hilbert-style
calculus C ⊇ MAILL and the resulting subvariety U ⊆ BPCRL, U = Gen(C). In our
case, however, we chose to present the axioms and conditions in formats more commonly
used in the literature.
In fact, Theorem 2.3 can be generalized to much broader classes of Hilbert-style calculi
(not just axiomatic extensions ofMAILL). This has been shown by Willem J. Blok and
Don Pigozzi in [17], in which they develop the framework of algebraizable logics, where
the presence of certain axioms on the syntactic side and the validity of certain equations
on the semantic side guarantee the existence of a translation from one side to the other.
A similar framework of algebraic implicative logics was developed by Petr Cintula and
Carles Noguera in [41].
For axiomatic extensions ofMAILL including (PRL) and (DIS), which incidentally are
axiomatic extensions of UL, a stronger result is folklore, namely completeness with re-
spect to all linearly ordered C-algebras, i.e. C-algebras where the lattice order is total. Let
Lin(C) denote the class of all linearly ordered C-algebras, also called C-chains. To prove
linear completeness, we construct a linearly ordered Lindenbaum algebra, the existence of
which is ensured by the presences of (PRL) in C and the proof-by-cases property enforced
by (DIS) (see e.g. [96]).
Theorem 2.5 (Strong Linear Completeness). For any axiomatic extension C of UL and
any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm:
Γ `C ϕ iﬀ Γ |=Lin(C) ϕ .
Note that because (DIS) is provable in any extension of MAILL that includes (W)
and (PRL), this theorem covers, among many others, all the logics in Table 2.3 except
ML and IL. In particular, it covers all the logics in Table 2.3 which are considered to
be fuzzy logics. In fact, enjoying linear completeness is often seen as the characteristic
property of fuzzy logics (see e.g. [35]). However, fuzzy logics were often designed with a
certain intended semantics in mind, which is usually a (class of) algebra(s) with the real
unit interval [0, 1] as universe. This is why it is an interesting and important question,
whether the mentioned logics enjoy completeness with respect to the so-called standard
algebras, a question that is generally much harder to answer (compared to the question
of linear completeness).
In order to deﬁne the standard algebras in BPCRL, we make use of the notion of
uninorms and t-norms. A uninorm is a binary operation ∗ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] on the closed
real unit interval that is commutative, associative, monotone, and has a unit element
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e∗ ∈ [0, 1]. A uninorm ∗ is called left-continuous or right-continuous, if for all a, b ∈ [0, 1],∨
c<a
(c ∗ b) = a ∗ b or
∧
a<c
(c ∗ b) = a ∗ b ,
respectively. It is called continuous, if it is left- and right-continuous. Furthermore, a
uninorm ∗ is called conjunctive if for all a ∈ [0, 1], a ∗ 0 = 0. Most notably, a uninorm ∗
is called a t-norm (short for triangular norm) if the unit element for ∗ is 1, i.e. e∗ = 1.
Example 2.6. Let us list the three main examples of continuous t-norms:
• Łukasiewicz t-norm: a ∗L b = max(0, a+ b− 1) ,
• product t-norm: a ∗P b = a · b (the usual product of reals),
• Gödel t-norm: a∗G b = min(a, b) (also called the mininum t-norm or just min).
An example of a left-continuous t-norm that is not continuous is the nilpotent minimum
t-norm:
a ∗NM b =
min(a, b) if a+ b > 1 ,0 otherwise .
If a uninorm ∗ is left-continuous and conjunctive (or a left-continuous t-norm), the fol-
lowing condition determines a unique binary operation →∗ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1], called the
residuum of ∗: for all a, b, c ∈ [0, 1],
a ∗ b ≤ c iﬀ a ≤ b→∗ c ,
or, equivalently: for all a, b ∈ [0, 1],
a→∗ b = max{c ∈ [0, 1] | a ∗ c ≤ b} .
In this case, the uninorm (or the t-norm) is called residuated (cf. [96]).
Example 2.7. The residual operations of the four t-norms in Example 2.6 are as follows:
a→∗ b = 1, if a ≤ b,
and if a > b, then we have for the
• Łukasiewicz implication: a→L b = 1− (a− b) ,
• product implication: a→Π b = ba ,
• Gödel implication: a→G b = b ,
• nilpotent minimum implication: a→NM b = max(1− a, b) .
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Remark 2.8. Let us mention that the continuous t-norms are completely classiﬁed by
the Mostert-Shields Theorem [98]. It says that a t-norm is continuous if and only if it
is isomorphic to an ordinal sum of the Gödel t-norm, the Łukasiewicz t-norm, and the
product t-norm. In Section 2.2, we will present the logics determined by these three
fundamental continuous t-norms.
An A ∈ BPCRL is called standard, if its bounded lattice reduct is 〈[0, 1],min,max, 0, 1〉,
& is a residuated uninorm,→ is its residuum, and e its unit (f can be any value in [0, 1]).
For an axiomatic extension C of MAILL, the class of all standard C-algebras will be
denoted by Std(C). In this case, we will say that a logic L, axiomatized by an axiomatic
extension C of MAILL, enjoys (ﬁnite) strong standard completeness if for any (ﬁnite)
set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm:
Γ `C ϕ iﬀ Γ |=Std(C) ϕ .
Example 2.9. In the next section, we will see that MTL and G enjoy strong standard
completeness, while BL, SBL (see [34]), L, and P are ﬁnitely strongly complete with
respect to their standard algebras. In fact, L, P, and G, are ﬁnitely strongly complete
with respect to just one standard algebra, respectively, namely the standard algebras
determined by the Łukasiewicz t-norm, the product t-norm, and the Gödel t-norm. In
the case of G, this is also true for inﬁnite sets of premises.
Furthermore, the logicsMTLn, SMTL, and IMTL enjoy strong standard completeness.
This was proved in [33] and [53] by extending the methods used in [79], where strong
standard completeness of MTL was shown.
In [94], Metcalfe and Montagna prove strong standard completeness of UL, where
Std(UL) is the class of all standard algebras in BPCRL, thus justifying the choice of
the name uninorm logic. For their proof, the authors show in a ﬁrst step the strong
standard completeness of UL extended with a density rule (introduced in [118]) and in
a second step, using hypersequent calculi, they prove that this density rule is admissible
in UL. Whether also IUL enjoys (ﬁnite) strong standard completeness, however, is still
an open question.
Another Syntactic Side
The approach taken by Metcalfe and Montagna in [94] represents a further popular way to
introduce and study logics (next to specifying classes of algebras or Hilbert-style calculi),
namely by specifying a set of axioms and rules in a Gentzen-style system (which includes
sequent and hypersequent calculi). Sequent calculi were ﬁrst introduced by Gerhard
Gentzen, who presented the sequent calculi LK and LJ for ﬁrst-order classical logic and
intuitionistic logic in [61]. In fact, it was these calculi that gave the deﬁning motivation
for the introduction of substructural logics, namely by the removal of structural rules such
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as exchange, weakening, and contraction from either LK or LJ (see e.g. [109]). The ﬁrst
hypersequent calculus was then introduced by Arnon Avron in [3] as a generalization of
sequent calculi in order to provide a Gentzen-style system for the relevance logic RM.
While Hilbert-style calculi provide very useful frameworks for classifying logics, estab-
lishing certain properties, and providing tight connections to algebraic semantics, they
are less suitable as frameworks for theorem-proving and establishing algorithmic proper-
ties. This is where e.g. Gentzen-style systems come in handy, which in many cases can
be shown to be analytic, that is, proofs in these systems can be built completely from
subformulas of the formula to be proved, in which case proof-search usually presents
an algorithmic decision procedure. The analyticity of a Gentzen-style system is usually
proved by cut-elimination, i.e. a (preferably syntactic) proof that the only non-analytic
rule, (CUT), is admissible in the system.
The monograph [96], by Metcalfe, Olivetti, and Gabbay, gives an overview of hyper-
sequent calculi used for fuzzy logics, as in these cases, regular sequent calculi are less
suitable. They provide proofs of the admissibility of (CUT) and certain density rules for
many cases, thus being able to establish (not necessarily unknown) complexity bounds
and strong standard completeness results for many of the fuzzy logics discussed in this
chapter.
Note that Genzten-style systems are not the only kinds of calculi that can be analytic,
also resolution, display logic, and tableau systems frequently have this property. In
Chapter 6, we will present analytic tableau calculi for certain Gödel modal logics.
2.2 Monoidal T-Norm Logic and Axiomatic Extensions
After giving a very general view on some substructural logics in the last section, we will
now take closer look at (some of) the logics we will be concerned with in the rest of this
thesis, namely the fuzzy logic MTL and its axiomatic extensions BL, L, P, and G.
Recall that in the presence of the axiom (W) (ϕ → e) ∧ (f → ϕ), the connectives e
and >, as well as f and ⊥, collapse. This is why, unless stated otherwise, we will ﬁx the
algebraic language L to consist of the four binary connectives, ∧ (weak conjunction), ∨
(weak disjunction), & (strong conjunction), and→ (implication), and two constants,
⊥ (falsum) and > (verum), for the rest of this chapter. We will also use the deﬁned
symbols ¬ (negation) and ↔ (equivalence), deﬁned by ¬ϕ = ϕ → ⊥ and ϕ ↔ ψ =
(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
Remark 2.10. In fact, in the setting of MTL, also ∨ and > can be deﬁned using the
remaining connectives in L: ϕ∨ψ = ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ)∧ ((ψ → ϕ)→ ϕ) and > = ⊥ → ⊥.
So, for our purposes, ∧, &, →, and ⊥ would be the only necessary symbols, but for the
sake of a familiar presentation, we will treat all the connectives in L as primitive.
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Monoidal T-Norm Logic
Monoidal t-norm logic MTL was introduced in [54] by Francesc Esteva and Lluís Godo
as the logic axiomatized by some Hilbert-style calculus (slightly diﬀerent from MTL
deﬁned above), but the intention was that MTL should be the logic of left-continuous
t-norms, which was later conﬁrmed by Sándor Jenei and Franco Montagna in [79]. In
fact, left-continuity is the weakest property that ensures that a t-norm has a residuum.
Let us recall that MTL is the subvariety of BPCRL where the conditions (int) and
(prl) are satisﬁed, that is, it is the variety of prelinear commutative bounded integral
residuated lattices. Put in terms of the restricted language L,
A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉
belongs to MTL if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
• 〈A,∧,∨,⊥,>〉 is a bounded lattice,
• 〈A,&,>〉 is a commutative monoid,
• & and → form a residuated pair, i.e. a& b ≤ c iﬀ a ≤ b→ c, for all a, b, c ∈ A,
• A is prelinear, i.e. (a→ b) ∨ (b→ a) = > is satisﬁed for all a, b ∈ A.
As now the top element of the lattice corresponds with the unit of the monoid, the
deﬁnition of consequence in an A ∈MTL simpliﬁes as follows: given a subset Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊆
Fm and an A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 ∈ MTL, Γ |=A ϕ if and only if v(ϕ) = > for all
A-evaluations v such that v[Γ] ⊆ {>}.
By general completeness, it makes sense to call algebras in MTL also MTL-algebras.
Furthermore, recall that an A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 is a standard MTL-algebra, if
A = [0, 1], the closed real unit interval, ∧ and ∨ are minimum and maximum, respectively,
& is a left-continuous t-norm and → its residuum, and ⊥ = 0 and > = 1. The following
standard completeness result was proved in [79], making it clear that Esteva and Godo
were justiﬁed in calling MTL the logic of left-continuous t-norms.
Theorem 2.11 (Strong Standard Completeness of MTL [79]). For any Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ `MTL ϕ iﬀ Γ |=Std(MTL) ϕ .
Even though decidability of both the validity problem as well as the ﬁnitary consequence
problem for MTL were established by Ono in [100], heavily relying on results in [16],
determining upper complexity bounds for these decision problems remains open (cf. [74]).
Theorem 2.12 (Decidability of MTL [16, 100]). The validity problem and the ﬁnitary
consequence problem for MTL are decidable.
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An important property of MTL and its axiomatic extensions is that they validate the
local deduction theorem (see e.g. [109]; recall that for any formula ϕ ∈ Fm, ϕ0 = >, and
for any natural number n ≥ 1, ϕn = ϕn−1 & ϕ).
Theorem 2.13 (Local Deduction Theorem). Let C be an axiomatic extension ofMTL,
then for any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ ∪ {ϕ} `C ψ iﬀ Γ `C ϕn → ψ , for some n ∈ N .
Hajék's Basic Logic
Petr Hájek introduced the so called basic logic BL via a Hilbert-style axiomatization in
his seminal work on mathematical fuzzy logics [67]. His intention, that BL is the logic
of continuous t-norms, was later conﬁrmed by Roberto Cignoli, Francesc Esteva, Lluís
Godo, and Antoni Torrens in [34]. Continuous t-norms play a crucial role for the fuzzy
logics studied in this thesis, enjoy nice properties, and were classiﬁed completely (see
Remark 2.8).
Remark 2.14. Note that BL proves the formulas (ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ (ϕ & (ϕ → ψ)) and thus
the connective ∧ becomes deﬁnable. So, for BL and all its axiomatic extensions, the
only necessary connectives would be &, →, and ⊥, but we will continue to treat all the
connectives of L as primitive.
Let us recall that an algebraA = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 ∈MTL belongs to BL if it satisﬁes
the condition (div), i.e. that for all a, b ∈ A:
a ∧ b = a& (a→ b) .
Thus, the class BL for L can be deﬁned as the variety of all divisible MTL-algebras, also
called BL-algebras. Furthermore, recall that the standard BL-algebras A ∈ Std(BL) for
L are of the form
A = 〈[0, 1],min,max,&,→, 0, 1〉 ,
where & is a continuous t-norm and → its residuum. Note that while the consequence
relations |=BL and |=Std(MTL) are both ﬁnitary, the consequence relation |=Std(BL) is not.
This is the reason that the following theorem, proved in [34], is only formulated for ﬁnite
sets of formulas.
Theorem 2.15 (Finite Strong Standard Completeness for BL [34]). For any ﬁnite set
of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ `BL ϕ iﬀ Γ |=Std(BL) ϕ .
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For BL, in contrast to MTL, not only the decidability of the validity and the ﬁnitary
consequence problem are known, but also the complexity bounds for these decision prob-
lems. The complexity of the validity problem was obtained in [6] and the complexity of
the problem of ﬁnitary consequence can be inferred from these results (see e.g. [74]).
Theorem 2.16 (Decidability and Complexity of BL [6]). The validity problem and the
ﬁnitary consequence problem for BL are coNP-complete.
Furthermore, the fact that BL is an axiomatic extension of MTL ensures that BL satisﬁes
the local deduction theorem (see Theorem 2.13 above).
Łukasiewicz Logic
Jan Łukasiewicz was the ﬁrst person to mention publicly a three-valued logic in a speech
in 1918 and thus marked the beginning of the study of many-valued logics. He later
elaborated the topic in the published speech [89] and went on to deﬁne an inﬁnite-valued
version of his three-valued logic in [91]. In this work, he introduced a Hilbert-style
calculus (quite diﬀerent from L given in Table 2.3) that he conjectured to axiomatize
the set of Ł-valid formulas, Ł being the algebra we now call the standard Łukasiewicz
algebra (see below). The ﬁrst published proof of this conjecture was given by Alan Rose
and John Barkley Rosser in [112].
For historical reasons, we denote the class of algebras with respect to which Łukasie-
wicz logic is strongly complete byMV, for many-valued algebras. This term was coined
by Chen Chung Chang, who ﬁrst introduced this class of algebras in [25] and proved that
it determines the same logic as Łukasiewicz's Hilbert-style calculus.4 This important
class of algebras has received a great deal of attention in its own right. For a recent
exposition on the subject, see e.g. [46].
Recall that we can deﬁne MV (for language L) as the variety of BL-algebras A =
〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 such that for all a ∈ A, the following equation is satisﬁed:
¬¬a = a ,
recalling that ¬a = a → ⊥. This condition is often called double-negation elimination
and in this case, the negation is called involutive.
There is one algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 ∈ MV ⊆ BL ⊆ MTL, which we will
call the standard L-algebra (or standard Łukasiewicz algebra). It will be denoted by Ł and
is deﬁned as follows: A = [0, 1], ∧ and ∨ denote minimum and maximum, respectively,
& is the Łukasiewicz t-norm ∗L,→ is the Łukasiewicz implication→L, ⊥ = 0, and > = 1.
4Let us note that the language originally used to deﬁne MV in [25] was quite diﬀerent than the
languages we use in Sections 2.1 and 2.2
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That is, the standard L-algebra is
Ł = 〈[0, 1],min,max, ∗L,→L, 0, 1〉 ,
recalling that for all a, b ∈ [0, 1], a ∗L b = max(0, a+ b− 1) and
a→L b =
1 if a ≤ b ,1− (a− b) otherwise .
This algebra provides the intended semantics for Łukasiewicz logic and thus the ﬁnite
strong completeness of L with respect to the standard Łukasiewicz algebra Ł is a very
important result proved by Louise Hay in [76], noting that the consequence relation |=Ł
is not ﬁnitary.5
Theorem 2.17 (Finite Strong Standard Completeness of L [76]). For any ﬁnite set
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ `L ϕ iﬀ Γ |=Ł ϕ .
While decidability was well-known, coNP-completeness of the validity problem for L was
proved by Daniele Mundici in [99], essentially by reducing the problem to the validity
problem for ﬁnite L-algebras. The complexity of the problem of ﬁnitary consequence for
L was later obtained as a consequence of Mundici's work (cf. [74]).
Theorem 2.18 (Decidability and Complexity of L [99]). The validity problem and the
ﬁnitary consequence problem for L are coNP-complete.
Product Logic
Product logic was introduce by Hájek, Godo, and Esteva in [72] as the logic of the product
t-norm, which is just the operation of multiplication on the reals.6 Product logic has
since been studied intensively, as it is based on one of the three fundamental continuous
t-norms (see Remark 2.8).
Recall that the variety P (in language L) can be deﬁned as a subvariety of BL of all
A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 ∈ BL such that for all a, b ∈ A:
¬a ∨ ((a→ (a& b))→ b) = > ,
5Let us remark that it is an open discussion in the mathematical logic community, whether Łukasiewicz
logic should be deﬁned as the logic determined by the axiomatization given in [91] or by the standard
Łukasiewicz algebra, which is widely held to be the intended semantics. As these consequence relations
diverge when it comes to inﬁnite sets of premises, this discussion is not idle. We chose the former
approach in this thesis not so much as to take a stance in the discussion, but for the sake of uniform
presentation in this chapter. Obviously, these discussions arise also for Hájek's basic logic, product logic,
and many other logics.
6Similar to the case of L, we deﬁne product logic P as given by the ﬁnitary consequence relation `P
(c.f. Table 2.3), which is a choice motivated by the beneﬁts of a uniform presentation.
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which is often called the cancellation condition. It is shown in [72] that P is ﬁnitely
strongly complete with respect to the standard P-algebra
P = 〈[0, 1],min,max, ∗P,→P, 0, 1〉 ,
recalling that for all a, b ∈ [0, 1], a ∗P b = a · b and
a→P b =
1 if a ≤ b ,b
a otherwise .
Theorem 2.19 (Finite Strong Standard Completeness of P [72]). For a ﬁnite set of
formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ `P ϕ iﬀ Γ |=P ϕ .
Decidability and complexity results for the validity problem for P were established in [5],
using a reduction to validity in Łukasiewicz logic L. The complexity of the ﬁnitary con-
sequence problem can be inferred from the complexity of the validity problem (see [74]).
Theorem 2.20 (Decidability and Complexity of P [5]). The validity problem and the
ﬁnitary consequence problem for P are coNP-complete.
Gödel Logic
What we call propositional Gödel logic G in this work was not technically introduced
by Kurt Gödel, contrary to what the name might suggest. Following his proof that the
semantics of intuitionistic logic could not be ﬁnite-valued, Gödel noted that there are
at least countably inﬁnitely many logics intermediate in strength between intuitionistic
propositional logic IL and classical propositional logic CL (see [62]). The logics he men-
tioned are what we now would call ﬁnite-valued Gödel logics. There is exactly one such
logic Gn for each natural number n ≥ 2, where n is the number of truth-values.
Michael Dummett developed Gödel's ideas further, introducing inﬁnite-valued Gödel
logic in [50]. This is why this inﬁnite-valued variant is often called Gödel-Dummett logic
or Dummett's logic LC.
To be precise, Gödel and Dummett both considered the logics they were talking
about as sets of valid formulas. As in this work we understand a logic as a consequence
relation, Gödel and Dummett were in fact talking about what we will denote here by
Val(G), the set of G-valid formulas, also called tautologies or 1-tautologies of G. Making
this distinction here is important, as Dummett, in some sense, deﬁned Val(G) by taking
the intersection of all ﬁnite-valued Gödel logics, that is
Val(G) =
⋂
n≥2
Val(Gn) .
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This equality is not true when we consider Gödel logic as a consequence relation, i.e.
G 6= ⋂n≥2 Gn. However, in [9], Matthias Baaz and Richard Zach prove that at least
G (
⋂
n≥2
Gn ,
their proof being a consequence of a study of Gödel logic over diﬀerent inﬁnite sets of
truth-values, something we will also look at later in this work.
We note that the variety of Gödel algebras G (for language L) can be deﬁned as the
subvariety of MTL of all algebras A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 ∈ MTL with an idempotent
monoidal operation, that is, the following identity is satisﬁed for all a ∈ A:
a = a& a .
Remark 2.21. In fact, an MTL-algebra with an idempotent monoidal operation is di-
visible. For this reason, G is not only a subvariety of MTL, but also of BL.
The standard G-algebra (or standard Gödel algebra) A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 ∈ G is
deﬁned as follows: A = [0, 1], ∧ and ∨ denote minimum and maximum, respectively, & is
the Gödel t-norm ∗G and → the Gödel implication →G, and ⊥ = 0 and > = 1, recalling
that for all a, b ∈ [0, 1], a ∗G b = min(a, b) and
a→G b =
1 if a ≤ b ,b otherwise .
The standard G-algebra A will be denoted by G, and because ∧ and & both denote
the minimum operation on the real unit interval [0, 1], we will omit writing &. In other
words, the standard G-algebra will be denoted by
G = 〈[0, 1],min,max,→G, 0, 1〉 .
Apart from the collapse of & and ∧, the idempotency of the t-norm also has the eﬀect
that ϕn is equivalent to ϕ, for all n ∈ N+ and all ϕ ∈ Fm (recall that ϕn = ϕ& . . .& ϕ,
for n copies of ϕ). Therefore, the local deduction theorem for G can be strengthened to
the classical form.
Theorem 2.22 (Deduction Theorem for G). For any subset Γ ∪ {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ ∪ {ϕ} `G ψ iﬀ Γ `G ϕ→ ψ .
The fact that Thm(G) = Val(G) was proved by Dummett in [50], which implies ﬁnite
strong completeness of G with respect to G, using the fact that G validates the (classical)
deduction theorem. It is worth noting that in contrast to |=Std(BL), |=Ł, and |=P, the
consequence relation |=G is ﬁnitary (see e.g. [67]), which allows for strong standard
completeness even for inﬁnite sets of premises.
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Theorem 2.23 (Strong Standard Completeness of G [50]). For any set of formulas
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ `G ϕ iﬀ Γ |=G ϕ .
A proof of coNP-completeness of the validity problem for G can be found in [5]. The
authors of that proof, however, claim that the result was already folklore. The fact
that also the ﬁnitary consequence problem is coNP-complete then follows directly by the
deduction theorem.
Theorem 2.24 (Decidability and Complexity of G [5]). The validity problem and the
ﬁnitary consequence problem for G are coNP-complete.
An important feature of the standard Gödel algebra G is that all connectives in L,
because the additive connective & coincides with the lattice connective ∧, are interpreted
by algebraic operations that depend solely on the lattice order of G or the constants,
that is, these operations can be deﬁned by quantiﬁer-free ﬁrst-order formulas using ∧, ∨,
and constants in L as the only function symbols and identity as the only relation symbol.
Logics where all connectives are interpreted by operations that depend only on the order
will be called order-based. We will say more about them in Chapter 3. While G is an
example of an order-based logic, L and P are not, as strong conjunction and implication
in these logics depend also on addition and multiplication, respectively.
Another important feature of Gödel logic is the fact that it is a so-called intermediate
or superintuitionistic logic, that is, G is intermediate in strength between intuitionistic
logic IL and classical logic CL, i.e.
IL ( G ( CL ,
as we have already seen in Figure 2.1. Furthermore, it is well known that adding the
law of the excluded middle (LEM) ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ as an axiom either to IL or to G would yield
classical propositional logic CL, i.e. CL = `IL∪{(LEM)} = `G∪{(LEM)}.
Furthermore, for each natural number n ≥ 2, let us deﬁne the algebra
Gn = 〈{0, 1n−1 , . . . , n−2n−1 , 1},min,max,→G, 0, 1〉 ,
which clearly is a subalgebra of G. We will then denote by Gn the logic given by the
ﬁnitary consequence relation |=Gn , which is the ﬁnite-valued Gödel logic with n diﬀerent
truth-values. For each n ≥ 2, Gn can be axiomatized by adding the following axiom to G:
(FINn) (ϕ0 → ϕ1) ∨ (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∨ . . . ∨ (ϕn−2 → ϕn−1) ∨ (ϕn−1 → ϕn) .
This shows that for any natural number n ≥ 2, Gn is an axiomatic extension of IL and
thus an intermediate logic between IL and CL. In fact it is even true that G2 = CL, and
we get the following inclusions:
IL ( G ( . . . ( Gn ( . . . ( G4 ( G3 ( G2 = CL .
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Summing up, we can see that Gödel logic G has many nice properties which make it a
logic well worth studying in detail:
• G is strongly complete with respect to the standard Gödel algebra G, even when
inﬁnite sets of premises are considered (in contrast to BL, L, and P)
• G is the logic of the minimum t-norm, one of the three fundamental continuous
t-norms, which together, as an ordinal sum, compose every continuous t-norm,
• G validates the (classical) deduction theorem (in contrast to MTL, BL, L, and P),
• G is an order-based logic (in contrast to MTL, BL, L, and P),
• G is an intermediate logic, i.e. IL ( G ( CL (in contrast to MTL, BL, L, and P).
2.3 Adding Modal Operators
While in the last sections we looked at axiomatic extensions of MTL in the algebraic
language L = {∧,∨,&,→,>,⊥}, the symbols of which we call propositional connectives,
we will in this section study these logics under the expansion by two further unary
connectives, the well-known modal operators box  and diamond ♦, also called modal
connectives. The box-connective is often understood as expressing the necessity of the
formula it precedes, or that the succeeding formula is known or provable, while the
diamond-connective is often taken to express possibility or that the formula succeeding
it is consistent with one's knowledge.
There are diﬀerent ways to specify many-valued modal logics. In this work, we choose
a semantic approach, which in the present case is either through Kripke-style semantics,
as studied by Saul Kripke and others for the classical case (see [80, 8487]), or through
neighbourhood semantics, introduced in the classical setting independently by Dana Scott
in [115] and Richard Montague in [97].7 In this section, we will only introduce the Kripke-
style semantics for the many-valued setting, reserving the introduction of many-valued
neighbourhood semantics for Chapter 7, where we will present some new results in that
area.
Given an MTL-algebra A, for the Kripke-style semantics over A, we have a set of
(possible) worlds, an accessibility relation on this set, and at each world, proposi-
tional connectives are interpreted by operations in A. That is, for each world x, there
is a diﬀerent A-evaluation vx : Var→ A, which is extended for the propositional connect-
ives by operations in A, while the modal connectives  and ♦ are understood as inﬁmum
and supremum in A, respectively, over all worlds which are accessible to some degree.
7Two excellent reference books for classical modal logics are [15] and [32]
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One of the ﬁrst to take this approach of deﬁning many-valued modal logics over
Kripke frames where locally at each world, formulas are interpreted in some algebra was
Melvin Fitting in [57] and [58], where he considered Kripke models over ﬁnite Heyting
algebras. The approach was further developed systematically by Felix Bou, Francesc
Esteva, Lluís Godo, and Ricardo Rodríguez in [21], where classes of Kripke models over
(ﬁnite) residuated lattices are studied. Kripke models over more speciﬁc algebras were
subsequently studied by many authors, including most notably the standard L-, P-, and
G-algebra. This line of research on many-valued modal logics will be roughly outlined in
the present section.
Frames and Models
Fixing L = {∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>}, we consider the language Lm = L ∪ {,♦} with the
two additional unary modal connectives  and ♦. The set of formulas FmLm is then
deﬁned inductively for the language Lm over the countably inﬁnite set Var, its members
denoted by ϕ,ψ, χ . . .. We will call formulas of the form ϕ and ♦ϕ box-formulas and
diamond-formulas, respectively. Furthermore, we let Fm denote the set of formulas for
the language L ∪ {} and similarly Fm♦ denotes the set of formulas for L ∪ {♦}. The
box-fragment or diamond-fragment of a many-valued modal logic L, denoted by L or
L♦, is L restricted to Fm or Fm♦, respectively. When the language is clear from the
context, we will write Fm instead of FmLm .
An algebra A ∈MTL is called complete if ∨B and ∧B exist in A, for any (inﬁnite)
subset B ⊆ A. For the remainder of this chapter, we will restrict our discussion to
complete MTL-algebras, and thus, unless stated otherwise, A will denote a complete
MTL-algebra.
Remark 2.25. Note that the restriction to complete algebras is not so much a choice
as a necessity, as our semantic deﬁnitions below would not make much sense without it
(we would have formulas with undeﬁned truth-values). This restriction follows some of
the literature, while other authors restrict to so-called safe models, which might yield
diﬀerent logics in certain cases.
We deﬁne an A-frame as a pair 〈W,R〉 such that W is a non-empty set of worlds and
R : W ×W → A is an A-accessibility relation on W . An A-frame 〈W,R〉 is called
• crisp, if Rxy ∈ {⊥,>}, for all x, y ∈W ,
• reﬂexive, if Rxx = >, for all x ∈W ,
• transitive, if Rxy &Ryz ≤ Rxz, for all x, y, z ∈W , and
• symmetric, if Rxy = Ryx, for all x, y ∈W .
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If 〈W,R〉 is a crisp A-frame, we will also say that R is crisp and often write R ⊆W ×W
and Rxy to mean Rxy = >. Note that what we call a crisp A-frame is exactly what is
usually called a Kripke frame in the literature on classical modal logics (see e.g. [15]).
We will denote by
• K, the class of all A-frames,
• T, the class of all reﬂexive A-frames,
• S4, the class of all reﬂexive and transitive A-frames,
• S5, the class of all reﬂexive, transitive, and symmetric A-frames, and
• given a class of A-frames F, Fc will denote the subclass of its crisp members.
AnA-model is a tripleM = 〈W,R, V 〉 such that 〈W,R〉 is anA-frame and V : Var×W →
A is a mapping, called an A-valuation. V will be extended to V : Fm×W → A such that
locally at each world x ∈ W , V acts as an A-evaluation vx for propositional formulas
and interprets  and ♦ as inﬁmum and supremum over all worlds which are accessible
from x to some degree, that is, for all x ∈W :
V (⊥, x) = ⊥ ,
V (>, x) = > ,
V (ϕ ∧ ψ, x) = V (ϕ, x) ∧ V (ψ, x) ,
V (ϕ ∨ ψ, x) = V (ϕ, x) ∨ V (ψ, x) ,
V (ϕ& ψ, x) = V (ϕ, x) & V (ψ, x) ,
V (ϕ→ ψ, x) = V (ϕ, x)→ V (ψ, x) ,
V (ϕ, x) =
∧
{Rxy → V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W} ,
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∨
{Rxy & V (ϕ, y)) | y ∈W} .
For a class of A-frames F, we will say that an A-model 〈W,R, V 〉 is an F(A)-model, if
it is based on a A-frame 〈W,R〉 ∈ F and we will denote the class of all F(A)-models by
F(A).
Recall that a Kc(A)-model 〈W,R, V 〉 satisﬁes the extra condition that 〈W,R〉 is a
crisp A-frame. In this case, the conditions for  and ♦ simplify to
V (ϕ, x) =
∧
{V (ϕ, y) | Rxy} ,
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∨
{V (ϕ, y) | Rxy} .
Let F be a class of A-frames, Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm a set of formulas, and M = 〈W,R, V 〉 an
F(A)-model. The formula ϕ is called an M-consequence of Γ, if V (ϕ, x) = > for all
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x ∈W such that V [Γ, x] = {V (ψ, x) | ψ ∈ Γ} ⊆ {>}. Moreover, ϕ will be called valid in
M, if V (ϕ, x) = > for all x ∈ W , written M |=F(A) ϕ. We will also write M |=F(A) Γ, if
M |=F(A) ψ, for all ψ ∈ Γ. We will say that ϕ is a local F(A)-consequence of Γ, written
Γ |=lF(A) ϕ, if ϕ is an M-consequence of Γ, for all F(A)-models M, and ϕ will be called
a global F(A)-consequence of Γ, written Γ |=gF(A) ϕ, if M |=F(A) ϕ, for all F(A)-models
such that M |=F(A) Γ.
It is quite obvious that for any ϕ ∈ Fm and any class of A-frames F, ∅ |=lF(A) ϕ iﬀ
∅ |=gF(A) ϕ, in which case we will say that ϕ is F(A)-valid, written |=F(A) ϕ. As we will
almost exclusively deal with global consequence in the present work, we will often write
Γ |=F(A) ϕ to mean Γ |=gF(A) ϕ.
We will denote by K(A) the logic deﬁned by setting K(A) = |=K(A) and the set of
all K(A)-valid formulas by Val(K(A)) = {ϕ ∈ Fm | |=K(A) ϕ}. As the logic K(A) is
obtained by considering all A-frames, it is the weakest modal logic based on A-frames,
also called in [21] the minimum many-valued modal logic overA. Furthermore, let Kc(A),
T(A), Tc(A), S4(A), S4c(A), S5(A), and S5c(A) denote the stronger modal logics over
A deﬁned by the consequence relations |=Kc(A), |=T(A), |=Tc(A), |=S4(A), |=S4c(A), |=S5(A),
and |=S5c(A), respectively.
Given a class of A-frames F, an F(A)-model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 is called ﬁnite or count-
able, if its set of worlds W is ﬁnite or countable, respectively. Furthermore, for a logic
L for Lm, we will say that L has the ﬁnite model property with respect to F(A), if for all
ϕ ∈ Fm, ϕ is valid in L if and only if ϕ is valid in all ﬁnite F(A)-models.
Remark 2.26. Let us point out a diﬃculty that arises with the increase of expressive
power by expanding with modal connectives. For two algebras A,B ∈MTL determining
the same valid formulas on the propositional level, i.e. for any non-modal formula ϕ ∈
FmL, |=A ϕ iﬀ |=B ϕ, we might obtain two diﬀerent modal logics, i.e. for two modal
formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ FmLm : |=K(A) ψ but 6|=K(B) ψ. This diﬃculty was pointed out in
[22] and will become clear when we study diﬀerent modal Gödel logics over diﬀerent
subalgebras of the standard Gödel algebra G in Section 3.2.
Remark 2.27. Another diﬃculty is that in the absence of involutive negation, the box
and diamond connectives are not interdeﬁnable (in contrast to the classical case). This
is why both connectives are added as primitive in the present setting. Because of this
diﬃculty, some of the discussions of many-valued modal logics in the literature consider
the box- and diamond-fragments separately.
Modal Logics over MTL-Algebras
Let us present some known results about many-valued modal logics based on K(A)-
models over complete MTL-algebras A. One of the most relevant studies of these logics
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is [21], where the minimum modal logics over complete bounded pointed commutative
residuated lattices are considered (possibly with additional constants). For example,
axiomatizations are presented for the box-fragments of K(A) and Kc(A) for ﬁnite MTL-
algebras A (and other algebras) with additional canonical constants, for the crisp logic,
only in the case where A has a unique coatom. Even though these results are very
interesting, they cannot easily be generalized to inﬁnite MTL-algebras or MTL-algebras
without canonical constants or a unique coatom. As the present work focuses mainly on
inﬁnite MTL-algebras, we will not present these results in detail here.
Nevertheless, let us highlight the following interesting K(A)- and Kc(A)-validities,
for any complete MTL-algebra A, presented in [21]. Obviously, they are then also valid
in every (crisp) many-valued modal logic over a complete BL-, L-, P-, or G-algebra.
Proposition 2.28 ([21]). Let A be a complete MTL-algebra and ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm, then the
following formulas are valid in K(A):
• (ϕ ∧ψ)↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ)
• ¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ
Additionally, the following formulas are valid in Kc(A):
• (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
• (ϕ&ψ)→ (ϕ& ψ)
This shows that the normality axiom (K) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ) is valid in all crisp
many-valued modal logics considered in this work. However, this is not true for some of
their non-crisp versions.
Furthermore, in [68], Hájek established decidability of the validity and satisﬁability
problem for fuzzy description logics based on continuous t-norms with respect to wit-
nessed interpretations, i.e. where each supremum or inﬁmum is actually a maximum or
minimum, respectively. As we can view many-valued modal logics as fragments of their
description logic counterparts, these results imply the decidability of the validity and sat-
isﬁability problem for the logics determined by all witnessed K(A)-models over standard
BL-algebras A. Note, however, that in general, K(A) is not complete with respect to
witnessed K(A)-models (except, for example, when A is Ł (see below)).
We now turn our attention to many-valued modal logics based on K(A)-models where
A is the standard Łukasiewicz, product, or Gödel algebra, respectively (or ﬁnite subal-
gebras thereof).
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Łukasiewicz Modal Logics
The most extensive study of Łukasiewicz modal logics is [75] by Georges Hansoul and
Bruno Teheux. They use methods from abstract algebraic logic to study Łukasiewicz
modal logics based on crisp K(A)-models, where A is Ł, the standard Łukasiewicz al-
gebra, or a ﬁnite subalgebra Łn of Ł with n evenly spaced elements. We will not go
into detail on their results here, as even just presenting them would require an extensive
elaboration of their algebraic framework. We will mention, however, that they are able to
axiomatize the logic Kc(Ł) in some sense, namely by using an inﬁnitary rule, which will
render some of the proofs in the calculus inﬁnitely long. Furthermore, for any natural
number n ≥ 2, they axiomatize the logic Kc(Łn) by a Hilbert-style calculus without any
inﬁnitary rules.
Furthermore, we note that while the Gödel modal logic K(G) and the product modal
logic K(P) are not complete with respect to witnessed Kripke models, the Łukasiewicz
modal logic K(Ł) is. This fact can easily be inferred from Hájek's result that ﬁrst-order
Łukasiewicz logic is complete with respect to witnessed structures [69, 70]. Recalling that
Hájek showed the decidability of the validity and satisﬁability problem for Łukasiewicz
modal logic (and others) based on all witnessed K(Ł)-models, this implies the ﬁnite
model property and the decidability of the satisﬁability and validity problem for K(Ł).
Moreover, using results about the one-variable fragment of the ﬁrst-order Łukasiewicz
logic, Hájek was able to show in [67] that the validities in the logic S5c(Ł) are recursively
enumerable, and thus he was able to obtain the decidability of the validity problem for
this logic by proving that it has the ﬁnite model property. Let us sum up with the
following two theorems:
Theorem 2.29 ([67, 68]). K(Ł) and S5c(Ł) have the ﬁnite model property with respect
to K(Ł) and S5c(Ł), respectively.
Theorem 2.30 ([67, 68]). The validity problems for K(Ł) and S5c(Ł) are decidable.
Finding ﬁnitary axiomatizations of inﬁnite-valued Łukasiewicz modal logics or answering
the questions of decidability for Łukasiewicz modal logics based on other classes of K(Ł)-
models remain open, however.
Product Modal Logics
The most extensive treatment of product modal logics is by Amanda Vidal, Francesc
Esteva, and Lluís Godo in [121], where they provide axiomatization results and study
the relationship between the Kripke-style semantics and the algebraic semantics of crisp
product modal logics. For their results, however, these authors depend on strong stand-
ard completeness for inﬁnite sets of premises, while for P, this is only given for ﬁ-
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(K) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ) (A1) (c→ ϕ)↔ (c→ ϕ)
(A♦1) (ϕ→ c)↔ (♦ϕ→ c) (A2) 4ϕ↔ 4ϕ
ϕ
(N) ϕ
Table 2.6: Modal Axioms and Rule for PKcl and PKcg
nite sets. For this reason, they add the Delta operator 4 (also known as the Baaz-
Monteiro operator, discussed in more detail in Chapter 3) to the algebraic language,
along with a constant symbol for each rational number in [0, 1]. In this way, for each
A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 ∈ P, they obtain the expansion A∞ = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,4,⊥,
>, {c | c ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q}〉 and set P∞ = {A∞ | A ∈ P}. Furthermore, they extend the
calculus P with suitable axioms to deal with 4 and the extra constants as well as two
inﬁnitary rules (i.e. rules with inﬁnite sets of premises) and denote this calculus by P∞.
Denoting by P∞ the standard P-algebra P = 〈[0, 1],min,max, ∗P,→P, 0, 1〉 expanded
with 4 and a constant for any element of [0, 1]∩Q, (inﬁnite) strong standard complete-
ness is achieved (a result proved by Petr Cintula in his PhD thesis [36]), that is, for any
set of non-modal formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ `P∞ ϕ iﬀ Γ |=P∞ ϕ iﬀ Γ |=P∞ ϕ .
Slightly abusing notation, for an algebraA ∈ P∞, certain classes ofA-frames are denoted
by F and the class of corresponding A-models by F(A).
Subsequently, strongly complete inﬁnitary axiomatizations (relying on inﬁnite proofs)
are provided in [121] for the local and global consequence relations |=lK(P∞) and |=gK(P∞).
These axiomatizations are denoted by PKcl and PKcg, respectively, and consist of adding
to P∞ the axioms and rule in Table 2.6, while for PKcl , the rule (N) can only be applied
to theorems.
Theorem 2.31 (Strong Standard Completeness for PKcl and PKcg [121]). For any set
of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ `PKcl ϕ iﬀ Γ |=lKc(P∞) ϕ and Γ `PKcg ϕ iﬀ Γ |=
g
Kc(P∞) ϕ .
In fact, Theorem 2.31 is extended in [121] such that the left equivalence is also true for
the subclasses of Tc(P∞)-, S4c(P∞)-, or S5c(P∞)-models, if the axioms (T) ϕ → ϕ,
or (4) ϕ→ ϕ and (T), or (5) ♦ϕ→ ϕ and (4) and (T) are added to PKcl ,
respectively.
Furthermore, in [31], description logics based on the standard product algebra P
are studied and decidability of the validity problem as well as the problem of positive
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(K) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ) (K♦) ♦(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (♦ϕ ∨ ♦ψ)
(Z) ¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ (Z♦) ♦¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬♦ϕ
(F♦) ¬♦⊥
(FS1) ♦(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ♦ψ) (FS2) (♦ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
ϕ
(N) ϕ
ϕ→ ψ
(N♦) ♦ϕ→ ♦ψ
Table 2.7: Modal Axioms and Rules of GK, GK♦, and GK
satisﬁability is established. The proof is based on an EXPTIME reduction to the pro-
positional product logic. As in the case for Łukasiewicz modal logic, this implies the
following theorem:
Theorem 2.32 ([31]). The validity problem and the problem of positive satisﬁability for
K(P) are decidable.
About product modal logics based on other classes of K(P)-models (where P is the stand-
ard P-algebra without4 or further constants), however, very little is known. Speciﬁcally,
issues of axiomatization and decidability present many open questions.
Gödel Modal Logics
Because of the nice properties of propositional Gödel logic listed in Section 2.2, the
study of Gödel modal logics is more advanced than for the other many-valued modal
logics mentioned above. Previous to the results presented in the subsequent chapters
of this work, many axiomatizability results, and even some decidability and complexity
results were already known for Gödel modal logics.
In [28], Xavier Caicedo and Ricardo Rodríguez axiomatized separately the box- and
the diamond-fragments of X(G), for X ∈ {K,T,S4, S5}. Consider the axioms and rules
in Table 2.7. When the axioms (K) and (Z) and the rule (N) are added to an
axiomatization of G, e.g. GK = G ∪ {(K), (Z), (N)}, a Hilbert-style axiomatization
of the box-fragment of K(G) is obtained. In fact, GK also axiomatizes the box-fragment
of Kc(G), as surprisingly, K(G) = Kc(G).
On the other hand, the Hilbert-style calculus GK♦ = G ∪{(K♦), (Z♦), (F♦), (N♦)} ax-
iomatizes the diamond-fragment of K(G). Moreover, the crisp diamond-fragment Kc(G)♦
was axiomatized by George Metcalfe and Nicola Olivetti in [95] by adding to the calculus
GK♦ the rule
ϕ ∨ (ψ → χ)
(N∗♦) ♦ϕ ∨ (♦ψ → ♦χ)
.
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In [29], Caicedo and Rodríguez proved that the Hilbert-style calculus GK, built from G
by adding all the axioms and rules in Table 2.7, i.e.
GK = G ∪ {(K), (Z), (K♦), (Z♦), (F♦), (FS1), (FS2), (N), (N♦)} ,
axiomatizes the full logic K(G). In fact, K(G) can also be axiomatized by adding the
prelinearity axiom (PRL) (ϕ → ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ) to a Hilbert-style axiomatization of the
intuitionistic modal logic IK (see [56]).
Furthermore, Gödel modal logics based on other classes of G-frames are axiomatized
by adding combinations of axioms in Table 2.8. Let GT = GK ∪ {(T), (T)}, GS4 =
GT ∪ {(4), (4)}, and GS5 = GS4 ∪ {(B1), (B2)}. We can summarize the above in the
following theorem.
(T) ϕ→ ϕ (T♦) ϕ→ ♦ϕ
(4) ϕ→ ϕ (4♦) ♦♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ
(B1) ϕ→ ♦ϕ (B2) ♦ϕ→ ϕ .
Table 2.8: Further Modal Axioms
Theorem 2.33 (Strong Standard Completeness of GK and axiomatic extensions [29]).
For any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
(a) Γ `GK ϕ iﬀ Γ |=K(G) ϕ ,
(b) Γ `GT ϕ iﬀ Γ |=T(G) ϕ ,
(c) Γ `GS4 ϕ iﬀ Γ |=S4(G) ϕ ,
(d) Γ `GS5 ϕ iﬀ Γ |=S5(G) ϕ .
We will denote these logics, as is usually done in the literature, by GK, GT, GS4, and
GS5, respectively, and their crisp counterparts by GKc, GTc, GS4c, and GS5c.
Decidability of the validity problem for the diamond-fragment GX♦, for X ∈ {K,T,
S4, S5}, was established in [28] by proving that it has the ﬁnite model property with
respect to the appropriate subclass of K(G). However, neither GKc♦ nor GK = GKc has
the ﬁnite model property with respect to Kc(G). This failure of the ﬁnite model property
is established by showing that the formulas (♦p→ ♦q)→ ((♦p→ ⊥)∨♦(p→ q)) ∈ Fm♦
(see [95]) and ¬¬p→ ¬¬p ∈ Fm (see [28]) are both valid in all ﬁnite Kc(G)-models,
but not in some inﬁnite Kc(G)-model (each formula in a diﬀerent one). As the inﬁnite
models where these formulas fail are both in S5c(G), the failure of the ﬁnite model
property with respect to appropriate subclasses of K(G) extends to the Gödel modal
logics GXc♦, GX, and GX
c
, for X ∈ {T,S4, S5}. Nevertheless, despite this failure of the
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ﬁnite model property, Metcalfe and Olivetti were able to establish decidability, indeed
PSPACE-completeness, of the validity problem for GKc♦ and GK in [95], using analytic
Gentzen-style proof systems.
Obviously, as both (♦p → ♦q) → ((♦p → ⊥) ∨ ♦(p → q)) and ¬¬p → ¬¬p are
formulas in Fm, also the full logics GK and GKc do not have the ﬁnite model prop-
erty with respect to K(G) and Kc(G), respectively, and neither does GX, for X ∈
{T,Tc, S4,S4c, S5,S5c}, with respect to the appropriate subclasses of K(G). Further-
more, devising analytic proof calculi for Gödel modal logics with both modal connectives
 and ♦ seems to be very challenging (cf. [95]). For these reasons, decidability results
for these Gödel modal logics have remained open.
As one of our main results, we establish decidability and PSPACE-completeness of
the validity problems for GK and GKc in Chapter 4. Furthermore, co-NP-completeness
is proved for the validity problem for the Gödel modal logic GS5c in Chapter 5, which
coincides with the one-variable fragment of ﬁrst-order Gödel logic (see [67]). In fact, these
results are generalized to the logics K(A), Kc(A), and S5c(A) based on other complete
G-chains A. We note that these results are based on joint work of the author of this
dissertation with Xavier Caicedo, George Metcalfe, and Ricardo Rodríguez in [26, 27].
Chapter 3
Order-Based Modal Logics
In this chapter, we introduce order-based logics and their modal counterparts. An order-
based logic is deﬁned as the consequence relation determined by an order-based algeb-
ras, which in turn is an algebra consisting of a complete sublattice of 〈[0, 1],min,max, 0, 1〉
with additional operations deﬁned based only on the order. Order-based modal logics
will be deﬁned in the same way as in Section 2.3 for the many-valued logics based on
MTL-algebras, interpreting the box  and the diamond ♦ as inﬁmum and supremum
over (to some degree) accessible worlds, respectively.
First we will deﬁne order-based logics and order-based modal logics in detail, present-
ing a Kripke-style semantics as in Section 2.3. We then recall that Gödel logic G is a
signiﬁcant example of an order-based logic and thus the logics GK and its extensions
are order-based modal logics. We will then observe that, on the one hand, the deﬁned
order-based modal logics, like many classical modal logics, enjoy the bounded tree-model
property, that is, a formula is valid in the logic if and only if it is valid in all tree-models
of height bounded by a function of the length of the formula. On the other hand, order-
based modal logics do not in many cases enjoy the ﬁnite model property with respect
to the Kripke models introduced in the present chapter. Moreover, as perhaps the most
characteristic property of order-based modal logics, we will show that validity in a Kripke
model is preserved even when values of propositional variables and the accessibility re-
lation are moved about in the algebra, as long as the order is preserved. This last fact
will be used heavily in Chapter 4.
Unless stated otherwise, all of the results in this chapter originate from joint work of
the author of this thesis with Xavier Caicedo, George Metcalfe, and Ricardo Rodríguez
[26, 27].
3.1 Order-Based Propositional Logics
Before we can deﬁne order-based logics and their modal counterparts, we will need to
say what we mean by operations being deﬁned based only on the order.
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We reserve the symbols⇒, uprise, ∼, and ≈ to denote implication, conjunction, negation,
and equality, respectively, in classical ﬁrst-order logic. We also recall an appropriate no-
tion of ﬁrst-order deﬁnability of operations for algebraic structures. Let L be an algebraic
language, A an algebra for L, and L′ a sublanguage of L. An operation f : An → A is
deﬁned in A by a ﬁrst-order L′-formula F (x1, . . . , xn, y) with free variables x1, . . . , xn, y
if for all a1, . . . , an, b ∈ A,
A |= F (a1, . . . , an, b) iﬀ f(a1, . . . , an) = b .
From now on, let L be any ﬁnite algebraic language that includes the binary operation
symbols ∧ and ∨ and constant symbols ⊥ and > (to be interpreted by the usual lattice
operations), and denote the ﬁnite set of constants (nullary operation symbols) of this
language by CL.
Remark 3.1. For convenience, we consider only ﬁnite algebraic languages, noting that
to decide the validity of a formula we may in any case restrict to the language containing
only operation symbols occurring in that formula.
An algebra A in language L will be called order-based if it satisﬁes the following condi-
tions:
• 〈A,∧A,∨A,⊥A,>A〉 is a complete sublattice of 〈[0, 1],min,max, 0, 1〉; that is,
{0, 1} ⊆ A ⊆ [0, 1] and for all B ⊆ A, ∧[0,1]B and ∨[0,1]B belong to A.
• For each operation symbol ? of L, the operation ?A is deﬁnable inA by a quantiﬁer-
free ﬁrst-order formula in the algebraic language consisting of ∧, ∨, and constants
from CL.
We also let CAL denote the ﬁnite set of constant operations {cA | c ∈ CL} and deﬁne
R(A) and L(A) to be the sets of right and left accumulation points, respectively, of A in
the usual topology inherited from [0, 1]; that is,
a ∈ R(A) iﬀ there is a c ∈ A such that a <A c and for all such c,
there is an e ∈ A such that a <A e <A c.
b ∈ L(A) iﬀ there is a d ∈ A such that d <A b, and for all such d,
there is an f ∈ A such that d <A f <A b.
Note that, because A is a complete chain, an implication operation →A may always be
introduced as the residual of ∧A:
a→A b =
∨A{c ∈ A | c ∧A a ≤A b} =
1 if a ≤A b ,b otherwise.
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Let s ≤ t stand for s ∧ t ≈ s and let s < t stand for (s ≤ t) uprise ∼(s ≈ t). Then the
implication operation →A is deﬁnable in A by the quantiﬁer-free ﬁrst-order formula
F→(x, y, z) = ((x ≤ y)⇒ (z ≈ >))uprise ((y < x)⇒ (z ≈ y)) .
That is, for all a, b, c ∈ A,
A |= F→(a, b, c) iﬀ a→A b = c .
Notice that the operation→A deﬁned here is exactly the Gödel implication→G presented
in Chapter 2. In this chapter, the symbol → will always be interpreted by →A = →G in
A. As in the last chapter, will also make use of the negation connective ¬, deﬁned by
¬ϕ = ϕ→ ⊥ , which is interpreted by the unary operation
¬Aa =
1 if a = 0 ,0 otherwise.
Examples of other useful operations (see e.g. [8]) covered by the order-based approach
are the delta and nabla operators
4Aa =
1 if a = 1 ,0 otherwise, and 4Aa =
0 if a = 0 ,1 otherwise,
deﬁnable in A (noting also that
4A
a = ¬A¬Aa), by
F4(x, y) = ((x ≈ >)⇒ (y ≈ >))uprise ((x < >)⇒ (y ≈ ⊥)) ,
F
4
(x, y) = ((x ≈ ⊥)⇒ (y ≈ ⊥))uprise ((⊥ < x)⇒ (y ≈ >)) ,
and the dual-implication connective (the residual of ∨A)
a←A b =
∧A{c ∈ A | b ≤A a ∨A c} =
0 if b ≤A a ,b otherwise,
deﬁnable in A by
F←(x, y, z) = ((y ≤ x)⇒ (z ≈ ⊥))uprise ((x < y)⇒ (z ≈ y)) .
Remark 3.2. Note that for any n-ary operation ?A deﬁned in this way, it is the case
that for all a1, . . . , an ∈ A, ?A(a1, . . . , an) ∈ {a1, . . . , an} ∪ CAL .
For the remainder of this chapter, let us ﬁx a ﬁnite language L including the operational
symbols >, ⊥, ∧, ∨, and →, and an order-based algebra A for L. The symbols ∧, ∨, ⊥,
and > in L will always be interpreted by the usual lattice operations on [0, 1] (i.e. ∧A
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and ∨A are minimum and maximum, respectively, and ⊥A = 0 and >A = 1) and → is
interpreted by the Gödel implication (i.e. →A = →G). Furthermore, we will omit the
superscript A's when the algebra or order is clear from the context.
Let FmL be the set of (propositional) formulas for the algebraic language L deﬁned
inductively over a countably inﬁnite set of propositional variables Var. Recall that an
A-evaluation e is a mapping e : Var→ A that is extended to e : FmL → A, as follows:
e(?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) = ?(e(ϕ1), . . . , e(ϕn)) ,
for each n-ary operation symbol ? of L. Recall moreover that for a set of formulas
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL, Γ |=A ϕ, if e(ϕ) = 1 for all A-evaluations e such that e[Γ] = {e(ψ) |
ψ ∈ Γ} ⊆ {1}, and ϕ is A-valid, if |=A ϕ. A propositional logic L for the language L will
be called order-based, if L = |=A for some order-based algebra A. In this case, we will
also write Val(L) for the set of A-validities {ϕ ∈ FmL | |=A ϕ}.
Example 3.3. As mentioned in Section 2.2, it is clear that the standard Gödel algebra
G = 〈[0, 1],min,max,→G, 0, 1〉 is an order-based algebra and thus Gödel logic G is an
order-based logic. Furthermore, any complete subalgebra of G is an order-based algebra.
Speciﬁcally, the subalgebras G↓ = 〈G↓,∧,∨,→, 0, 1〉 and G↑ = 〈G↑,∧,∨,→, 0, 1〉 of G,
based on the universes
G↓ = {0} ∪ { 1n+1 | n ∈ N} and G↑ = {1− 1n+1 | n ∈ N} ∪ {1} ,
are order-based algebras and thus the consequence relations |=G↓ and |=G↑ deﬁne order-
based logics. Clearly, order-based algebras with universes G↓ and G↑ are isomorphic to
algebras with universes {−n | n ∈ N} ∪ {−∞} and N ∪ {∞}, respectively.
3.2 Adding Modal Operators
We deﬁne order-based modal logics Kc(A) and K(A) based on crisp A-frames and A-
frames with an accessibility relation taking values in A, respectively, where A-frames for
an order-based algebra A are deﬁned similarly as for MTL-algebras.
Let us again denote by FmLm the set of formulas for the language Lm, which is L with
additional unary operation symbols (modal connectives)  and ♦, deﬁned inductively
over a countably inﬁnite set Var of propositional variables. Subformulas are deﬁned as
usual, and the length of a formula ϕ, denoted by `(ϕ), is the total number of occurrences
of subformulas in ϕ. We also let Var(ϕ) denote the set of variables occurring in the
formula ϕ. We will drop the subscript Lm if the language is clear from the context.
We deﬁne an A-frame to be a pair 〈W,R〉 such that W is a non-empty set of worlds
and R : W × W → A is an A-accessibility relation on W . If Rxy ∈ {0, 1} for all
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x, y ∈ W , then R is crisp and 〈W,R〉 is called a crisp A-frame. In this case, we often
write R ⊆W ×W and Rxy to mean Rxy = 1.
A K(A)-model is deﬁned as a triple M = 〈W,R, V 〉 such that 〈W,R〉 is an A-
frame and V : Var ×W → A is a mapping, called an A-valuation, that is extended to
V : Fm×W → A by
V (?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), x) = ?(V (ϕ1, x), . . . , V (ϕn, x)) ,
for each n-ary operation symbol ? of L, and
V (ϕ, x) =
∧
{Rxy → V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∨
{Rxy ∧ V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}.
A Kc(A)-model satisﬁes the extra condition that 〈W,R〉 is a crisp A-frame. In this case,
the conditions for  and ♦ simplify to
V (ϕ, x) =
∧
{V (ϕ, y) | Rxy}
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∨
{V (ϕ, y) | Rxy}.
For a set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm and a K(A)-model M = 〈W,R, V 〉, ϕ is called an
M-consequence of Γ, if V (ϕ, x) = 1 for all x ∈ W such that V [Γ, x] = {V (ψ, x) | ψ ∈
Γ} ⊆ {1}. Moreover, ϕ will be called valid in M, if V (ϕ, x) = 1 for all x ∈ W , written
M |=F(A) ϕ. We will say that ϕ is a K(A)-consequence (a Kc(A)-consequence) of Γ,
written Γ |=K(A) ϕ (Γ |=Kc(A) ϕ), if M |=K(A) ϕ, for all K(A)-models M (for all Kc(A)-
models M) such that M |=K(A) Γ.1 And if ϕ is valid in all K(A)- or Kc(A)-models, then
ϕ is said to be K(A)-valid or Kc(A)-valid, respectively, written |=K(A) ϕ or |=Kc(A) ϕ.
We will denote the logics deﬁned by |=K(A) and |=Kc(A) by K(A) and Kc(A), respectively,
deﬁne Val(K(A)) = {ϕ | |=K(A) ϕ} and Val(Kc(A)) = {ϕ | |=Kc(A) ϕ}, and will call their
members K(A)- and Kc(A)-valid, respectively.
Recalling that the standard Gödel algebraG = 〈[0, 1],min,max,→G, 0, 1〉 is an order-
based algebra, we notice that the logics K(G) and Kc(G) are just the Gödel modal logics
GK and GKc introduced in Section 2.3. More generally, we may consider the family of
Gödel modal logics K(A) and Kc(A) whereA is a complete subalgebra ofG, in particular,
when A is G↓ or G↑, as presented in Example 3.3.
It is not hard to show that for a ﬁnite order-based algebraA, the sets of valid formulas
of K(A) and Kc(A) depend only on the cardinality of A and are decidable (see below).
Recall, moreover, that although all inﬁnite subalgebras of G produce the same set of
1We only deﬁne global consequence here, as this is the only consequence relation we treat in this
work. Local consequence for order-based modal logics could be deﬁned similarly as for many-valued
modal logics over MTL-algebras.
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valid propositional formulas (see Chapter 2 or [50]), there are countably inﬁnitely many
diﬀerent inﬁnite-valued ﬁrst-order Gödel logics (considered as sets of valid formulas;
cf. [10]). Below, we show that this result holds also for Gödel modal logics.
Theorem 3.4. There are countably inﬁnitely many diﬀerent logics K(A) (considered as
sets of valid formulas), for diﬀerent inﬁnite subalgebras A of G. Moreover, the same is
true for Kc(A).
Proof. It follows from the result in [10] that there can be at most countably many such
logics, because for each inﬁnite subalgebra A of G, K(A) corresponds to a speciﬁc frag-
ment of the ﬁrst-order logic over A, determined by the same standard translation pi as
in the classical setting, where box- and diamond-formulas are translated as follows:
pi(ϕ) = (∀y)(Rxy → pi(ϕ)(y)) and pi(♦ϕ) = (∃y)(Rxy ∧ pi(ϕ)(y)) .
To obtain the fragment in the crisp case, we may use the usual crispiﬁcation of the
relation symbol R by preﬁxing it with ¬¬.
To show that there are inﬁnitely such logics, let us ﬁx, for each n ∈ Z+, a complete
subalgebra An of G with exactly n right accumulation points. We then prove that for
all n,m ∈ Z+ such that n 6= m, K(An) and K(Am) are mutually distinct, even when
only valid formulas are considered, and so are Kc(An) and Kc(Am). For this, we deﬁne
the formula
ϕ(p, q) = ((q → p) ∧ (q → q) ∧((p→ q)→ q))→ ((p→ q)→ q),
which detects right accumulation points, as is stated in the following claim.
Claim 1: For any K(A)-model M = 〈W,R, V 〉, x ∈ W , and p, q ∈ Var: if
V (ϕ(p, q), x) < 1 then V (ϕ(p, q), x) = V (q, x) ∈ R(A).
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose that V (ϕ(p, q), x) < 1. Then V (ϕ(p, q), x) =
V ((p→ q)→ q, x) = (V (p, x)→ V (q, x))→ V (q, x) < 1 and thus
V (p, x) ≤ V (q, x) = V (ϕ(p, q), x) < 1 .
For a contradiction, we assume that V (q, x) 6∈ R(A). In this case, there is a world y ∈W
such that Rxy → V (p, y) ≤ V (q, x) < 1, and thus
Rxy > V (p, y) ≤ V (q, x) . (1)
Moreover, by the assumption that V (ϕ(p, q), x) < 1, we have that V ((q → p) ∧ (q →
q) ∧((p→ q)→ q), x) > V ((p→ q)→ q, x) = V (q, x), and thus
V (q, x) < V ((q → p), x) (2)
V (q, x) < V (q → q, x) (3)
V (q, x) < V (((p→ q)→ q), x) (4)
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From inequality (2), we can infer that V (q, x) < Rxy → (V (q, y) → V (p, y)) =
(Rxy ∧ V (q, y)) → V (p, y), the later equality following from a well-known property
of the Gödel t-norm and its residuum. We thus have either Rxy ∧ V (q, y) ≤ V (p, y)
or Rxy ∧ V (q, y) > V (p, y) > V (q, x). As the latter case contradicts (1), we have
Rxy ∧ V (q, y) ≤ V (p, y) and thus, also using (1), we obtain
V (q, y) ≤ V (p, y) . (5)
Furthermore, from inequality (3), we obtain V (q, x) < V (q, x)→ V (q, x) which implies
that V (q, x) ≤ V (q, x) ≤ Rxy → V (q, y). By (1) and (5), we then get V (q, x) ≤
Rxy → V (q, y) = V (q, y) ≤ V (p, y) ≤ V (q, x) and thus
V (q, x) = V (q, y) = V (p, y) . (6)
Finally, from inequality (4), we infer that V (q, x) < Rxy → ((V (p, y) → V (q, y)) →
V (q, y)) and by (6), V (q, x) < Rxy → ((V (q, x) → V (q, x)) → V (q, x)) = Rxy → (1 →
V (q, x)) = Rxy → V (q, x), from which we can infer, by (1) and (6),
V (q, x) < Rxy → V (q, x) = V (q, x) ,
which is a contradiction. It follows that V (ϕ(p, q), x) = V (q, x) ∈ R(A) and Claim 1 is
established.
Claim 2: Let a ∈ R(A), p, q ∈ Var, and deﬁne a Kc(A)-model Ma = 〈Wa, Ra, Va〉
by Wa = N, Ra = {0} × Z+, and for all k ∈ N, Va(q, k) = a and Va(p, k) = bk, for some
strictly descending sequence {bk}k∈N ⊆ A such that a =
∧
k∈N bk. We then have that
V (ϕ(p, q), 0) = V (q, 0) = a < 1 .
Proof of Claim 2: This claim is easily veriﬁed by observing the following equalities:
Va((q → p), 0) =
∧
{Va(q, k)→ Va(p, k) | k ∈ Z+}
=
∧
{a→ bk | k ∈ Z+}
= 1
Va(q → q, 0) = Va(q, 0)→
∧
{Va(q, k) | k ∈ Z+}
= a→ a
= 1
Va(((p→ q)→ q), 0) =
∧
{(Va(p, k)→ Va(q, k))→ Va(q, k) | k ∈ Z+}
=
∧
{(bk → a)→ a | k ∈ Z+}
=
∧
{a→ a | k ∈ Z+}
= 1
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Va((p→ q)→ q, 0) = (
∧
{Va(p, k) | k ∈ Z+} → Va(q, 0))→ Va(q, 0)
= (a→ a)→ a
= 1→ a
= a
Having established Claim 1 and 2, we deﬁne for any n ∈ Z+, the formula
ϕn(p1, q1, . . . , pn, qn) =
n−1∧
i=1
((qi+1 → qi)→ qi)→
n∨
i=1
ϕ(pi, qi) .
Claim 3: For each n ∈ Z+, the formula ϕn(p1, q1, ..., pn, qn) is K(A)-valid if and only
if |R(A)| < n.
Proof of Claim 3: First, let us ﬁx an n ∈ Z+. We then prove the right-to-left
direction by contraposition. Let V (ϕn(p1, q1, ..., pn, qn), x) < 1 for some K(A)-model
〈W,R, V 〉 and x ∈ W . In this case, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, V (ϕ(pi, qi), x) < 1 and
thus V (ϕ(pi, qi), x) = V (qi, x) ∈ R(A) by Claim 1. Moreover, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
V ((qi+1 → qi) → qi, x) >
∨n
i=1 V (qi, x) ≥ V (qi, x) which implies that V (qi, x) <
V (qi+1, x). Hence we obtain a strictly increasing sequence of n right accumulation points
and thus |R(A)| ≥ n.
For the left-to-right direction, let {ai ∈ R(A) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be a sequence in R(A)
such that a1 < . . . < an and deﬁne a Kc(A)-model M = 〈N, {0} × Z+, V 〉 such that
V (pi, k) = Vai(pi, k) and V (qi, k) = Vai(qi, k), for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and k ∈ N, where
Vai is deﬁned as in Claim 2. We then have that
n−1∧
i=1
V ((qi+1 → qi)→ qi, 0) =
n−1∧
i=1
((ai+1 → ai)→ ai) =
n−1∧
i=1
(ai → ai) = 1 .
Moreover, by Claim 2,
n∨
i=1
V (ϕ(pi, qi), 0) =
n∨
i=1
V (qi, 0) =
n∨
i=1
ai = an < 1 ,
and thus V (ϕn(p1, q1, ..., pn, qn), 0) = an < 1 and Claim 3 is established.
Noting that the modelM in the proof of Claim 3 is crisp, we have shown that for each
n ∈ Z+, ϕn+1 is K(An)-valid and Kc(An)-valid, but neither K(Am)-valid nor Kc(Am)-
valid for any m ≥ n+ 1.
The logics K(G), K(G↑), and K(G↓) and their crisp counterparts are all distinct. The
formula ¬¬p→ ¬¬p is valid in the logics based on G↑, but not in those based on G
or G↓. To see this, note that 0 is an accumulation point in [0, 1] and G↓ (but not in G↑);
hence for these sets there is an inﬁnite strictly descending sequence of values (ai)i∈I with
limit 0, giving ¬¬ai = 1 for each i ∈ I and infi∈I ¬¬ai = 1, while ¬¬ infi∈I ai = ¬¬0 = 0
56 CHAPTER 3. ORDER-BASED MODAL LOGICS
(see the proof of Theorem 3.9). Similarly, (♦p→ ♦q)→ (¬♦q ∨♦(p→ q)) is valid in the
logics based on G↓ but not those based on G. Moreover, the formula ¬¬♦p→ ♦¬¬p is
valid in any of the crisp logics, but not in their non-crisp versions.
3.3 The Finite Model Property
Let us introduce some more useful notation and terminology. A subset Σ ⊆ Fm will be
called a fragment if it contains all constants in CL and is closed with respect to taking
subformulas. For a formula ϕ ∈ Fm, we let Σ(ϕ) be the smallest (always ﬁnite) fragment
containing ϕ. Also, for any K(A)-model M = 〈W,R, V 〉, subset X ⊆ W , and fragment
Σ ⊆ Fm, we let
V [Σ, X] = {V (ϕ, x) | ϕ ∈ Σ, x ∈ X} .
We shorten V [Σ, {x}] to V [Σ, x]. For Σ ⊆ Fm, we let Σ and Σ♦ be the sets of all
box-formulas in Σ and diamond-formulas in Σ, respectively.
We also consider many-valued analogues of some notions and results from classical
modal logic (see e.g. [15]). For an A-frame 〈W,R〉, we deﬁne the crisp relation R+ and,
for each x ∈W , the set of worlds R+[x] as follows:
R+ = {(x, y) ∈W 2 | Rxy > 0} and R+[x] = {y ∈W | R+xy} .
Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a K(A)-model. We call M′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 a K(A)-submodel of
M, written M′ ⊆M, if W ′ ⊆ W and R′ and V ′ are the restrictions to W ′ of R and V ,
respectively. In particular, given x ∈W , the K(A)-submodel of M generated by x is the
smallest K(A)-submodel M′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 of M such that x ∈ W ′ and for all y ∈ W ′,
whenever z ∈ R+[y], also z ∈W ′.
Lemma 3.5. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a K(A)-model and M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 a generated
K(A)-submodel of M. Then V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) for all x ∈ Ŵ and ϕ ∈ Fm.
Proof. We proceed by induction on `(ϕ). The base case is trivial for any submodel of
M, so also for M̂. For the induction step, the case where ϕ = ?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) for some
operation symbol ? follows immediately using the induction hypothesis.
Suppose now that ϕ = ψ. Fix x ∈ Ŵ and note that for any y ∈ W \ Ŵ , we have
Rxy = 0. Observe also that 0→ a = 1 for all a ∈ A. Hence, excluding all worlds y ∈W
such that Rxy = 0 does not change the value of
∧{Rxy → V (ψ, y) | y ∈ W}. So, using
the induction hypothesis,
V (ψ, x) =
∧
{Rxy → V (ψ, y) | y ∈ Ŵ}
=
∧
{R̂xy → V̂ (ψ, y): y ∈ Ŵ}
= V̂ (ψ, x) .
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The case where ϕ = ♦ψ is very similar.
Following the usual terminology of modal logic, a tree is deﬁned as a relational structure
〈N,E〉 such that (i) E ⊆ N2 is irreﬂexive, (ii) there exists a unique root x0 ∈ N satisfying
E∗x0x for all x ∈ N where E∗ is the reﬂexive transitive closure of E, (iii) for each
x ∈ N \ {x0}, there is a unique x′ ∈ N such that Ex′x. A tree 〈N,E〉 has height m ∈ N
if m = max{|{y ∈ N | E∗yx}| ∈ N | x ∈ N}. A K(A)-model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 is called a
K(A)-tree-model if 〈W,R+〉 is a tree, and has ﬁnite height hg(M) = m if 〈W,R+〉 has
height m.
Lemma 3.6. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a K(A)-model, x0 ∈ W , and k ∈ N. Then
there exists a K(A)-tree-model M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 with root x̂0 and hg(M̂) ≤ k such that
V̂ (ϕ, x̂0) = V (ϕ, x0) for all ϕ ∈ Fm with `(ϕ) ≤ k. Moreover, if M is a Kc(A)-model,
then so is M̂.
Proof. Consider the K(A)-model M′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 obtained by unravelling M at the
world x0; i.e. for all n ∈ N (noting that 0 ∈ N),
W ′ =
⋃
n∈N
{(x0, . . . , xn) ∈Wn+1 | R+xixi+1, i < n} ,
R′yz =
Rxnxn+1 if y = (x0, . . . , xn), z = (x0, . . . , xn+1) ,0 otherwise ,
V ′(p, (x0, . . . , xn)) = V (p, xn) .
Clearly, M′ is a K(A)-tree-model with root x̂0 = (x0) and R′ is crisp if R is. Now let
M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 be the K(A)-tree-submodel of M′ deﬁned by cutting M′ at depth k; i.e.
let Ŵ = {(x0, . . . , xn) ∈ W ′ | n ≤ k} and let R̂ and V̂ be the restrictions of R′ and V ′
to Ŵ × Ŵ and Var × Ŵ , respectively. A straightforward induction on `(ϕ) shows that
for all ϕ ∈ Fm and n ∈ N such that `(ϕ) ≤ k − n, V̂ (ϕ, (x0, . . . , xn)) = V (ϕ, xn). In
particular, V̂ (ϕ, x̂0) = V (ϕ, x0) for all ϕ ∈ Fm with `(ϕ) ≤ k.
A K(A)-model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 is called ﬁnite or countable, if its set of worlds W is ﬁnite
or countable, respectively. A logic L for Lm has the ﬁnite model property with respect
to K(A) (Kc(A)), if for all ϕ ∈ Fm, ϕ is valid in L if and only if ϕ is valid in all ﬁnite
K(A)-models (all ﬁnite Kc(A)-models).
Lemma 3.7. If A is a ﬁnite order-based algebra, then K(A) and Kc(A) have the ﬁnite
model property with respect to K(A) and Kc(A), respectively.
Proof. By Lemma 3.6, it suﬃces to show that for any ﬁnite fragment Σ ⊆ Fm and K(A)-
tree-model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 of ﬁnite height with root x, there is a ﬁnite K(A)-tree-model
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M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 ⊆ M with root x such that V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) for all ϕ ∈ Σ. We prove
this claim by induction on hg(M). For the base case, W = {x} and we let M̂ = M.
For the induction step, consider for each y ∈ R+[x], the submodel My = 〈Wy, Ry, Vy〉
of M generated by y. Each My is a K(A)-tree-model of ﬁnite height with root y and
hg(My) < hg(M). Hence, by the induction hypothesis, for each y ∈ R+[x], there is a
ﬁnite K(A)-tree-model M̂y = 〈Ŵy, R̂y, V̂y〉 ⊆ My ⊆ M with root y ∈ Ŵy such that for
all ϕ ∈ Σ, by Lemma 3.5, V̂y(ϕ, y) = Vy(ϕ, y) = V (ϕ, y).
Because A is ﬁnite, we can now choose for each ϕ ∈ Σ ∪ Σ♦, a world yϕ such that
V (ϕ, x) = Rxyϕ → V̂y(ψ, yϕ) when ϕ = ψ, and V (ϕ, x) = Rxyϕ ∧ V̂y(ψ, yϕ) when
ϕ = ♦ψ. Deﬁne the ﬁnite set Y = {yϕ ∈ R+[x] | ϕ ∈ Σ ∪ Σ♦}. We let M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉
where
Ŵ = {x} ∪
⋃
y∈Y
Ŵy,
and R̂ and V̂ are R and V , respectively, restricted to Ŵ . An easy induction on `(ϕ)
establishes that V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) for all ϕ ∈ Σ.
Furthermore, we are able to establish the ﬁnite model property when the underlying
(inﬁnite) algebra is G↑.
Theorem 3.8. K(G↑) and Kc(G↑) have the ﬁnite model property with respect to K(G↑)
and Kc(G↑), respectively.
Proof. By Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7, it suﬃces to show that if ϕ ∈ Fm is not valid in some
K(G↑)-tree-model M of ﬁnite height, then there is a ﬁnite subalgebra B of G↑ and a
K(B)-model M̂ (that is crisp if M is crisp) such that ϕ is not valid in M̂.
Suppose that β = V (ϕ, x) < 1 for some K(G↑)-tree-model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 of ﬁnite
height with root x. Let B be the ﬁnite subalgebra of G↑ with universe (G↑∩ [0, β])∪{1}
and consider h : G↑ → B deﬁned by
h(a) =
a if a ≤ β1 otherwise.
We deﬁne a K(B)-model M̂ = 〈W, R̂, V̂ 〉 (that is crisp if M is crisp) as follows. Let
R̂yz = h(Ryz) for all y, z ∈ W and V̂ (p, y) = h(V (p, y)) for all y ∈ W and p ∈ Var. We
prove that V̂ (ψ, y) = h(V (ψ, y)) for all y ∈W and ψ ∈ Fm by induction on `(ψ).
The base case follows by deﬁnition (recalling that the only constants are ⊥ and >).
For the induction step, the propositional cases follow by observing that h is a Heyting
algebra homomorphism (i.e. preserves the operations ∧, ∨, →, ⊥, and >). The case of
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ψ = χ is also straightforward. If ψ = ♦χ, then
V̂ (♦χ, y) =
∨
{R̂yz ∧ V̂ (χ, z) | z ∈W} (7)
=
∨
{h(Ryz) ∧ h(V (χ, z)) | z ∈W} (8)
=
∨
{h(Ryz ∧ V (χ, z)) | z ∈W} (9)
= h(
∨
{Ryz ∧ V (χ, z) | z ∈W}) (10)
= h(V (♦χ, y)) . (11)
The step from (7) to (8) follows using the induction hypothesis and the step from (8) to (9)
follows because h is a Heyting algebra homomorphism. For the step from (9) to (10),
note that for
∨{Ryz ∧ V (χ, z) | z ∈ W} ≤ β, the equality is immediate. Otherwise,
Ryz∧V (χ, z) > β for some z ∈W and h(Ryz∧V (χ, z)) = 1, so h(∨{Ryz∧V (χ, z) | z ∈
W}) = 1 = ∨{h(Ryz ∧ V (χ, z)) | z ∈ W}. Hence V̂ (ϕ, x) = h(V (ϕ, x)) = h(β) = β < 1
as required.
The ﬁnite model property does not hold, however, for Gödel modal logics with universe
[0, 1] or G↓, or even G↑ if we add also the connective 4 to the language. The problem
in these cases stems from the existence of accumulation points in the universe of truth
values considered together with the non-continuous operation ¬ or 4. If inﬁnitely many
worlds are accessible from a world x, then the value taken by a formula ϕ (or ♦ϕ) at
x will be the inﬁmum (supremum) of values calculated from values of ϕ at these worlds,
but may not be the minimum (maximum). A formula may therefore not be valid in such
a model, but valid in all ﬁnite models where inﬁma (suprema) and minima (maxima)
coincide.
Theorem 3.9. Suppose that either (i) the universe of A is [0, 1] or G↓, or (ii) the
universe of A is G↑ and the language contains 4. In either cases, neither K(A) nor
Kc(A) has the ﬁnite model property with respect to K(A) or Kc(A), respectively.
Proof. For (i), we follow [28] where it is shown that the following formula provides a
counterexample to the ﬁnite model property of GK and GKc:
¬¬p→ ¬¬p .
Just observe that the formula is valid in all ﬁnite K(A)-models, but not in the inﬁnite
Kc(A)-model 〈N, R, V 〉 where Rmn = 1 for all m,n ∈ N and V (p, n) = 1n+1 for all n ∈ N.
Hence neither K(A) nor Kc(A) has the ﬁnite model property with respect to K(A) or
Kc(A), respectively.
Similarly, for (ii), the formula
4♦p→ ♦4p
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is valid in all ﬁnite K(A)-models, but not in the inﬁnite Kc(A)-model 〈N, R, V 〉 where
Rmn = 1 for all m,n ∈ N and V (p, n) = nn+1 for all n ∈ N.
3.4 Order-Embeddings
Given a linearly ordered set 〈P,≤〉 and C ⊆ P , a map h : P → P will be called a C-order
embedding if it is an order-preserving embedding (i.e. a ≤ b if and only if h(a) ≤ h(b)
for all a, b ∈ P ) satisfying h(c) = c for all c ∈ C. We will call an order embedding
h : P → P inﬂationary or deﬂationary if for all a ∈ P , a ≤ h(a), or for all a ∈ P ,
a ≥ h(a), respectively. h will be called B-complete for B ⊆ P if whenever ∨D ∈ B or∧
D ∈ B for some D ⊆ P , respectively,
h(
∨
D) =
∨
h[D] or h(
∧
D) =
∧
h[D] .
The following lemma establishes the critical property of order-based modal logics for
our purposes. Namely, it is only the relative order of the values taken by variables and
the accessibility relation between worlds that plays a role in determining the values of
formulas and checking validity.
Lemma 3.10. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a K(A)-model and Σ ⊆ Fm a fragment, and let
h : A→ A be a V [Σ ∪Σ♦,W ]-complete CL-order embedding. Consider the K(A)-model
M̂ = 〈W, R̂, V̂ 〉 with R̂xy = h(Rxy) and V̂ (p, x) = h(V (p, x)) for all p ∈ Var and
x, y ∈W . Then for all ϕ ∈ Σ and x ∈W :
V̂ (ϕ, x) = h(V (ϕ, x)) .
Proof. We proceed by induction on `(ϕ). The case ϕ ∈ Var ∪CL follows from the deﬁn-
ition of V̂ . For the induction step, suppose that ϕ = ?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) for some operation
symbol ? of L and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Σ. Recall that ? is deﬁnable in A by some quantiﬁer-free
ﬁrst-order formula F ?(x1, . . . , xn, y) in the ﬁrst-order language with ∧, ∨, and constants
from CL, i.e.
?(a1, . . . , an) = b iﬀ A |= F ?(a1, . . . , an, b) .
Because F ?(x1, . . . , xn, y) is quantiﬁer-free and h preserves ∧, ∨, and CL,
A |= F ?(a1, . . . , an, b) iﬀ A |= F ?(h(a1), . . . , h(an), h(b)) .
So we may also conclude
?(h(a1), . . . , h(an)) = h(?(a1, . . . , an)) .
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Hence for all x ∈W , using the induction hypothesis for the step from (1) to (2):
V̂ (?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), x) = ?(V̂ (ϕ1, x), . . . , V̂ (ϕn, x)) (12)
= ?(h(V (ϕ1, x)), . . . , h(V (ϕn, x))) (13)
= h(?(V (ϕ1, x), . . . , V (ϕn, x))) (14)
= h(V (?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), x)) . (15)
If ϕ = ♦ψ for some ψ ∈ Σ, then we obtain for all x ∈W :
V̂ (♦ψ, x) =
∨
{R̂xy ∧ V̂ (ψ, y) | y ∈W} (16)
=
∨
{h(Rxy) ∧ h(V (ψ, y)) | y ∈W} (17)
=
∨
{h(Rxy ∧ V (ψ, y)) | y ∈W} (18)
= h(
∨
{Rxy ∧ V (ψ, y) | y ∈W}) (19)
= h(V (♦ψ, x)) . (20)
(16) to (17) follows from the deﬁnition of R̂ and the induction hypothesis, (17) to (18)
follows because h is an order embedding, and (18) to (19) follows because h is V [Σ ∪
Σ♦,W ]-complete and
∨{Rxy ∧ V (ψ, y) | y ∈ W} = V (♦ψ, x) ∈ V [Σ♦,W ]. The case
ϕ = ψ is very similar.
There is one more notion we will introduce before moving on to decidability and com-
plexity issues for order-based modal logics. To ensure that the alternative semantics we
will deﬁne in the next chapter accepts the same valid formulas as the original semantics,
we restrict our attention to order-based algebras where the order satisﬁes a certain ho-
mogeneity property.
Recall that R(A) and L(A) are the sets of right and left accumulation points, re-
spectively, of an order-based algebra A in the usual topology inherited from [0, 1]. Note
also that by (a, b), [a, b), etc. we denote here the intervals (a, b) ∩ A, [a, b) ∩ A, etc. in
A. We say that A is locally right homogeneous if for any a ∈ R(A), there is a c ∈ A
such that a < c and for any e ∈ (a, c), there is a complete deﬂationary order embedding
h : [a, c) → [a, e) such that h(a) = a. In this case, c is called a witness of right homo-
geneity at a. Similarly, A is said to be locally left homogeneous if for any b ∈ L(A),
there is a d ∈ A such that d < b and for any f ∈ (d, b), there is a complete inﬂationary
order embedding h : (d, b] → (f, b] such that h(b) = b. In this case, d is called a witness
of left homogeneity at b. We will call A locally homogeneous if it is both locally right
homogeneous and locally left homogeneous.
Observe that if c ∈ A is a witness of right homogeneity at a, then any e ∈ (a, c) will
also be a witness of right homogeneity at a. Hence c can be chosen suﬃciently close to
a so that (a, c) is disjoint to any given ﬁnite subset of A. A similar observation holds for
witnesses of left homogeneity.
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Example 3.11. Any ﬁniteA is trivially locally homogeneous. Also anyA with A = [0, 1]
is locally homogeneous: for a ∈ R(A) = [0, 1), choose any c > a to witness right
homogeneity at a, and similarly for b ∈ L(A) = (0, 1], choose any d < b to witness
left homogeneity at b. In the case of A = G↓, L(A) = ∅, R(A) = {0}, and any c > 0
witnesses right homogeneity at 0. Similarly, for A = G↑, R(A) = ∅, L(A) = {1}, and any
d < 1 witnesses left homogeneity at 1. Moreover, inﬁnitely many more non-isomorphic
examples can be constructed using the fact that any ordered sum or lexicographical
product of two locally homogeneous ordered sets is locally homogeneous.
In the next chapter, we introduce a new kind of Kripke-style semantics for which we
prove, if the underlying order-based algebra is locally homogeneous, that it renders valid
the same formulas as the semantics introduced in the present chapter. We show that the
modal logics based on such algebras do enjoy the ﬁnite model property with respect to
this new semantics and obtain decidability and complexity results.
Chapter 4
Decidability and Complexity of
Order-Based Modal Logics
Most order-based modal logics do not enjoy the ﬁnite model property with respect to
the Kripke-style semantics introduced in Chapter 3. In the present chapter, we will
introduce a new alternative semantics based on modiﬁed Kripke-models and show that
an order-based modal logic based on a locally homogeneous order-based algebra does
indeed enjoy the ﬁnite model property with respect to this alternative semantics. In
fact, we will get a strong kind of ﬁnite model property where we can put an upper bound
on the size of the models, which will give us decidability of the validity problem for
these order-based modal logics in various cases. Furthermore, using the fact that we can
restrict to ﬁnite tree-models, we obtain complexity bounds for these decision problems,
namely PSPACE-completeness.
All of the ideas and results in this chapter were obtained as the result of joint work by
the author of this thesis with Xavier Caicedo, George Metcalfe, and Ricardo Rodríguez
[26, 27].
Before we begin, we ﬁx a ﬁnite algebraic language L including the operational symbols
>, ⊥, ∧, ∨, and→, and recall that CL denotes the ﬁnite set of constants, Lm = L∪{,♦},
and the set of formulas FmLm for Lm will often be denoted by Fm. Furthermore, we ﬁx
a locally homogeneous order-based algebra A for L.
4.1 Alternative Kripke-Style Semantics
Let us consider again the failure of the ﬁnite model property of GKc with respect to Kc(G)
(see Theorem 3.9). For a Kc(G)-model to render the formula ¬¬p → ¬¬p invalid
at a world x, there must be values of p at worlds accessible to x that form an inﬁnite
descending sequence tending to but never reaching 0. This ensures that the inﬁnite model
falsiﬁes the formula, but also that no particular world acts as a witness to the value of
p. In this section, we redeﬁne models to restrict the values at each world that can be
taken by box-formulas and diamond-formulas. A formula p can then be witnessed at
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a world where the value of p is merely suﬃciently close to the value of p.
Let us ﬁx a ﬁnite algebraic language L including the operational symbols >, ⊥, ∧, ∨,
and →, and recall that CL denotes the ﬁnite set of constants, Lm = L ∪ {,♦}, and the
set of formulas FmLm for Lm will often be denote by Fm. Furthermore, we ﬁx a locally
homogeneous order-based algebra A for L.
An FK(A)-model is a ﬁve-tupleM = 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 such that 〈W,R, V 〉 is a K(A)-
model and T : W →P(A) and T♦ : W →P(A) are functions satisfying for each x ∈W :
(i) CAL ⊆ T(x) ∩ T♦(x),
(ii) T(x) = A \
⋃
i∈I(ai, ci), for some ﬁnite I ⊆ N (possibly empty), where ai ∈ R(A),
ci witnesses right homogeneity at ai, and the intervals (ai, ci) are pairwise disjoint,
(iii) T♦(x) = A\
⋃
j∈J(dj , bj), for some ﬁnite J ⊆ N (possibly empty), where bj ∈ L(A),
dj witnesses left homogeneity at bj , and the intervals (dj , bj) are pairwise disjoint.
The valuation V is extended to the mapping V : Fm×W inductively as follows:
V (?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), x) = ?(V (ϕ1, x), . . . , V (ϕn, x))
for each n-ary operational symbol ? of L, and
V (ϕ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T(x) | r ≤
∧
{Rxy → V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}}
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∧
{r ∈ T♦(x) | r ≥
∨
{Rxy ∧ V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}} .
As before, an FKc(A)-model satisﬁes the extra condition that 〈W,R〉 is a crisp A-frame,
and the conditions for  and ♦ simplify to
V (ϕ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T(x) | r ≤
∧
{V (ϕ, y) | Rxy}}
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∧
{r ∈ T♦(x) | r ≥
∨
{V (ϕ, y) | Rxy}} .
A formula ϕ ∈ Fm is called valid in an FK(A)-model M = 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉, if V (ϕ, x) =
1 for all x ∈W , writtenM |=FK(A) ϕ. Furthermore, ϕ is called valid in FK(A) or FKc(A)
written |=FK(A) ϕ or |=FKc(A) ϕ, if ϕ is valid in all FK(A)-models or ϕ is valid in all
FKc(A)-models, respectively.
Example 4.1. Note that when A is ﬁnite, T(x) = T♦(x) = A. For A = [0, 1], both
T(x) and T♦(x) are obtained by removing ﬁnitely many arbitrary disjoint intervals
(a, b) not containing constants. For A = G↓, the only possibilities are T♦(x) = A and
T(x) = A or T(x) = {0, 1n , 1n−1 , . . . , 1} for some n ∈ Z+ respecting CL ⊆ T(x). The
case of A = G↑ is very similar.
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Remark 4.2. We introduce this alternative semantics mainly as a tool to obtain decid-
ability and complexity results for the logics K(A) and Kc(A). Nevertheless, restricting
the values assigned to box- and diamond-formulas might have other beneﬁts, e.g. when
we want to model certain notions as modal connectives which are crisp or have a diﬀerent
behaviour than the other connectives.
For example, in a crisp FK(A)-model 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 where T(x) = T♦(x) = {0, 1}
for all x ∈ W , the formula ϕ represents the crisp property of the existence of an
accessible world y such that V (ϕ, y) < 1, and the formula ♦ψ represents the positive
satisﬁability of ψ at some accessible world y.
Furthermore, by deﬁning T(x) = T♦(x) = B ⊆ A for all worlds x, we would obtain
semantics for a two-layered logic, where non-modal formulas are interpreted as in the
order-based logic over A and purely modal formulas, where all propositional variables
are preceded by a box or a diamond, are interpreted as in the order-based logic over the
subalgebra of A generated by B. E.g. in the case where T(x) = T♦(x) = {0, 1} for all
worlds x, purely modal formulas would behave classically.
Remark 4.3. It is worth pointing out that in every FK(A)-modelM = 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉
and for any x ∈W , T(x) and T♦(x) will be complete subsets of A. Hence, the supremum
deﬁning V (ϕ, x) and the inﬁmum deﬁning V (♦ϕ, x) will actually be a maximum and
a minimum, respectively. Furthermore, we always have that V (ϕ, x) ∈ T(x) and
V (♦ϕ, x) ∈ T♦(x).
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving that a formula ϕ ∈ Fm is valid
in FK(A) or FKc(A) if and only if it is valid in all ﬁnite FK(A)-(tree)-models or all
ﬁnite FKc(A)-(tree)-models, respectively. In order to reach this goal, we ﬁrst need to
extend some previously introduced notions to FK(A)-models and establish some crucial
properties of these models.
Given an FK(A)-model M = 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉, we call M′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′, T ′, T ′♦〉 an
FK(A)-submodel of M, written M′ ⊆ M, if W ′ ⊆ W and R′, V ′, T ′, and T ′♦ are the
restrictions toW ′ of R, V , T, and T♦, respectively. As before, given x ∈W , the FK(A)-
submodel of M generated by x is the smallest FK(A)-submodelM′ = 〈W ′, R′, V ′, T ′, T ′♦〉
of M satisfying x ∈ W ′ and for all y ∈ W ′, z ∈ R+[y] implies z ∈ W ′. Lemmas 3.5
and 3.6 then extend to FK(A)-models as follows with minimal changes in the proofs.
Lemma 4.4. Let M = 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 be an FK(A)-model.
(a) Let M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ , T̂, T̂♦〉 be a generated FK(A)-submodel of M. Then V̂ (ϕ, x) =
V (ϕ, x) for all x ∈ Ŵ , and ϕ ∈ Fm.
(b) Given any x ∈ W and k ∈ N, there exists an FK(A)-tree-model M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ ,
T̂, T̂♦〉 with root x̂ and hg(M̂) ≤ k such that V̂ (ϕ, x̂) = V (ϕ, x) for all ϕ ∈ Fm
with `(ϕ) ≤ k, and if M is an FKc(A)-model, then so is M̂.
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Example 4.5. There are very simple ﬁnite FKc(A)-counter-models for the formula
¬¬p → ¬¬p when A = [0, 1]. For example for M = 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 deﬁned by
W = {a}, Raa = 1, T(a) = T♦(a) = CL, and 0 < V (p, a) < min(CL \ {0}) :
V (¬¬p, a) =
∨
{r ∈ CL | r ≤
∧
{V (¬¬p, y) | Ray}}
=
∨
{r ∈ CL | r ≤ V (¬¬p, a)}
=
∨
{r ∈ CL | r ≤ 1}
= 1
V (¬¬p, a) = ¬¬
∨
{r ∈ CL | r ≤
∧
{V (p, y) | Ray}}
= ¬¬
∨
{r ∈ CL | r ≤ V (p, a)}
= ¬¬ 0
= 0
and thus
V (¬¬p→ ¬¬p, a) = V (¬¬p, a)→ V (¬¬p, a)
= 1→ 0
= 0 .
The same formula fails in a similar ﬁnite FKc(A)-model when A = G↓, and 4♦p→ ♦4p
fails in a similar FKc(A)-model when A = G↑.
Indeed, as shown below, given an FK(A)-tree-model of ﬁnite height where ϕ ∈ Fm is not
valid, we can always prune (i.e. remove branches from) the model in such a way that ϕ
is still not valid in the resulting ﬁnite FK(A)-tree-model. It then follows from part (b)
of Lemma 4.4 that FK(A) and FKc(A) have the ﬁnite model property with respect to
FK(A) and FKc(A), respectively.
Lemma 4.6. Let Σ ⊆ Fm be a ﬁnite fragment. Then for any FK(A)-tree-model M =
〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 of ﬁnite height with root x, there is a ﬁnite FK(A)-tree-model M̂ =
〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ , T̂, T̂♦〉 with 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 ⊆ 〈W,R, V 〉, root x ∈ Ŵ , and |Ŵ | ≤ |Σ|hg(M) such
that V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) for all ϕ ∈ Σ.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on hg(M). For the base case, W = {x} and it
suﬃces to deﬁne M̂ = M.
For the induction step hg(M) = n + 1, consider for each y ∈ R+[x], the submodel
My = 〈Wy, Ry, Vy, Ty, T♦y〉 of M generated by y. Each My is an FK(A)-tree-model
of ﬁnite height with root y and hg(My) ≤ n. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, for
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each y ∈ R+[x], there is a ﬁnite FK(A)-tree-model M̂y = 〈Ŵy, R̂y, V̂y, T̂y, T̂♦y〉 with
〈Ŵy, R̂y, V̂y, 〉 ⊆ 〈Wy, Ry, Vy〉 and root y ∈ Ŵy, such that |Ŵy| ≤ |Σ|n and for all ϕ ∈ Σ,
using Lemma 4.4(a), V̂y(ϕ, y) = Vy(ϕ, y) = V (ϕ, y).
We choose a ﬁnite number of appropriate y ∈ R+[x] in order to build our ﬁnite
FK(A)-submodel M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ , T̂, T̂♦〉 of M as the union of these M̂y connected by
the root world x ∈ Ŵ . First we deﬁne T̂(x) and T̂♦(x).
Consider T(x) = A \
⋃
i∈I(ai, ci) for some ﬁnite I ⊆ N (possibly empty), where for
all i ∈ I, ai ∈ R(A), ci witnesses right homogeneity at ai, and the intervals (ai, ci) are
pairwise disjoint. Consider also the ﬁnite (possibly empty) set (V [Σ, x] ∩R(A)) \ {ai |
i ∈ I} = {aj | j ∈ J} where I ∩ J = ∅. For j ∈ J , choose a witness of right homogeneity
cj at aj such that the intervals (ai, ci) are pairwise disjoint, for all i ∈ I ∪ J , and
(V [Σ, x] ∪ CL) ∩ (
⋃
i∈I∪J(ai, ci)) = ∅. We deﬁne T̂(x) = A \
⋃
i∈I∪J(ai, ci), satisfying
conditions (i) and (ii) of the deﬁnition of an FK(A)-model by construction. Note also
that V [Σ, x] ∪ CL ⊆ T̂(x) ⊆ T(x).
Similarly, consider T♦(x) = A \
⋃
i∈I′(di, bi) for some ﬁnite I
′ ⊆ N (possibly empty),
where for all i ∈ I ′, bi ∈ L(A), di witnesses left homogeneity at bi, and the intervals
(di, bi) are pairwise disjoint. Consider also the ﬁnite (possibly empty) set (V [Σ♦, x] ∩
L(A)) \ {bi | i ∈ I ′} = {bj | j ∈ J ′}. For j ∈ J ′, choose a witness of left homogeneity
dj at bj such that the intervals (di, bi) are pairwise disjoint for all i ∈ I ′ ∪ J ′, and
(V [Σ♦, x]∪CL)∩ (
⋃
i∈I′∪J ′(di, bi)) = ∅. We deﬁne T̂♦(x) = A \
⋃
i∈I′∪J ′(di, bi), satisfying
conditions (i) and (iii) of the deﬁnition of an FK(A)-mode by construction. Note also
that V [Σ♦, x] ∪ CL ⊆ T̂♦(x) ⊆ T♦(x).
Consider now ϕ = ψ ∈ Σ and let a = V (ψ, x) ∈ T̂(x). If a /∈ R(A), choose
yϕ ∈ R+[x] such that a = Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ). If a ∈ R(A), there is an i ∈ I ∪ J , such
that a = ai, and we choose yϕ ∈ R+[x] such that Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ) ∈ [ai, ci). Similarly,
for each ϕ = ♦ψ ∈ Σ♦, let b = V (♦ψ, x) ∈ T♦(x). If b /∈ L(A), choose yϕ ∈ R+[x] such
that b = Rxyϕ ∧ V (ψ, yϕ). If b ∈ L(A), there is an i ∈ I ′ ∪ J ′, such that b = bi and we
choose yϕ ∈ R+[x] such that Rxyϕ ∧ V (ψ, yϕ) ∈ (di, bi].
Now let Y = {yϕ ∈ R+[x] | ϕ ∈ Σ ∪ Σ♦}, noting that |Y | ≤ |Σ ∪ Σ♦| < |Σ|. We
deﬁne M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ , T̂, T̂♦〉 where
Ŵ = {x} ∪
⋃
y∈Y
Ŵy ,
and R̂ and V̂ are R and V , respectively, restricted to Ŵ . T̂(z) and T̂♦(z) are deﬁned as
T̂y(z) and T̂♦y(z), respectively, if z ∈ Ŵy, for some y ∈ Y . T̂(x) and T̂♦(x) are deﬁned
as above.
Observe that 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 ⊆ 〈W,R, V 〉, x ∈ Ŵ is the root of M̂, and |Ŵ | ≤ |Y ||Σ|n+1 <
|Σ||Σ|n = |Σ|hg(M). Moreover, for each y ∈ Y , M̂y is an FK(A)-submodel of M̂ generated
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by y. Hence, by Lemma 4.4(a) and the induction hypothesis, for all ϕ ∈ Σ,
V̂ (ϕ, y) = V̂y(ϕ, y) = Vy(ϕ, y) = V (ϕ, y) . (21)
We show now that V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) for all ϕ ∈ Σ, proceeding by induction on `(ϕ). The
base case follows directly from the deﬁnition of V̂ . For the inductive step, the non-modal
cases follow directly using the induction hypothesis. For ϕ = ψ, there are two cases.
Suppose ﬁrst that V (ψ, x) = a /∈ R(A) and recall that
V (ψ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T(x) | r ≤
∧
{Rxy → V (ψ, y) | y ∈W}} = a .
This implies that Rxy → V (ψ, y) ≥ a for all y ∈ Y ⊆ R+[x]. Hence, by (21), R̂xy →
V̂ (ψ, y) ≥ a for all y ∈ Y = R̂+[x]. Moreover, R̂xyϕ → V̂ (ψ, yϕ) = a and hence, because
a ∈ V [Σ, x] ⊆ T̂(x),
V̂ (ψ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T̂(x) | r ≤
∧
{R̂xy → V̂ (ψ, y) | y ∈ Ŵ}} = a .
For the second case, suppose that V (ψ, x) = a ∈ R(A). Then a = ai, for some i ∈ I∪J ,
and we observe that
ai = a ≤
∧
{Rxy → V (ψ, y) | y ∈W} .
By (21), we know that R̂xy → V̂ (ψ, y) = Rxy → V (ψ, y) for each y ∈ Ŵ , and because
Ŵ ⊆W , it follows that
ai ≤
∧
{Rxy → V (ψ, y) | y ∈W} ≤
∧
{R̂xy → V̂ (ψ, y) | y ∈ Ŵ} .
By the choice of yϕ ∈ Ŵ ,
R̂xyϕ → V̂ (ψ, yϕ) = Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ) < ci .
Hence ai ≤
∧{R̂xy → V̂ (ψ, y) | y ∈ Ŵ} < ci and
V̂ (ψ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T̂(x) | r ≤
∧
{R̂xy → V̂ (ψ, y) | y ∈ Ŵ}} = ai = a .
The case where ϕ = ♦ψ is very similar.
Remark 4.7. Let us suppose that in Lemma 4.6, for the FK(A)-tree-model M with
root x, T(x) = T♦(x) = A. In this case, the number of intervals omitted from T̂(x)
and T̂♦(x), deﬁned in the proof, is smaller than or equal to the cardinality of Σ and
Σ♦, respectively, for the given ﬁnite fragment Σ. This is because the left endpoints of
the intervals utilized in the proof to deﬁne T̂(x) in the ﬁnite FK(A)-tree-model belong
to V [Σ(ϕ), x], and similarly for T̂♦(x).
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4.2 Relating the Two Semantics
Let us assume again that A is a locally homogeneous order-based algebra. We devote
this section to establishing that a formula is valid in K(A) or Kc(A) if and only if it
is valid in FK(A) or FKc(A), respectively. Observe ﬁrst that any K(A)-model can be
extended to an FK(A)-model with the same valid formulas simply by deﬁning T and
T♦ to be constantly A. Hence any FK(A)-valid formula is also K(A)-valid. We therefore
turn our attention to the other (much harder) direction: proving that any K(A)-valid
formula is also FK(A)-valid.
The main ingredient of the proof (see Lemma 4.10) is the construction of a K(A)-tree-
model taking the same values for formulas at its root as a given FK(A)-tree-model. Note
that the original FK(A)-tree-model without the functions T and T♦ cannot play this role
in general; in [0, 1], for example, the inﬁmum or supremum required for calculating the
value of a box-formula or diamond-formula at the root x might not be in the set T(x) or
T♦(x). This problem is resolved by taking inﬁnitely many copies of an inductively deﬁned
K(A)-model in such a way that certain parts of the intervals in A missing in T(x) or
T♦(x) are squeezed closer to either their lower or upper bounds. The obtained inﬁma
and suprema will then coincide with the next smaller or larger member of T(x) and
T♦(x): that is, the required values of the formulas at x in the original FK(A)-tree-model.
The following example illustrates this idea for the relatively simple case where A = G.
Example 4.8. Consider the FKc(G)-tree-modelM = 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 withW = {x, y},
R = {(x, y)}, and T(x) = [0, 1]\ (0.2, 0.8). Note that 0.2 ∈ R(G) and that 0.8 witnesses
right homogeneity at 0.2. Suppose that V (p, y) = 0.6, so that
V (p, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T(x) | r ≤
∧
{V (p, y) | Rxy}}
=
∨
{r ∈ [0, 1] \ (0.2, 0.8) | r ≤ 0.6}
= 0.2 .
For each k ≥ 2, we then consider the Kc(G)-model Mk = 〈Wk, Rk, Vk〉 with Wk =
{yk}, Rk = ∅, and Vk(p, yk) = hk(V (p, y)), for some deﬂationary {0, 1}-order embedding
hk : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], satisfying
hk[[0.2, 0.8)] = [0.2, 0.2 +
1
k ) .
Deﬁning the Kc(G)-tree-model M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉, with Ŵ = {x} ∪ {yk | k ≥ 2}, R̂ =
{(x, yk) | k ≥ 2}, and V̂ (p, yk) = Vk(p, yk), we obtain (see Figure 4.1):
V̂ (p, x) =
∧
{V̂ (p, yk) | R̂xyk}
= 0.2
= V (p, x).
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M:
0 10.8V (p, x) = 0.2
V (p, y)
Mk, k = 2:
0 10.2 0.80.2 + 1k
Vk(p, yk)
Mk, k = 4:
0 10.2 0.80.2 + 1k
Vk(p, yk)
Mk, k = 20:
0 10.2 0.80.2 + 1k
Vk(p, yk)
M̂:
0 10.8V̂ (p, x) = 0.2
{V̂ (p, yk) | k ≥ 2}
Figure 4.1: Squeezing models
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A central tool in the proof of Lemma 4.10 below is the following technical result, which
allows the squeezing of K(A)-models so that the values of formulas are arbitrarily close
to certain points (as in Example 4.8). Intuitively, in the proof of Lemma 4.10, the set
B in Lemma 4.9 will be the set of values at the root world x of all box-formulas and
diamond-formulas in some fragment Σ. Furthermore, the values a and c, in (a) of Lemma
4.9, will denote the endpoints of the removed interval and s will be the relevant value
that we want to squeeze closer and closer towards a. The value t, the upper endpoint
of the squeezed interval, will then be chosen in A \ (B ∩ L(A)) in order to ensure that
all the suprema in B (relevant for determining the values of diamond-formulas in Σ)
are preserved by the squeezing. Note that u ∈ [0, 1] can be any value as close to a as
needed (e.g. u = a + 1k for any k ∈ Z+) so as to squeeze the interval [a, t) into [a, u) by
the B-complete deﬂationary order embedding h, with the intention that s ∈ [a, t) and
h(s) ∈ [a, u). For (b) of Lemma 4.9, the ideas are very similar.
Lemma 4.9. Let B ⊆ A be countable.
(a) Given a ∈ R(A), some witness c > a of right homogeneity at a, and an s ∈ [a, c),
there is a t ∈ (s, c] such that t /∈ B ∩ L(A). Moreover, for all u ∈ (a, t], there is a
B-complete deﬂationary order embedding h : A→ A such that
h[[a, t)] ⊆ [a, u) and h|A\(a,t) = idA .
(b) Given b ∈ L(A), some witness d < b of left homogeneity at b, and an s ∈ (d, b],
there is a t ∈ [d, s) such that t /∈ B ∩ R(A). Moreover, for all u ∈ [t, b), there is a
B-complete inﬂationary order embedding h : A→ A such that
h[(t, b]] ⊆ (u, b] and h|A\(t,b) = idA .
Proof. For (a), let B ⊆ A be countable and consider a ∈ R(A), a witness c of right
homogeneity at a, and s ∈ [a, c). We ﬁrst prove that there is a t ∈ (s, c] which is either
in A \ L(A) or in A \ B. If c /∈ L(A), choose t = c. If c ∈ L(A), then [s, c] is inﬁnite.
Recall that A is a complete sublattice of [0, 1] and that every non-empty perfect set of
real numbers (closed and containing no isolated points) is uncountable. Hence if [s, c]
is countable, there must be an isolated point t ∈ (s, c] such that t /∈ L(A). If [s, c] is
uncountable, then there is a t ∈ (s, c] \ B, as B is countable. Either way, there is a
t ∈ (s, c] such that t /∈ B ∩ L(A).
Now we deﬁne the embedding. Because t ≤ c also witnesses right homogeneity at a,
for each u ∈ (a, t], there is a complete deﬂationary order embedding g : [a, t) → [a, u)
with g(a) = a. Deﬁne h as g on [a, t) and as the identity on A \ [a, t). Then all arbitrary
meets and joins in A are preserved except in the case where t is a join of elements in
[a, t) and so t ∈ L(A). But in this case t /∈ B. Hence (a) holds. For (b), we use a very
similar argument.
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Lemma 4.10. Let Σ be a ﬁnite fragment and let M = 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 be a ﬁnite
FK(A)-tree-model with root x. Then there is a countable K(A)-tree-model M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉
with root x̂ such that V̂ (ϕ, x̂) = V (ϕ, x) for all ϕ ∈ Σ. Moreover, if M is crisp, then so
is M̂.
Proof. The lemma is proved by induction on hg(M). The base case is immediate, ﬁxing
M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 with Ŵ = W = {x}, R̂ = R, and V̂ = V . For the induction step, given
y ∈ R+[x], let My = 〈Wy, Ry, Vy, Ty, T♦y〉 be the submodel of M generated by y. Then
My is a ﬁnite FK(A)-tree-model with root y, hg(My) < hg(M), and, by Lemma 4.4(a),
Vy(ϕ, z) = V (ϕ, z) for all z ∈Wy and ϕ ∈ Fm. So, by the induction hypothesis, there is
a countable K(A)-tree-model M̂y = 〈Ŵy, R̂y, V̂y〉 (crisp if M is crisp) with root ŷ such
that V̂y(ϕ, ŷ) = Vy(ϕ, y) = V (ϕ, y) for all ϕ ∈ Σ.
For each ϕ ∈ Σ∪Σ♦, we will choose a world yϕ ∈ R+[x] as described below and then,
using Lemma 4.9, deﬁne for each k ∈ Z+ a copy of the K(A)-tree-model M̂yϕ , denoted
M̂kϕ. Suppose that ϕ = ψ ∈ Σ. Consider T(x) = A \
⋃
i∈I(ai, ci) for some ﬁnite
I ⊆ N (possibly empty), where for all i ∈ I, ai ∈ R(A), ci witnesses right homogeneity
at ai, and the intervals (ai, ci) are pairwise disjoint. There are two cases.
(i) Suppose that V (ψ, x) = ai for some i ∈ I. Recalling that
ai = V (ψ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T(x) | r ≤
∧
{Rxy → V (ψ, y) | y ∈W}} ,
there must be a world yϕ ∈ R+[x] such that
Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ) ∈ [ai, ci) .
We ﬁx B = V̂yϕ [Σ∪Σ♦, Ŵyϕ ], which is countable because Ŵyϕ is countable and Σ∪Σ♦
is ﬁnite. Using Lemma 4.9, for some t satisfying
ai ≤ s = Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ) < t ≤ ci ,
there exists for each k ∈ Z+, a B-complete deﬂationary order embedding hk : A → A
mapping [ai, t) into [ai, ai + 1k ), and hk|A\(ai,t) = idA. Clearly, this implies that for all
k ∈ Z+, hk is a V̂yϕ [Σ ∪Σ♦, Ŵyϕ ]-complete deﬂationary CL-order embedding. We then
deﬁne the copy M̂kϕ = 〈Ŵ kϕ , R̂kϕ, V̂ kϕ 〉 of M̂yϕ as follows:
• Ŵ kϕ is a copy of Ŵyϕ , denoting the copy of x̂yϕ ∈ Ŵyϕ by x̂kϕ
• R̂kϕx̂kϕẑkϕ = hk(R̂yϕ x̂yϕ ẑyϕ) for x̂yϕ , ẑyϕ ∈ Ŵyϕ
• V̂ kϕ (p, x̂kϕ) = hk(V̂yϕ(p, x̂yϕ)) for x̂yϕ ∈ Ŵyϕ .
Because hk is a V̂yϕ [Σ ∪ Σ♦, Ŵyϕ ]-complete deﬂationary CL-order embedding, it fol-
lows by Lemma 3.10 that V̂ kϕ (χ, ŷ
k
ϕ) = hk(V̂yϕ(χ, ŷϕ)) for all χ ∈ Σ. By the induction
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hypothesis,
(†) hk(Rxyϕ)→ V̂ kϕ (ψ, ŷkϕ) = hk(Rxyϕ)→ hk(V̂yϕ(ψ, ŷϕ))
= hk(Rxyϕ → V̂yϕ(ψ, ŷϕ))
= hk(Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ))
= hk(s)
∈ [ai, ai + 1k ) .
(ii) Suppose that V (ψ, x) 6= ai for all i ∈ I. In this case, V (ψ, x) =
∧{Rxy →
V (ψ, y) | y ∈ W} and, because W is ﬁnite, there is a yϕ ∈ W , such that, by the
induction hypothesis,
V (ψ, x) = Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ) = Rxyϕ → V̂yϕ(ψ, yϕ) .
In this case, let hk be the identity function on A and M̂kϕ = 〈Ŵ kϕ , R̂kϕ, V̂ kϕ 〉 = M̂yϕ .
In a similar fashion, when ϕ = ♦ψ ∈ Σ♦, we obtain for each k ∈ Z+, a K(A)-tree-
model M̂kϕ as a copy of M̂yϕ .
We now deﬁne the K(A)-tree-model M̂ = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 by
Ŵ = {x̂} ∪
⋃
ϕ∈Σ∪Σ♦
⋃
k∈Z+
Ŵ kϕ
R̂wz =

R̂kϕwz if w, z ∈ Ŵ kϕ for some ϕ ∈ Σ ∪ Σ♦, k ∈ Z+
hk(Rxyϕ) if w = x̂, z = ŷkϕ ∈ Ŵ kϕ for ϕ ∈ Σ ∪ Σ♦, k ∈ Z+
0 otherwise
V̂ (p, z) =
V̂ kϕ (p, z) if z ∈ Ŵ kϕ for some ϕ ∈ Σ ∪ Σ♦, k ∈ Z+V (p, x) if z = x̂.
If M is crisp, then for all ϕ ∈ Σ ∪ Σ♦, M̂yϕ is crisp and so also are M̂kϕ for all k ∈ Z+.
Hence, by construction, M̂ is crisp. Moreover, as there are only ﬁnitely many diﬀerent
countable M̂yϕ , and we only take countably many copies of each one, M̂ is also countable.
Observe now that for each ŷkϕ ∈ R̂+[x̂], we have that M̂kϕ is the submodel of M̂
generated by ŷkϕ. Hence, by Lemma 3.5, for all χ ∈ Σ and ŷkϕ ∈ R̂+[x̂],
(‡) V̂ (χ, ŷkϕ) = V̂ kϕ (χ, ŷkϕ) = hk(V̂yϕ(χ, ŷϕ)) = hk(Vyϕ(χ, yϕ)) = hk(V (χ, yϕ)) .
Finally, we prove that V̂ (χ, x̂) = V (χ, x) for all χ ∈ Σ, proceeding by induction on `(χ).
The base case follows directly from the deﬁnition of V̂ . For the induction step, the cases
for the non-modal connectives follow easily using the induction hypothesis. Let us just
consider the case χ = ϕ = ψ (a formula in Σ), the case χ = ♦ψ being very similar.
There are two possibilities.
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(i) Suppose that V (ψ, x) = ai for some i ∈ I. Then for all z ∈ W , we have
Rxz → V (ψ, z) ≥ ai. Note that it is not possible for any a ∈ A and hk deﬁned above
that hk(a) < ai ≤ a, as hk is either the identity on T(x) or is inﬂationary on A. So by
construction, for all ẑ ∈ Ŵ ,
R̂x̂ẑ → V̂ (ψ, ẑ) ≥ ai .
Moreover, for yϕ ∈W ,
Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ) ∈ [ai, ci) ,
and by (†) and (‡),
ai ≤
∧
{R̂x̂ẑ → V̂ (ψ, ẑ) | ẑ ∈ Ŵ}
≤
∧
{R̂x̂ŷkϕ → V̂ (ψ, ŷkϕ) | k ∈ Z+}
=
∧
{hk(Rxyϕ)→ V̂ kϕ (ψ, ŷkϕ) | k ∈ Z+}
=
∧
{hk(Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ)) | k ∈ Z+}
≤
∧
{ai + 1k | k ∈ Z+}
= ai .
So V̂ (ψ, x̂) =
∧{R̂x̂ẑ → V̂ (ψ, ẑ) : ẑ ∈ Ŵ} = ai = V (ψ, x) as required.
(ii) Suppose that V (ψ, x) 6= ai for all i ∈ I. Again, for all z ∈ W , we have
that Rxz → V (ψ, z) ≥ V (ψ, x) ∈ T(x). As hk is either the identity on T(x) or is
inﬂationary on A, by construction, for all ẑ ∈ Ŵ ,
R̂x̂ẑ → V̂ (ψ, ẑ) ≥ V (ψ, x) .
Moreover, as in (ii) above, because W is ﬁnite, there is a yϕ ∈W such that
Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ) = V (ψ, x) .
Using (‡) and the fact that hk is either the identity on T(x) or inﬂationary on A,
V̂ (ψ, x̂) =
∧
{R̂x̂ẑ → V̂ (ψ, ẑ) | ẑ ∈ Ŵ}
=
∧
{R̂x̂ŷkϕ → V̂ (ψ, ŷkϕ) | k ∈ Z+}
=
∧
{hk(Rxyϕ)→ V̂ kϕ (ψ, ŷkϕ) | k ∈ Z+}
=
∧
{hk(Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ)) | k ∈ Z+}
= Rxyϕ → V (ψ, yϕ)
= V (ψ, x) .
So V̂ (ψ, x̂) = V (ψ, x) as required.
We then obtain the following equivalences.
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Theorem 4.11.
(a) For any formula ϕ ∈ Fm, the following are equivalent:
(i) |=K(A) ϕ
(ii) |=FK(A) ϕ
(iii) ϕ is valid in all ﬁnite FK(A)-tree-models 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 such that
|W | ≤ (`(ϕ) + |CL|)`(ϕ)
(b) For any formula ϕ ∈ Fm, the following are equivalent:
(i) |=Kc(A) ϕ
(ii) |=FKc(A) ϕ
(iii) ϕ is valid in all ﬁnite FKc(A)-tree-models 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 such that
|W | ≤ (`(ϕ) + |CL|)`(ϕ)
Proof. For (a), the step from (ii) to (i) is immediate using the fact that every K(A)-
tree-model can be extended to an FK(A)-tree-model with the same valid formulas by
setting T and T♦ to be constantly A. For the steps from (i) to (iii) and from (iii) to
(ii), suppose that 6|=FK(A) ϕ. By Lemmas 4.4 and 4.6, there is a ﬁnite FK(A)-tree-model
〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 with root x such that V (ϕ, x) < 1 and |W | ≤ (`(ϕ) + |CL|)`(ϕ). By
Lemma 4.10, we obtain a K(A)-tree-model 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 with root x̂ such that V̂ (ϕ, x̂) =
V (ϕ, x) < 1. So 6|=K(A) ϕ.
The proof of (b) is very similar, using the fact that Lemmas 4.4, 4.6, and 4.10 preserve
crisp models.
Let us extend the notion of ﬁnite model property as follows: a logic L for Lm has the
ﬁnite model property with respect to FK(A) (FKc(A)), if for all ϕ ∈ Fm, ϕ is valid in
L if and only if ϕ is valid in all ﬁnite FK(A)-models (all ﬁnite FKc(A)-models). The
following corollary is then an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.11.
Corollary 4.12. The logics K(A) and Kc(A) have the ﬁnite model property with respect
to FK(A) and FKc(A), respectively.
4.3 Decidability and Complexity
Let us assume again that A is a locally homogeneous order-based algebra. In this sec-
tion, we will use the ﬁnite model property of K(A) and Kc(A) with respect to FK(A) and
FKc(A), respectively, to obtain decidability and complexity results for the validity prob-
lem of these logics in various cases. We prove, in particular, that the validity problem
of the Gödel modal logics GK and GKc (i.e. where A is G) are both PSPACE-complete
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and that the same is true for K(A) and Kc(A) in case A is G↓ or G↑. These and other
results in this section contrast with the fact that no ﬁrst-order expansion of a Gödel logic
based on a countably inﬁnite set of truth values is recursively axiomatizable (see [8]).
A standard reference book for notions in complexity theory is [104]. Moreover, the
more recent text book [2] covers the state of art of complexity theory.
For simplicity of exposition, we will assume that the only constants are > and ⊥. To
explain the ideas involved in the proofs, consider ϕ ∈ Fm and n = |Σ(ϕ)| = `(ϕ)+ |CL| =
`(ϕ) + 2. To check that ϕ is not K(A)-valid, it suﬃces, by Lemmas 4.4, 4.6, and 4.10, to
ﬁnd a ﬁnite FK(A)-tree-model M = 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 of height ≤ `(ϕ) with root x and
|W | ≤ |Σ(ϕ)|`(ϕ) ≤ nn such that V (ϕ, x) < 1.
If A is inﬁnite, then T(x) and T♦(x) may also be inﬁnite, and hence M may not be
a computational object. We therefore introduce a modiﬁed version of M:
M∗ = 〈W,R, V, {Φ(x)}x∈W , {Ψ(x)}x∈W 〉,
where for each x ∈ W , Φ(x) ⊆ A2 is the set of ordered pairs for which T(x) = A \⋃
〈r,s〉∈Φ(x)(r, s), and Ψ(x) ⊆ A2 is the set of ordered pairs deﬁning T♦(x). Using the proof
of Lemma 4.6 applied to a K(A)-model, we may assume that |Φ(x)|, |Ψ(x)| ≤ |Σ(ϕ)| = n
for all x ∈ W (see Remark 4.7). Let us deﬁne inductively in M∗, for all x ∈ W and
ψ ∈ Fm,
V (ψ, x) =

r if
∧{Rxy → V (ψ, y) | y ∈W} ∈ (r, s)
for some 〈r, s〉 ∈ Φ(x)∧{Rxy → V (ψ, y) | y ∈W} otherwise,
V (♦ψ, x) =

s if
∨{Rxy ∧ V (ψ, y) | y ∈W} ∈ (r, s)
for some 〈r, s〉 ∈ Ψ(x)∨{Rxy ∧ V (ψ, y) | y ∈W} otherwise.
Then M∗ and M assign the same values to a formula at any world. Moreover, for
χ ∈ Σ(ϕ), the computation of V (χ, x) in M∗ involves only the set of values
N = V [Σ(ϕ),W ] ∪ {Rxy | x, y ∈W} ∪ {r, s | 〈r, s〉 ∈ Φ(x) ∪Ψ(x), x ∈W} .
Note that |N | ≤ 4n2n = en. Hence, we may assume that R and V take values in the
ﬁxed set A(en), where for m ∈ Z+,
A(m) = {0, 1m , . . . , m−1m , 1} .
We can also assume that W is Wn ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , nn}, yielding a ﬁnite structure
M∗ = 〈Wn, R, V, {Φ(i)}i∈Wn , {Ψ(i)}i∈Wn〉 ,
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where 〈Wn, R+〉 is a tree with root 0 of height ≤ n and branching ≤ n, and the sets
Φ(i),Ψ(i), for i ∈ Wn, determine the endpoints of a family of disjoint open intervals
in A(en). We will call this kind of structure a (crisp if R is crisp) FK(en)-tree-model.
In order to recover the connection with the original FK(A)-model, we introduce the
following convenient notion.
A ﬁnite system is a triple A(m) = 〈A(m),Φ,Ψ〉 where Φ,Ψ ⊆ A(m)2. We call
A(m) consistent with A if for some order-preserving embedding h : A(m)→ A, satisfying
h(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1,
• h(c) witnesses right homogeneity at h(a) ∈ R(A) for all 〈a, c〉 ∈ Φ,
• h(d) witnesses left homogeneity at h(b) ∈ L(A) for all 〈d, b〉 ∈ Ψ.
Then we obtain from the previous discussion:
Theorem 4.13. The validity problems of K(A) and Kc(A) are decidable if the problem of
consistency of ﬁnite systems A(m) with A is decidable. Moreover, the validity problems
of K(A) and Kc(A) are coNEXPTIME-reducible (in the length of the formula) to the
problem of consistency of ﬁnite systems A(m) with A.
Proof. As observed above, ϕ ∈ Fm with n = `(ϕ) + 2 is not K(A)-valid (Kc(A)-
valid) if and only if there is a (crisp) FK(en)-tree-model of the form M∗ = 〈Wn, R,
V, {Φ(i)}i∈Wn , {Ψ(i)}i∈Wn〉 for which V (ϕ, 0) < 1 and the ﬁnite system A(en) =
〈A(en),
⋃
i∈Wn Φ(i),
⋃
i∈Wn Ψ(i)〉 is consistent with A.
Choose non-deterministically V : Var(ϕ)→ A(en), R : W 2n → A(en), and Φ(i), Ψ(i) ⊆
A(en)
2 for all i ∈Wn to obtain the (crisp) FK(en)-tree-model M∗, and compute V (ϕ, 0)
to verify V (ϕ, 0) < 1. This takes a number of steps bounded by a constant multiple of
en. Then utilize an oracle to verify the consistency of A(en) with A.
Example 4.14. Any ﬁnite system A(m) = 〈A(m),Φ,Ψ〉 is consistent with G. Also
A(m) is consistent with G↓ if and only if Ψ = ∅ and Φ = {(0, k1m ), . . . , (0, klm)} for some
l ∈ Z+ and k1, . . . , kl ∈ N, or is ∅, and A(m) is consistent with G↑ if and only if Φ = ∅
and Ψ = {(k1m , 1), . . . , (klm , 1)} for some l ∈ Z+ and k1, . . . , kl ∈ N, or is ∅. Hence in these
cases the consistency problem is obviously decidable in linear time and space (null-space
if the size of the input tape is not considered).
Moreover, it is easy to verify inductively that any algebraA obtained fromG,G↓,G↑,
and ﬁnite order-based algebras as a ﬁnite combination of ordered sums, lexicographical
products, and fusion of consecutive points has a (PTIME) decidable consistency problem.
In all of these cases, validity in K(A) and Kc(A) is (coNEXPTIME) decidable. This
includes the case when A, as an ordered set, is isomorphic to an ordinal α + 1 < ωω or
its reverse.
78 CHAPTER 4. DECIDABILITY OF ORDER-BASED MODAL LOGICS
The algebras G, G↓, G↑, and ﬁnite order-based algebras have the additional property
that if the ﬁnite systems 〈A(m),Φi,Ψi〉, for i = 0, . . . , k, are consistent with A, then the
same holds for 〈A(m),⋃i≤k Φi,⋃i≤k Ψi〉. This will allow us to improve the decidability
result in these cases to PSPACE-completeness. First, however, we need a result about
FK(en)-tree-models.
Lemma 4.15. The following problem is PSPACE-reducible (in n) to the consistency of
ﬁnite systems with A :
Given Σ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} ⊆ Fm (not necessarily distinct formulas) such that k ≤
n and `(ϕj) ≤ n for j = 1, . . . , k, and given intervals I1, . . . , Ik ⊆ A(en) (closed or
open at their endpoints), determine if there exists a (crisp) FK(en)-tree-model M∗ =
〈Wn, R, V, {Φ(i)}i∈Wn , {Ψ(i)}i∈Wn〉 with root 0 and height ≤ n such that V (ϕj , 0) ∈ Ij,
for j = 1, . . . , k, and for i ∈Wn, the system 〈A(en),Φ(i),Ψ(i)〉 is consistent with A.
Proof. As PSPACE = NPSPACE (see [113]), it suﬃces to give a non-deterministic poly-
nomial space algorithm to produce the FK(en)-tree-mode M∗. Because the full model
may need exponential space to be displayed, our strategy is to search sequentially the
branches of M∗, from the root down, so that all branches are built in the same poly-
nomial space. This is the basic idea of Richard Ladner's proof in [88] of the PSPACE
complexity of the classical modal logic K. We do not try to optimize the space bound
but show that 22n5 does the job.
Input. Each value in A(en) may be represented by a binary word of length at most
log en ≤ 2n2, and the only information we need from the input, besides Σ, is the maximum
(strictly smaller than 1) of A(en) and the endpoints of the intervals Ij , indicating if they
are included or not in the intervals. We consider also as part of the input a particular
world x ∈ Wn, written in binary notation (length ≤ log nn ≤ n2). At the initial stage,
x = 0. With appropriate markings in the formulas, we may also assume that each ϕj
appears decomposed in the form:
ϕj = χj(p1, . . . , pl,ψj1, . . . ,ψjnj ,♦θ
j
1, . . . ,♦θjmj ) ,
where P = {p1, . . . , pl} ⊆ Var and χj(p1, . . . , pl, q1, . . . , qnj , s1, . . . , smj ) is a non-modal
formula. Set:
S = {ψj1, . . . ,ψjnj : j = 1, . . . , k} , S♦ = {♦θj1, . . . ,♦θjmj : j = 1, . . . , k} ,
F = {ψj1, . . . , ψjnj : j = 1, . . . , k} , F♦ = {θj1, . . . , θjmj : j = 1, . . . , k} .
Note that the input may be displayed in space at most 3n2 + (1 + 2n)2n2 ≤ 9n3.
Step 1. Choose values V (ρ, x) ∈ A(en), for all ρ ∈ P ∪ S ∪ S♦, and verify that
V (ϕj , x) ∈ Ij for each j ≤ k.
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Choose partial functions Φ(x) = {〈a, ca〉 : a ∈ G} ⊆ V [S, x] × A(en) and Ψ(x) =
{〈db, b〉 : b ∈ H} ⊆ A(en)×V [S♦, x] and verify that the ﬁnite system 〈A(en),Φ(x),Ψ(x)〉
is consistent with A. Each a ∈ G plays the role of a right accumulation point" and ca
plays the role of a witness of right homogeneity" at a; similarly, each b ∈ H plays the
role of a left accumulation point" and db plays the role of a witness of left homogeneity"
at b. An oracle for the consistency problem must certify that this distribution can be
realized in A.
Choose also worlds y1, . . . , ym ∈Wn for m ≤ n in the next level of the tree and values
Rxyt ∈ A(en) for t = 1, . . . ,m.
Note that the space required to perform this step and store the data produced is
at most 3n · 2n2 + n · n2 = 7n3. The values of the desired tree-model M∗ are guessed
at the root. Hence, this model exists if and only if it is possible to ﬁnd further (crisp,
if necessary) FK(en)-tree-models M∗t of height ≤ n − 1 with respective roots yt, for
t = 1, . . . ,m, such that for any ρ ∈ F ∪ F♦,
1.
m∧
t=1
(Rxyt → V (ρ, yt)) ∈ [V (ρ, x), ca), if ρ ∈ F and V (ρ, x) = a ∈ G,
2.
m∧
t=1
(Rxyt → V (ρ, yt)) = V (ρ, x), if ρ ∈ F and V (ρ, x) /∈ G,
3.
m∨
t=1
(Rxyt ∧ V (ρ, yt)) ∈ (db, V (♦ρ, x)], if ρ ∈ F♦ and V (♦ρ, x) = b ∈ H,
4.
m∨
t=1
(Rxyt ∧ V (ρ, yt)) = V (♦ρ, x), if ρ ∈ F♦ and V (♦ρ, x) /∈ H.
If F t (F
t
♦) denotes the set of ρ ∈ F (ρ ∈ F♦) for which the minimum (maximum)
associated to ρ above is realized at yt, then the situation ρ ∈ F t♦, V (♦ρ, x) = b ∈ H and
Rxyt ≤ db does not arise and, similarly, the situation ρ ∈ F t♦, and Rxyt < V (♦ρ, x) 6∈ H
is impossible. Moreover, the above conditions are equivalent to asking for all t and ρ:
1. Rxyt → V (ρ, yt) ≥ V (ρ, x) if ρ ∈ F
2. Rxyt → V (ρ, yt) ∈ [V (ρ, x), ca) if ρ ∈ F t and V (ρ, x) ∈ G,
3. Rxyt → V (ρ, yt) = V (ρ, x) if ρ ∈ F t and V (ρ, x) /∈ G,
4. Rxyt ∧ V (ρ, yt) ≤ V (♦ρ, x) if ρ ∈ F♦
5. Rxyt ∧ V (ρ, yt) ∈ (db, V (♦ρ, x)] if ρ ∈ F t♦ and V (♦ρ, x) ∈ H,
6. Rxyt ∧ V (ρ, yt) = V (♦ρ, x) if ρ ∈ F t♦ and V (♦ρ, x) /∈ H.
These conditions are equivalent, in turn, to asking that for each model M∗t and ρ ∈
F ∪ F♦, the value V (ρ, yt) belongs to the interval Iρ,t, ﬁxed to be
1. [V (ρ, x), Rxyt) if ρ ∈ F and V (ρ, x) < 1,
[Rxyt, 1] if ρ ∈ F and V (ρ, x) = 1,
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2. [V (ρ, x), ca ∧Rxyt) if ρ ∈ F t and V (ρ, x) = a ∈ G,
3. [V (ρ, x), V (ρ, x)] if ρ ∈ F t, V (ρ, x) /∈ G, and V (ρ, x) < 1,
[Rxyt, 1] if ρ ∈ F t, V (ρ, x) /∈ G, and V (ρ, x) = 1,
4. [0, Rxyt → V (♦ρ, x)] if ρ ∈ F♦,
5. (db, Rxyt → V (♦ρ, x)] if ρ ∈ F t♦, V (♦ρ, x) = b ∈ H,
6. [V (♦ρ, x), Rxyt → V (♦ρ, x)] if ρ ∈ F t♦, V (♦ρ, x) /∈ H.
But this amounts to the original problem: the existence of M∗t with root yt satisfying
the conditions of the lemma for the input Σ′ = F ∪ F♦ and intervals Iρ,t, ρ ∈ Σ′. This
justiﬁes the next steps of the algorithm.
Step 2. Find coverings F =
⋃
t∈(1,m] F
t
 and F♦ =
⋃
t∈(1,m] F
t
♦, verify that the
situations ρ ∈ F t♦, V (♦ρ, x) = b ∈ H, and Rxyt ≤ db, or ρ ∈ F t♦ and Rxyt < V (♦ρ, x) 6∈
H do not arise, and compute for each t and ρ ∈ F ∪ F♦ the interval Iρ,t.
Note that computing and storing the data produced in this step requires space at
most 2n · n2 + 2n2 · 2n2 ≤ 6n4.
Step 3. For t = 1, . . . ,m, return consecutively to Step 1 with input: Σ′ = F ∪ F♦,
{Iρ,t : ρ ∈ Σ′}, and x = yt, traversing the resulting tree of worlds in pre-order; that is,
the leftmost branch is exhausted before passing to the next unexplored sub-branch at
the right.
Note that the cyclic repetition of Steps 1 and 2 (an exponential number of times), if
successful at each stage, runs through a tree of height less than n, so the space needed
to guess a branch of the tree is at most 22n5. The key point is that having veriﬁed
successfully the existence of a branch we may utilize the same space for the next one,
and thus the total space required is bounded by 22n5. Informally, returning to Step 1
with t = 1 starts a search for M∗1, after ﬁnishing it successfully, we return to Step 1 with
t = 2 and utilize the same space, bounded by 22n4(n− 1), to search for M∗2, etc. Adding
to this common space the space of the ﬁrst cycle, we obtain 22n5.
Theorem 4.16. The validity problems for K(A) and Kc(A) are PSPACE-complete for
the algebras G, G↓, and G↑.
Proof. Lemma 4.15 applied to a formula ϕ and the interval I = [0, 1) yields a PSPACE
algorithm in the length of ϕ to determine for these algebras, whether there is an FK(en)-
tree-model for which V (ϕ, 0) < 1 and 〈A(en),Φ(i),Ψ(i)〉 is consistent with A, for each
i ∈ Wn ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , nn}. The latter condition is equivalent to consistency with A of
〈A(en),
⋃
i∈Wn Φ(i),
⋃
i∈Wn Ψ(i)〉. The existence of this model is equivalent, recalling the
earlier discussion in this section, to the existence of a K(A)-counter-model for ϕ. The
lower bound follows from the fact that classical modal logic K is PSPACE-hard (cf. [88])
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and can be interpreted faithfully in K(A) or Kc(A) by the double negation interpretation
which adds ¬¬ in front of any subformula of a formula.
Remark 4.17. Note that the last theorem applies to any algebra for which the con-
sistency problem is (PSPACE) decidable and the union of consistent ﬁnite systems is
consistent. Examples of these algebras are ﬁnite algebras (trivially), the ordinals ωn + 1,
n ∈ N+, and their reverse orders. We also expect that PSPACE-completeness holds
for all ﬁnite combinations of G, G↓, G↑, and ﬁnite algebras built via ordered sums,
lexicographical products, and fusion of consecutive points, but will not prove this here.
To generalize the results in this section to languages with a ﬁnite set of constants
CL = {c1 < . . . < cl}, utilize a set of values A′(en) containing an isomorphic copy
C′L = {c′1 < . . . < c′l} of CL such that |[c′i, c′i+1]A′(en)| = |[ci, ci+1]A|, if |[ci, ci+1]A| < en,
and |[c′i, c′i+1]A′(en)| = en, otherwise. This allows V and R to take values in any possible
interval of consecutive constants. Moreover, |A′(en)| ≤ |CL|en and all bounds are multi-
plied by a constant. Finite systems must have now the form 〈A(m),Φ,Ψ, {c′}c∈CL〉 and
the embeddings granting consistency must send c′ to c.
Chapter 5
One-Variable Fragments of
Order-Based First-Order Logics
Similarly to the many-valued modal logics over complete MTL-algebras, further order-
based modal logics may be deﬁned as logics of particular classes of K(A)-models, for
a given order-based algebra A. In particular, in this chapter, we will study the class
of K(A)-models where the accessibility relation is a crisp equivalence relation, which
deﬁnes crisp order-based S5 logics. We ﬁrst turn our attention to proving decidability
and coNP-completeness of the validity problem for these logics in various cases and show
later that these logics may be understood also as one-variable fragments of order-based
ﬁrst-order logics. In particular, we give a positive answer to the open decidability problem
(and establish coNP-completeness) for validity in the one-variable fragment of ﬁrst-order
Gödel logic (see e.g. [67, Chapter 9, Problem 13]).
Unless stated otherwise, the results in the present chapter are based on joint work
of the author of this dissertation with Xavier Caicedo, George Metcalfe, and Ricardo
Rodríguez [26, 27].
Before we start, let us ﬁx again a ﬁnite algebraic language L including the operational
symbols >, ⊥, ∧, ∨, and→, and an order-based algebra A for L. Fm will denote the set
of formulas in FmLm , where Lm = L ∪ {,♦}.
5.1 Alternative Semantics for Order-Based Crisp S5 Logics
In this section, we will deﬁne crisp S5 versions of order-based modal logics and relate
them to a similar alternative semantics as in Chapter 4. The proofs are similar to those
in the previous chapter, but considerably less complicated, as we can restrict to universal
S5c(A)-models, where R is a universal crisp relation.
We deﬁne an S5c(A)-model to be a Kc(A)-model M = 〈W,V,R〉 (see Section 3.2)
such that R is an equivalence relation. We call M universal if R = W ×W and in this
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case write M = 〈W,V 〉, noting that the clauses for  and ♦ simplify to
V (ϕ, x) =
∧
{V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∨
{V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W} .
Let us denote by S5c(A) the logic deﬁned by |=S5c(A). The following lemma is an im-
mediate corollary of Lemma 3.5 and the fact that an S5c(A)-submodel generated by a
world is universal.
Lemma 5.1. A formula ϕ ∈ Fm is valid in S5c(A) if and only if ϕ is valid in all
universal S5c(A)-models.
The inﬁnite K(A)-model deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 3.9 for the formula ¬¬p →
¬¬p is in fact a universal S5c(A)-model. Hence, if the universe of A is [0, 1] or G↓,
then S5c(A) does not have the ﬁnite model property with respect to S5c(A). Also, as
in Theorem 3.8, the logic S5c(G↑) has the ﬁnite model property, but not if 4 is added
to the language. We will prove decidability for these and other cases here using again a
new equivalent semantics.
Let us assume from now on that A is a locally homogeneous order-based algebra for
L. We deﬁne an FS5c(A)-model as an FKc(A)-model M = 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 such that
〈W,R, V 〉 is an S5c(A)-model, and for all x, y ∈W ,
(i) T(x) = T(y) and T♦(x) = T♦(y) whenever Rxy,
(ii) {V (♦p, x) | p ∈ Var} ⊆ T(x) and {V (p, x) | p ∈ Var} ⊆ T♦(x).
We call M universal if R = W ×W and in this case write M = 〈W,V, T, T♦〉, where
T and T♦ may now be understood as ﬁxed subsets of A, and the clauses for  and ♦
simplify to
V (ϕ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T | r ≤
∧
{V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}}
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∧
{r ∈ T♦ | r ≥
∨
{V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}} .
Note in particular that, by condition (i), in universal S5c(A)- and FS5c(A)-models, the
truth values of box-formulas and diamond-formulas are independent of the world.
The new condition (ii) for FS5c(A)-models reﬂects the fact that we deal here with
universal models not tree-models and must therefore take into account the values of
diamond-formulas and box-formulas when ﬁxing the values in T and T♦, respectively.
We will now show that (ii) extends to all diamond- and box-formulas.
Lemma 5.2. For any universal FS5c(A)-model M = 〈W,V, T, T♦〉 and x ∈W ,
{V (♦ϕ, x) | ϕ ∈ Fm} ⊆ T and {V (ϕ, x) | ϕ ∈ Fm} ⊆ T♦ .
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Proof. Let M = 〈W,V, T, T♦〉 be a universal FS5c(A)-model, x ∈W , and ϕ ∈ Fm. We
prove that V (♦ϕ, x) ∈ T and V (ϕ, x) ∈ T♦ by an induction on the length of ϕ.
For the base case, let ϕ be a propositional variable or a constant in CL. Then the
statements follow, for the ﬁrst case, from condition (ii) in the deﬁnition of an FS5c(A)-
model, and for the second case, from condition (i) in the deﬁnition of an FK(A)-model
in Chapter 4 (i.e. in the present case, CL ⊆ T ∩ T♦).
The induction step for the non-modal connectives follows easily from the induction
hypothesis and the fact that the operations of an order-based algebra either map to a
constant or to one of its arguments (see Remark 3.2).
Let us therefore consider the case where ϕ = ψ. For the ﬁrst part, because the
values of box-formulas are independent of the world and because clearly V (ψ, x) ∈ T,
we obtain that
V (ψ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T | r ≤
∧
{V (ψ, y) | y ∈W}}
=
∨
{r ∈ T♦ | r ≤ V (ψ, x)}
= V (ψ, x) ,
and thus, by the induction hypothesis, V (ϕ, x) = V (ψ, x) ∈ T♦. For the second part,
we note that by the induction hypothesis (V (ψ, x) ∈ T♦) we have that
V (♦ψ, x) =
∧
{r ∈ T♦ | r ≥
∨
{V (ψ, y) | y ∈W}}
=
∧
{r ∈ T♦ | r ≥ V (ψ, x)}
= V (ψ, x) ,
and thus, V (♦ϕ, x) = V (ψ, x) ∈ T. The case for ϕ = ♦ψ is very similar.
We now show that S5c(A)-validity is equivalent to validity in ﬁnite universal FS5c(A)-
models, following fairly closely the corresponding proofs in Chapter 4.
Lemma 5.3. Let Σ ⊆ Fm be a ﬁnite fragment, M = 〈W,V 〉 a universal S5c(A)-model,
and x ∈ W . Then there is a ﬁnite universal FS5c(A)-model M̂ = 〈Ŵ , V̂ , T̂, T̂♦〉 with
x ∈ Ŵ ⊆W and |Ŵ | ≤ |Σ| such that V̂ (ϕ, y) = V (ϕ, y) for all ϕ ∈ Σ and y ∈ Ŵ .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.6. Let us ﬁx a ﬁnite fragment
Σ ⊆ Fm, a universal S5c(A)-model M = 〈W,V 〉, and x ∈ W . Consider the ﬁnite
(possibly empty) sets
V [Σ, x] ∩R(A) = {ai | i ∈ I} and V [Σ♦, x] ∩ L(A) = {bj | j ∈ J} ,
noting that these sets are independent of the choice of the world x ∈W . For each i ∈ I,
choose a witness of right homogeneity ci at ai such that the intervals (ai, ci) are pairwise
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disjoint for all i ∈ I, and
(V [Σ, x] ∪ {V (♦p, x) | p ∈ Var ∩ Σ} ∪ CL) ∩ (
⋃
i∈I
(ai, ci)) = ∅ .
Similarly, for each j ∈ J , choose a witness of left homogeneity dj at bj such that the
intervals (dj , bj) are pairwise disjoint for all j ∈ J , and
(V [Σ♦, x] ∪ {V (p, x) | p ∈ Var ∩ Σ} ∪ CL) ∩ (
⋃
j∈J
(dj , bj)) = ∅ .
We deﬁne
T̂ = A \
⋃
i∈I
(ai, ci) and T̂♦ = A \
⋃
j∈J
(dj , bj) .
Now consider ϕ = ψ ∈ Σ and a = V (ψ, x) ∈ T̂. If a /∈ R(A), then we choose
yϕ ∈ W such that a = V (ψ, yϕ). If a ∈ R(A), then there is an i ∈ I such that a = ai,
and we choose yϕ ∈ W such that V (ψ, yϕ) ∈ [ai, ci). Suppose now that ϕ = ♦ψ ∈ Σ♦
and b = V (♦ψ, x) ∈ T̂♦. If b /∈ L(A), then we choose yϕ ∈ W such that b = V (ψ, yϕ).
If b ∈ L(A), then there is a j ∈ J such that b = bj , and we choose yϕ ∈ W such that
V (ψ, yϕ) ∈ (dj , bj ].
Now let Ŵ = {x}∪ {yϕ ∈W : ϕ ∈ Σ ∪Σ♦}, noting that |Ŵ | ≤ 1 + |Σ ∪Σ♦| ≤ |Σ|.
Deﬁne for each y ∈ Ŵ and p ∈ Var:
V̂ (p, y) =
V (p, y) if p ∈ Σ0 otherwise.
Hence M̂ = 〈Ŵ , V̂ , T̂, T̂♦〉 is a ﬁnite FS5c(A)-model satisfying x ∈ Ŵ ⊆ W and |Ŵ | ≤
|Σ|. It then follows by an easy induction on `(ϕ) that V̂ (ϕ, y) = V (ϕ, y) for all y ∈ Ŵ
and ϕ ∈ Σ.
Remark 5.4. Note that the number of intervals omitted from T̂ and T̂♦, deﬁned in the
proof of Lemma 5.3, is smaller than or equal to the cardinality of Σ and Σ♦, respectively,
for the given fragment Σ.
Lemma 5.5. Let M = 〈W,V, T, T♦〉 be a ﬁnite universal FS5c(A)-model. Then there
is a universal S5c(A)-model M̂ = 〈Ŵ , V̂ 〉 with W ⊆ Ŵ such that V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) for
all ϕ ∈ Fm and x ∈W .
Proof. Given a ﬁnite universal FS5c(A)-model M, we construct our universal S5c(A)-
model M̂ directly by taking inﬁnitely many copies of M.
Consider T = A \
⋃
i∈I(ai, ci) and T♦ = A \
⋃
j∈J(dj , bj) for ﬁnite (possibly empty)
sets I, J , where for each i ∈ I, right homogeneity at ai ∈ R(A) is witnessed by ci
such that the intervals (ai, ci) are pairwise disjoint, and, similarly, for each j ∈ J , left
homogeneity at bj ∈ L(A) is witnessed by dj such that the intervals (dj , bj) are pairwise
disjoint. We deﬁne a family of CL-order embeddings {hk : A→ A}k∈Z+ such that
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• for each even k ∈ Z+, hk is the identity function on T and for each i ∈ I,
hk[[ai, ci)] ⊆ [ai, ai + 1k ) ,
• for each odd k ∈ Z+, hk is the identity function on T♦ and for each j ∈ J ,
hk[(dj , bj ]] ⊆ (bj − 1k , bj ] .
Note that Lemma 5.2 ensures for all x ∈ W that {V (ϕ, x), V (♦ϕ, x) : ϕ ∈ Fm} ⊆
T ∩ T♦ and hence that for all k ∈ Z+ (even and odd), hk is the identity function on
{V (ϕ, x), V (♦ϕ, x) : ϕ ∈ Fm}. Let h0 be the identity on A, let Ŵ0 = W , and for each
k ∈ Z+, let Ŵk be a copy of W with a distinct copy x̂k of each x ∈ W ; also let x̂0 = x
for each x ∈W . We deﬁne the universal S5c(A)-model M̂ = 〈Ŵ , V̂ 〉 where
Ŵ =
⋃
k∈N
Ŵk and V̂ (p, x̂k) = hk(V (p, x)), for p ∈ Var, x ∈W, and k ∈ N.
It suﬃces now to prove that for all ϕ ∈ Fm, x ∈W , and k ∈ N,
V̂ (ϕ, x̂k) = hk(V (ϕ, x)) ,
proceeding by induction on `(ϕ). The base case follows by deﬁnition, while for the non-
modal connectives, the argument is the same as in the proof of Lemma 3.10. Consider
ϕ = ♦ψ. Fix x ∈W and k ∈ N. There are two cases.
For the ﬁrst case, suppose that V (♦ψ, x) = bj for some j ∈ J . Note ﬁrst that by
Lemma 5.2, V (♦ψ, x) = bj ∈ T♦ ∪T and hence hk(bj) = bj . Clearly V (ψ, z) ≤ bj for all
z ∈ W . Hence, by the induction hypothesis and the construction of {hn : A → A}n∈N,
for all n ∈ N and ẑn ∈ Ŵ ,
V̂ (ψ, ẑn) = hn(V (ψ, z)) ≤ bj .
Also, for some y ∈W ,
V (ψ, y) ∈ (dj , bj ] .
Hence for any odd n ∈ N,
hn(V (ψ, y)) ∈ (bj − 1n , bj ] .
Using the induction hypothesis,
V̂ (♦ψ, x̂k) =
∨
{V̂ (ψ, ŷn) | y ∈W,n ∈ N}
=
∨
{hn(V (ψ, y)) | y ∈W,n ∈ N}
=
∨
{bj − 1n | n ∈ Z+}
= bj
= hk(V (♦ψ, x)) .
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For the second case, suppose that V (♦ψ, x) = b 6= bj for all j ∈ J . Note again that
by Lemma 5.2, V (♦ψ, x) = b ∈ T♦ ∪ T and hence hk(b) = b. Clearly, V (ψ, z) ≤ b
for all z ∈ W . It follows again by the induction hypothesis and the construction of
{hn : A→ A}n∈N that for all n ∈ N and ẑn ∈ Ŵ ,
V̂ (ψ, ẑn) = hn(V (ψ, z)) ≤ b .
Moreover, becauseW is ﬁnite, there is a y ∈W such that V (ψ, y) = b = V (♦ψ, x). Using
the induction hypothesis and the fact that hn is the identity function on {V (ϕ, z),
V (♦ϕ, z) | ϕ ∈ Fm} for all n ∈ N and z ∈W , it follows that
V̂ (♦ψ, x̂) =
∨
{V̂ (ψ, ẑn) | z ∈W,n ∈ N}
=
∨
{hn(V (ψ, z)) | z ∈W,n ∈ N}
=
∨
{hn(b) | n ∈ N}
= b
= hk(V (♦ψ, x)).
The case ϕ = ψ is very similar.
Combining Lemmas 5.1, 5.3, and 5.5, we obtain the following equivalence.
Theorem 5.6. Let ϕ ∈ Fm, then
|=S5c(A) ϕ iﬀ M |=FS5c(A) ϕ, for all ﬁnite universal FS5c(A)-models M.
Extending the notion of the ﬁnite model property with respect to the class FS5c(A) of
FS5c(A)-models in the obvious way, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.7. The logic S5c(A) has the ﬁnite model property with respect to FS5c(A).
5.2 Decidability and Complexity
The desired decidability and complexity results are now obtained by considering the
number of truth values needed to check validity of formulas in ﬁnite universal FS5c(A)-
models. Recall (see Section 4.3) that if A(m) = {0, 1m , . . . , m−1m , 1}, then a ﬁnite system
〈A(m),Φ,Ψ, {c′}c∈CL〉, where Φ,Ψ ⊆ A(m)2, is consistent withA if there exists an order-
preserving embedding h : A(m) → A such that h(c′) = c for all c ∈ CL, h(c) witnesses
right homogeneity at h(a) ∈ R(A), for all 〈a, c〉 ∈ Φ, and h(d) witnesses left homogeneity
at h(b) ∈ L(A), for all 〈d, b〉 ∈ Φ.
Theorem 5.8. Let A be a locally homogeneous order-based algebra for L. Then the
validity problem for S5c(A) is coNP-reducible to the problem of consistency of ﬁnite
systems with A.
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Proof. Consider ϕ ∈ Fm and let n = |Σ(ϕ)| = `(ϕ) + |CL|. To check if ϕ is not S5c(A)-
valid, it suﬃces, by Lemmas 5.3 and 5.5, to check that ϕ is not valid in a ﬁnite universal
FS5(A)C-modelM = 〈W,V, T, T♦〉 with |W | ≤ |Σ(ϕ)| = n. To compute V (ϕ, x) in such
a model, we need to know only the values V [Σ(ϕ),W ] (that is, fewer than n2 values) and
the endpoints of the intervals deﬁning T and T♦ (that is, considering Remark 5.4, fewer
than 2n values). So, we need at most 3n2 distinct values. Therefore, we may assume that
these values are in a ﬁxed ﬁnite set An = A(p(n)) = {0, 1p(n) , . . . , p(n)−1p(n) , 1}, containing
properly spaced copies of constants, where p(n) = 3|CL|n2. We may assume also that
W = Wn ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. Then checking non-deterministically that ϕ is not valid
amounts to performing the following steps:
1. Guessing the values V (p, i) in An for each p ∈ Var(ϕ) and i ∈ Wn (no more than
np(n) steps).
2. Guessing the sets Φ,Ψ ⊆ A2n such that Φ and Ψ deﬁne families of disjoint open
intervals and using them to deﬁne, respectively, the two subsets T ∗, T
∗
♦ ⊆ An (at
most 2p(n)2 steps).
3. Checking that the system 〈An,Φ,Ψ, {c′}c∈CL〉 is consistent with A.
4. Computing V (ϕ, 0) in the model 〈Wn, V, T ∗, T ∗♦〉 and checking V (ϕ, 0) < 1 (essen-
tially n3 steps).
Hence a counter-model for ϕ may be guessed in polynomial time if we have an oracle for
the consistency problem.
Corollary 5.9. The validity problems for S5c(G), S5c(G↓), and S5c(G↑) are coNP-
complete. The same is true for S5c(A) if A is a ﬁnite combination of G, G↓, G↑, and
ﬁnite algebras via ordered sums, lexicographical products, and fusion of consecutive points.
Proof. The validity problem is coNP-hard already for the pure propositional logic over
any A, because classical propositional logic is interpretable in these logics. Moreover, for
G, G↓, and G↑, the consistency problem is checked in null or linear time. In the other
cases, the consistency problem is solvable in polynomial time.
5.3 Order-Based First-Order Logics
In this section, we introduce the syntax and semantics of order-based ﬁrst-order logics.
We then present a standard translation between modal formulas and formulas in the
one-variable fragment of the ﬁrst-order expansions and show that a modal formula is
valid in S5c(A) if and only if its translation  a ﬁrst-order formula in the one-variable
fragment  is valid in all ﬁrst-order structures over A. Considering this translation, we
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can infer coNP-completeness of the validity problem for the one-variable fragments of the
ﬁrst-order expansions of order-based logics over certain locally homogeneous order-based
algebras A from the coNP-completeness of the validity problem for S5c(A) over these
algebras A (see Corollary 5.9). In particular, we can infer that the validity problem for
the one-variable fragment of ﬁrst-order Gödel logic is decidable and coNP-complete.
We deﬁne a ﬁrst-order language F to be a triple 〈Pr,Fu,Ar〉 where Pr is a non-empty
set of predicate symbols, Fu is a set (disjoint with Pr) of function symbols, and Ar is an
arity function, assigning to each predicate or function symbol a natural number called
the arity of the symbol.
We ﬁx a countable set FVar = {xn | n ∈ N} of ﬁrst-order variables and deﬁne
for a ﬁrst-order language F = 〈Pr,Fu,Ar〉 the set Tm(F) of F-terms inductively over
FVar such that FVar ⊆ Tm(F) and for each n-ary f ∈ Fu and any t1, . . . , tn ∈ Tm(F),
f(t1, . . . , fn) ∈ Tm(F). Moreover, the set Fm(F) of F-formulas is deﬁned inductively as
follows:
• for any n-ary relation symbol P ∈ Pr and t1, . . . , tn ∈ Tm(F),
P (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Fm(F) ,
• for any n-ary operation symbol ? ∈ L and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Fm(F),
?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ∈ Fm(F) ,
• for any x ∈ FVar and any ϕ ∈ Fm(F),
(∀x)ϕ ∈ Fm(F) and (∃x)ϕ ∈ Fm(F) .
Given a ﬁrst-order language F = 〈Pr,Fu,Ar〉, let us deﬁne an A-structure S for F to
be a triple 〈D, {PS}P∈Pr, {fS}f∈Fu〉, where D is a non-empty set called the domain, for
each n-ary predicate symbol P ∈ Pr, PS is an n-ary mapping from Dn to the universe
of the algebra A, i.e. PS : Dn → A, and for each n-ary function symbol f ∈ Fu, fS is a
function fS : Dn → D.
Let F = 〈Pr,Fu,Ar〉 be a ﬁrst-order language and S = 〈D, {PS}P∈Pr, {fS}f∈Fu〉 an
A-structure for F, we deﬁne anS-assignment to be a mapping h : FVar→ D assigning an
element of the domainD to each variable in FVar, extended to a mapping h : Tm(F)→ D
inductively such that
h(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = f
S(h(t1), . . . , h(tn)) ,
for any n-ary function symbol f ∈ Fu and t1, . . . , tn ∈ Tm(F). Let h be an S-assignment,
x ∈ FVar, and d ∈ D, then we deﬁne the S-assignment h(x → d) as follows: for all
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y ∈ FVar,
h(x→ d)(y) =
d if y = x ,h(y) otherwise.
Given an S-assignment h, we deﬁne the map Vh : Fm(F)→ A, called an S-valuation for
h, inductively as follows:
• for any n-ary relation symbol P ∈ Pr and t1, . . . , tn ∈ Tm(F),
Vh(P (t1, . . . , tn)) = P
S(h(t1), . . . , h(tn)) ,
• for any n-ary operation symbol ? ∈ L and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Fm(F),
Vh(?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) = ?(Vh(ϕ1), . . . , Vh(ϕn)) ,
• for any x ∈ FVar and any ϕ ∈ Fm(F),
Vh((∀x)ϕ) =
∧
{Vh(x→d)(ϕ) | d ∈ D} ,
Vh((∃x)ϕ) =
∨
{Vh(x→d)(ϕ) | d ∈ D} .
Let S = 〈D, {PS}P∈Pr, {fS}f∈Fu〉 be an A-structure for a ﬁrst-order language F =
〈Pr,Fu,Ar〉 and Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm(F) a set of F-formulas, we will say that ϕ is an S-
consequence of Γ, written Γ |=S ϕ, if Vh(ϕ) = 1 for all S-assignments h such that
Vh[Γ] = {Vh(ψ) | ψ ∈ Γ} ⊆ {1}. Let us denote by A(A) the class of all A-structures
for F, we will say that ϕ is a
A
(A)-consequence, written Γ |= A(A) ϕ, if Γ |=S ϕ for all
A-structures S ∈ A(A) for F. A formula ϕ will be called valid in S if ∅ |=S ϕ, and ϕ is
valid in
A
(A) if ∅ |= A(A) ϕ, also written |= A(A) ϕ. We will denote the logic deﬁned by
the consequence relation |= A(A) on Fm(F) by ∀(A) and will say that an F-formula ϕ is
valid in ∀(A) if it is valid in A(A).
One-Variable Fragments and the Standard Translation
In order to be able to deﬁne a suitable translation between modal formulas and ﬁrst-
order formulas with only one-variable, we ﬁx FVar = {x} and a ﬁrst-order language
F1 = 〈Pr,Fu,Ar〉, such that Pr = {Pi | i ∈ N} is enumerable, Fu = ∅, and for all
P ∈ Pr, Ar(P ) = 1. The set Fm(F1) of F1-formulas is then deﬁned inductively over
the singleton-set FVar = {x} of one ﬁrst-order variable. Given an order-based algebra
A, we will call the logic ∀1(A), resulting from restricting the logic ∀(A) to Fm(F1), the
one-variable fragment of ∀(A).
Remark 5.10. Note that usually the one-variable fragment of a ﬁrst-order logic L for any
ﬁrst-order language F denotes the restriction of L to the set of formulas in Fm(F) which
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contain no function symbols and at most one variable (but possibly several occurrences
of it). However, restricting to a ﬁxed ﬁrst-order language with countably many unary
predicate symbols, such as F1, is not essential in this case. Firstly, as we are only
interested in validity, we may in any case restrict to the ﬁnitely many predicate symbols
occurring in the formula in question. Secondly, in the presence of only one variable,
each n-ary predicate symbol P in any formula ϕ can be uniformly replaced by a unary
predicate symbol P̂ , resulting in the formula ϕ̂, such that for any A-structure S: |=S ϕ
if and only if |=S ϕ̂.
Recall that FmLm denotes the set of formulas for the language Lm = L ∪ {,♦} deﬁned
inductively over the enumerable set Var of propositional variables. We then notice that
because both Pr = {Pi | i ∈ N} and Var = {pi | i ∈ N} are enumerable sets, we can
assume that there is a bijection mapping pi to Pi for all i ∈ N.
The translation pi between formulas in FmLm and F1-formulas in Fm(F1) is a map
pi : FmLm→ Fm(F1) deﬁned inductively as follows:
pi(pi) = Pi(x), for all pi ∈ Var,
pi(?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) = ?(pi(ϕ1), . . . , pi(ϕn)), for all n-ary ? ∈ L and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ FmLm ,
pi(ϕ) = (∀x)pi(ϕ), for all ϕ ∈ FmLm ,
pi(♦ϕ) = (∃x)pi(ϕ), for all ϕ ∈ FmLm .
In fact, pi is a bijection between FmLm and Fm(F1) and thus there is also an inverse
translation pi−1 : Fm(F1)→ FmLm .
We associate an A-structure for F1 to each universal S5c(A)-model and vice versa.
Given a universal S5c(A)-model M = 〈W,V 〉, deﬁne the A-structure SM = 〈D,
{PSMi }Pi∈Pr, ∅〉 for F1 as follows:
D = W and PSMi (d) = V (pi, d), for all i ∈ N and all d ∈W.
Conversely, given an A-structure S = 〈D, {PSi }Pi∈Pr, ∅〉 for F1, we deﬁne the universal
S5c(A)-model MS = 〈W,V 〉 as follows:
W = D and V (pi, d) = PSi (d), for all i ∈ N and all d ∈ D.
We will omit the proof of the following lemma, as it is just a routine induction on the
length of the formula. It can be found for example in [67]. The following theorem is an
obvious consequence.
Lemma 5.11 ([67]).
(a) Let M = 〈W,V 〉 be a universal S5c(A)-model and SM = 〈D, {PSMi }Pi∈Pr, ∅〉 the
associated A-structure for F1. Then for all modal formulas ϕ ∈ FmLm, all worlds
d ∈W , and all SM-assignments h :
V (ϕ, d) = Vh(x→d)(pi(ϕ)) .
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(b) Let S = 〈D, {PSi }Pi∈Pr, ∅〉 be an A-structure for F1 and MS = 〈W,V 〉 the asso-
ciated universal S5c(A)-model. Then for all F1-formulas ϕ ∈ Fm(F1), all d ∈ D,
and all S-assignments h :
Vh(x→d)(ϕ) = V (pi−1(ϕ), d) .
Theorem 5.12. Let A be any order-based algebra. Then, a modal formula ϕ ∈ FmLm
is valid in S5c(A) if and only if pi(ϕ) is valid in ∀1(A) (and ∀(A)), and an F1-formula
ψ ∈ Fm(F1) is valid in ∀1(A) (and ∀(A)) if and only if pi−1(ψ) is valid in S5c(A).
Recalling Corollary 5.9, we then easily conclude the main result of this chapter, which
answers a long-standing open problem posed by Hájek in [67].
Theorem 5.13. The validity problems for the one-variable fragments of ﬁrst-order Gödel
logics based on G, G↓, and G↑ are coNP-complete. The same is true for the one-variable
fragments of ﬁrst-order Gödel logics based on a ﬁnite combination of G, G↓, and G↑,
and ﬁnite algebras via ordered sums, lexicographical products, and fusion of consecutive
points.
Remark 5.14. It was pointed out to us by Lluís Godo that part of this result was
already known. In [7], it is shown that the validity problem for the untangled monadic
fragment of ∀(G↑) (i.e. where only unary predicates are allowed and no subformula has
more than one free variable) is decidable, indeed coNP-complete. As the one-variable
fragment is strictly weaker than the untangled monadic fragment, the results in [7] imply
the coNP-completeness of the validity problem for ∀1(G↑). This is made explicit in [71],
where it is mentioned that the results in [7] imply the coNP-completeness of the validity
problem for S5c(G↑).
Chapter 6
Tableaux Calculi for Gödel
Modal Logics
In this chapter, we introduce tableau calculi for validity in the Gödel modal logics GK,
GKc, and GS5c, which were developed independently by the author of this dissertation.
In fact, these are just sample cases, it would be rather straightforward to adapt the
calculi for K(A), Kc(A), and S5c(A) for many other locally homogeneous order-based
algebras A.
The calculi presented in this chapter provide decision procedures that can be applied
and implemented more easily than the decision procedures introduced in Sections 4.3
and 5.1. They do not, however, provide algorithms of optimal complexity. For the calculi
for GK and GKc, this is not surprising, as the same is the case for the usual tableau calculi
for the classical modal logic K (see e.g. [107]). On the other hand, the tableau calculus
for GS5c could be slightly modiﬁed - by removing repetitions of formulas - such that it
yields a coNP-algorithm. This would make the exposition more cumbersome, however,
and is therefore left out.
As is common for tableau calculi for modal logics, a tableau is designed to reﬂect the
construction of a Kripke model for the given modal logic. In our case, the tableaux reﬂect
the modiﬁed Kripke models from the alternative semantics (i.e. FK(G)-, and FS5c(G)-
models), because GK, GKc, and GS5c enjoy the ﬁnite model property with respect to
these models.
For convenience, we simplify FK(G)- and FS5c(G)-models slightly while not changing
the set of valid formulas they determine. This is possible because of the nice topological
properties of the algebra G, in particular, the fact that every point except 0 and 1 is
a right and left accumulation point and any other point witnesses local homogeneity.
These simpliﬁed models will be introduced in Section 6.1, before we go on to present a
tableau calculus for GS5c in Sections 6.2 and similar but more complicated calculi for GK
and GKc in Section 6.3.
Let us ﬁx the algebraic language L consisting of the binary operational symbols ∧, ∨,
and→, and the nullary constants > and ⊥, and let Lm = L∪{,♦}. The set of formulas
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FmLm for Lm will be denoted by Fm. Recall that G denotes the standard Gödel algebra
〈[0, 1],min,max,→G, 0, 1〉 for L.
6.1 Simpliﬁed Alternative Semantics
We deﬁne an SK(G)-model as a quadrupleM = 〈W,R, V, T 〉, where 〈W,R, V 〉 is a K(G)-
model (see Section 2.3) and T : W →P<ω([0, 1]) is a function from worlds to ﬁnite sets
of truth values satisfying {0, 1} ⊆ T (x) ⊆ [0, 1] for all x ∈W .
The valuation V is extended to the mapping V : Fm×W inductively as follows:
V (?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), x) = ?(V (ϕ1, x), . . . , V (ϕn, x))
for each n-ary operation symbol ? of L, and
V (ϕ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T (x) | r ≤
∧
{Rxy → V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}}
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∧
{r ∈ T (x) | r ≥
∨
{Rxy ∧ V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}} .
We denote the class of all SK(G)-models by SK(G) and the class of all SK(G)-models
with a crisp accessibility relation by SKc(G) (sometimes calling them crisp SK(G)-
models). As before, a formula ϕ ∈ Fm is valid in an SK(G)-model M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉 if
V (ϕ, x) = 1 for all x ∈W , written M |=SK(G) ϕ. And for a subclass U ⊆ SK(G), we will
say that ϕ is valid in U, written |=U ϕ, if M |=SK(G) ϕ for all M ∈ U.
An SK(G)-model M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉, where R is a crisp equivalence relation and
T (x) = T (y) for all x, y ∈ W such that Rxy, is called an SS5c(G)-model. Let us denote
the classes of all SS5c(G)-models by SS5c(G).
We note that again validity in SS5c(G) amounts to validity in all universal SS5c(G)-
models, written M = 〈W,V, T 〉, where R = W ×W and thus T may be understood as
a single ﬁxed ﬁnite subset of [0, 1] (cf. Chapter 5). In this case, the conditions for box-
and diamond-formulas simplify to
V (ϕ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T | r ≤
∧
{V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}}
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∧
{r ∈ T | r ≥
∨
{V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}} .
Noting that SK(G)-, SKc(G)-, and SS5c(G)-models can be understood as special cases
of FK(G)-, FKc(G)-, and FS5c(G)-models, respectively, we can prove the following the-
orem by using theorems from previous chapters and slightly adopting the proofs of some
lemmas.
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Theorem 6.1. For any formula ϕ ∈ Fm,
(a) ϕ is valid in GK if and only if it is valid in all ﬁnite SK(G)-models,
(b) ϕ is valid in GKc if and only if it is valid in all ﬁnite SKc(G)-models,
(c) ϕ is valid in GS5c if and only if it is valid in all ﬁnite universal SS5c(G)-models.
Proof. Note that an SK(G)-model 〈W,R, V, T 〉 can be understood as a special case of
an FK(G)-model 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 where for all x ∈W :
T (x) = T(x) = T♦(x) = [0, 1] \
⋃
i<n
(ai, ai+1)
for some n ∈ N and {a0, . . . , an} ⊆ [0, 1] satisfying 0 = a0 < . . . < an = 1. A similar
inclusion holds for SKc(G)- and FKc(G)-models as well as for universal SS5c(G)- and
FS5c(G)-models, as in the latter case also
{V (♦ϕ, x), V (ϕ, x) | ϕ ∈ Fm} ⊆ T .
Using Theorems 4.11 and 5.6, this establishes the left-to-right directions of (a), (b), and
(c), respectively.
For the right-to-left direction in (a) and (b), consider Lemma 4.6 but instead of a
(crisp) FK(A)-tree-model we are given a (crisp) K(G)-tree-model and show that we can
ﬁnd a ﬁnite (crisp) SK(G)-tree-model where ϕ fails at the root. This can be done by
deﬁning for each x ∈W ,
T (x) = V [Σ ∪ Σ♦, x] ∪ {0, 1} ,
and then adapting the proof of Lemma 4.6 in a straightforward manner.
In almost the same way, we can adapt the proof of Lemma 5.3 to prove the right-
to-left direction in (c). Instead of laboriously deﬁning T and T♦, we just deﬁne T as
follows:
T = V [Σ ∪ Σ♦, x] ∪ {0, 1} .
For a tableau calculus to decide validity in GK, GKc or GS5c, it is therefore enough to
decide validity in all ﬁnite SK(G)-models, ﬁnite SKc(G)-models, or universal SS5c(G)-
models, respectively.
6.2 A Tableau Calculus for GS5c
We start by deﬁning a tableau calculus for GS5c, as it is considerably simpler than the
calculi for GK and GKc. A proof in the tableau calculus will be a tree, called a tableau,
where intuitively, the nodes represent (in)equalities between values of formulas at the
given world. These notions will be made clear below.
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Tableaux
In order to deﬁne nodes, we not only make use of formulas in Fm as symbols, but also
the symbols ≤, <, =, : , and world-symbols w ∈WS. Furthermore, we make use of a set
TS of T -symbols γ, which is deﬁned inductively over a set bTS of basic T -symbols t such
that bTS∪{0, 1} ⊆ TS and whenever γ ∈ TS, then also s(γ) ∈ TS. Note that the set TS
of T -symbols is distinct from the set Var of propositional variables and that members of
TS cannot occur in formulas. We then deﬁne a node to be a string of the form
w : ϕC ψ , where ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm ∪ TS, w ∈WS, and C ∈ {≤, <},
γ = ψ , where ψ ∈ Fm and γ ∈ TS, or
♦ϕ = γ , where ϕ ∈ Fm and γ ∈ TS.
A node will often be denoted by N and nodes of the form w : ϕ C ψ, where ϕ,ψ ∈
{⊥,>} ∪Var ∪ TS, will be called atomic.
The idea is that for an SS5c(G)-model 〈W,V, T 〉, each world-symbol w will be associ-
ated with a world in W and each T -symbol γ will be associated with a value a in T such
that s(γ) is associated with the next larger value b in T (except when a = 1, then also
b = 1). The T -symbols 0 and 1 will always be associated with 0 and 1, respectively. A
node w : ϕCψ then states that at the world x ∈W associated with w, V (ϕ, x)CV (ψ, x)
(if ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm). A node of the form ♦ϕ = γ states for the value a ∈ T associated with
γ and any world y ∈ W , V (♦ψ, y) = a. This makes sense because in SS5c(G)-models,
box- and diamond-formulas are assigned truth values independently of worlds.
A tableau is a pair T = 〈D,E〉 with D being a set of nodes and E ⊆ D2 such that
〈D,E〉 is a tree (see Section 3.3). A branch of a tableau 〈D,E〉 is a sequence of nodes
〈N0, . . . , Nk〉 ∈ Dk+1, for k ∈ N, such that N0 is the root of 〈D,E〉 and 〈Ni, Ni+1〉 ∈ E
for all i < k.
The rules of T GS5 c are displayed in Figure 6.1, where C ∈ {<,≤}, t is a new
basic T -symbol (i.e. not occurring above on the branch), and v is a new world-symbol.
Furthermore, (u occurs on b) means that the rule can be applied for any world-symbol
u that occurs anywhere on the current branch b.
A T GS5 c-tableau is a tableau that is built top-down (starting with the root) according
to the rules of T GS5 c without repetition, that is, to each node of the form w : ϕ C ψ,
for ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm ∪ TS, a rule is applied at most once and to nodes γ = ψ and ♦ϕ = γ
the rules (=) and (♦=) are applied at most once per world-symbol occurring on the
current branch.
Remark 6.2. Every T GS5 c-tableau is ﬁnite. This is because the branching factor is at
most 2 and, building the tableau top-down, every rule decomposes the formulas occurring
at its root, resulting in branches of ﬁnite length. The only cases where a formula is not
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(∧C) : w : ϕ ∧ ψ C χ
w : ϕC χ w : ψ C χ
(C∧) : w : ϕC ψ ∧ χ
w : ϕC ψ
w : ϕC χ
(∨C) : w : ϕ ∨ ψ C χ
w : ϕC χ
w : ψ C χ
(C∨) : w : ϕC ψ ∨ χ
w : ϕC ψ w : ϕC χ
(→C) : w : ϕ→ ψ C χ
w : >C χ w : ψ < ϕ
w : ψ C χ
(C→) : w : ϕC ψ → χ
w : ϕC χ w : ψ ≤ χ
w : ϕC>
(C) : w : ϕC ψ
w : >C ψ w : tC ψ (t new)
v : ϕ < s(t) (v new)
(C♦) : w : ϕC ♦ψ
w : ϕC⊥ w : ϕC s(t) (t new)
v : t < ψ (v new)
(C) : w : ϕCψ
1 = ψ
w : ϕC 1
t = ψ (t new)
w : ϕC t
v : ψ < s(t) (v new)
(♦C) : w : ♦ϕC ψ
♦ϕ = 0
w : 0C ψ
♦ϕ = s(t) (t new)
w : s(t)C ψ
v : t < ϕ (v new)
(=) : γ = ψ
(u occurs on b)
u : γ ≤ ψ
(♦=) : ♦ϕ = γ
(u occurs on b)
u : ϕ ≤ γ
Figure 6.1: T GS5 c-Rules
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(¬¬≤) : w : ¬¬ϕ ≤ ψ
w : > ≤ ψ w : ϕ ≤ ⊥
(≤¬¬) : w : ϕ ≤ ¬¬ψ
w : ⊥ < ψ w : ϕ ≤ ⊥
(¬¬<) : w : ¬¬ϕ < ψ
w : ⊥ < ψ
w : ϕ ≤ ⊥
(<¬¬) : w : ϕ < ¬¬ψ
w : ⊥ < ψ
w : ϕ < >
Figure 6.2: Derived T GS5 c-Rules for Double Negation
directly decomposed are the rules (C) and (♦C), but in those cases there are no other
choices than to stop, to decompose the box- or diamond formula by using (=) or (♦=),
respectively, or to decompose the other formula by another rule. At some point, there
are no more formulas to decompose and the building of the tableau is stopped.
Example 6.3. The following is an example of a T GS5 c-tableau:
w : (ϕ→ ⊥)→ ⊥ ≤ ψ
w : > ≤ ψ w : ⊥ < ϕ→ ⊥
w : ⊥ ≤ ψ
w : ⊥ < ⊥ w : ϕ ≤ ⊥
w : ⊥ < >
As negation is deﬁned by ¬ϕ = ϕ → ⊥, double negation is ¬¬ϕ = (ϕ → ⊥) → ⊥.
Considering the fully decomposed nodes in Example 6.3 which are neither trivial nor
contradictory, namely w : > ≤ ψ and w : ϕ ≤ ⊥, we can formulate the derived rule
(¬¬≤) for double negation in Figure 6.2. The other derived T GS5 c-rules in Figure 6.2
can all be justiﬁed in a similar way.
Tableaux Satisfaction and Proofs
For a universal SS5c(G)-model M = 〈W,V, T 〉, we deﬁne a mapping f : WS∪TS→W ∪
[0, 1], called anM-assignment, that assigns to each world-symbol w ∈WS a world x ∈W
and to each T -symbol γ ∈ TS a value a ∈ T = {a0, . . . , an}, where 0 = a0 < . . . < an = 1,
such that if for some i < n, f(γ) = ai, then f(s(γ)) = ai+1 (otherwise f(s(γ)) = 1), and
always f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1.
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A node of the form w : ϕ C ψ will be called satisﬁed by a universal SS5c(G)-model
M = 〈W,V, T 〉 under an M-assignment f if
V (ϕ, f(w))C V (ψ, f(w)), if ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm,
V (ϕ, f(w))C f(ψ), if ϕ ∈ Fm and ψ ∈ TS,
f(ϕ)C V (ψ, f(w)), if ϕ ∈ TS and ψ ∈ Fm, or
f(ϕ)C f(ψ), if ϕ,ψ ∈ TS.
Nodes of the form γ = ψ or ♦ϕ = γ will be called satisﬁed by a universal SS5c(G)-model
M = 〈W,V, T 〉 under anM-assignment f if, respectively, for all x ∈W , f(γ) = V (ψ, x),
or for all x ∈W , V (♦ϕ, x) = f(γ).
A branch b of a tableau is called closed if the atomic nodes on b cannot all be jointly
satisﬁed by any universal SS5c(G)-model M under any M-assignment f , i.e. the atomic
nodes on b represent some inconsistent collection of inequalities. In a tableau, we will
indicate that a branch is closed by
⊗
and usually write the inconsistent collection of
inequalities just below (writing t or s(t) for f(t) or f(s(t)), respectively, and pw
for V (p, f(w))). A branch that is not closed, we call open, and if no more rules can be
applied to nodes of a branch, it is called complete.
If all its branches are closed, a tableau is called closed, and open otherwise. A tableau
is called complete, if each of its branches is either a closed branch or a complete open
branch. A formula ϕ ∈ Fm is called provable in T GS5 c, abbreviated by `T GS5 c ϕ, if
there is a closed T GS5 c-tableau with root w : ϕ < >, for some world-symbol w.
Remark 6.4. Note that a branch of an T GS5 c-tableau is complete if and only if it is
closed or to each non-atomic node of the form w : ϕC ψ a rule has been applied exactly
once and to each node of the form γ = ψ or ♦ϕ = γ the rule (=) or (♦=), respectively,
has been applied exactly once for each world-symbol occurring on the branch.
It is also worth noticing that every T GS5 c-tableau can be extended to a complete
T GS5 c-tableau by applying all applicable rules that have not been applied yet on every
open branch.
Later in this section, we will prove soundness (Theorem 6.9) and completeness (The-
orem 6.11) for the tableau calculus T GS5 c with respect to validity in GS5c (using The-
orem 6.1), but in fact, the completeness lemma (Lemma 6.10) lets us infer a slightly
stronger statement. Lemma 6.10 implies that if there is a complete open T GS5 c-tableau
with the root w : ϕ < >, we can read oﬀ each complete open branch a universal SS5c(G)-
model 〈W,V, T 〉 satisfying each node on the branch and thus V (ϕ, x) < 1 for some world
x ∈W . This implies that there is no closed T GS5 c-tableau with the same root. Recall-
ing that each T GS5 c-tableau is ﬁnite (see Remark 6.2), we obtain the following decision
procedure:
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w0 : ¬¬p→ ¬¬p < >
w0 : > < >⊗ w0 : ¬¬p < ¬¬p
w0 : ¬¬p < >
w0 : ⊥ < p
w0 : ¬¬p < >
w0 : > < >⊗ w0 : t0 < >
w1 : ¬¬p < s(t0)
w1 : ⊥ < s(t0)
w1 : p ≤ ⊥
1 = p
w0 : ⊥ < 1
w1 : 1 ≤ p⊗
pw1 ≤ ⊥ < 1 ≤ pw1
t1 = p
w0 : ⊥ < t1
w2 : p < s(t1)
w1 : t1 ≤ p⊗
⊥ < t1 ≤ pw1 ≤ ⊥
Figure 6.3: A Closed T GS5 c-Tableau
Theorem 6.5 (Decision Procedure). Let ϕ ∈ Fm and let T be a complete T GS5 c-tableau
with root w : ϕ < >, then
(a) if T is closed then ϕ is valid in GS5c,
(b) if T is open then ϕ is not valid in GS5c.
We will now present two examples where the validity in GS5c of two interesting formulas
are decided by using the tableau calculus T GS5 c.
Example 6.6. In Figure 6.3, an example of a closed T GS5 c-tableau is displayed, showing
that `T GS5 c ¬¬p → ¬¬p and thus, by Theorem 6.9, the formula ¬¬p → ¬¬p is
valid in GS5c.
We ﬁrst use the rule (→<) on the root node, then (<¬¬) on the node w0 : ¬¬p <
¬¬p, and (<) on w0 : ¬¬p < >. Subsequently, we use (¬¬<) on w1 : ¬¬p < s(t0)
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and (<) on w0 : ⊥ < p. On the left branch, in order to close the branch, we apply
(=) on 1 = p for the world-symbol w1. The right branch is closed by applying (=)
on t1 = p for the world-symbol w1.
Example 6.7. Figure 6.4 is an example of a complete open tableau, establishing that
the formula used to disprove the ﬁnite model property of GK with respect to K(G)
is not provable in T GS5 c, i.e. 6`T GS5 c ¬¬p → ¬¬p, and thus, by Theorem 6.11,
¬¬p→ ¬¬p is not valid in GS5c.
We ﬁrst use (→<) on the root node, then (¬¬<) on w0 : ¬¬p < ¬¬p and (¬¬<)
on w0 : ¬¬p < >, followed by (≤) on the upper most occurrence of w0 : p ≤ ⊥. Next,
we apply again (≤) on the next lower occurrence of w0 : p ≤ ⊥. After using (<) on
w0 : ⊥ < ¬¬p, we ﬁrst apply on the right branch the rule (¬¬<) to w3 : ¬¬p < s(t2),
then (=) to t2 = ¬¬p for the world-symbol w3, and ﬁnally (≤¬¬) to w3 : t2 ≤ ¬¬p,
closing both resulting branches. On the left branch, we apply (=) to 1 = ¬¬p for w0
and then (≤¬¬) to w0 : 1 ≤ ¬¬p. These last two steps are then repeated for w1 and w2.
Having applied all possible rules at the open branch b (marked with an ⇑), b is complete,
and thus also the tableau is open and complete.
Because branch b (marked with an ⇑) is open, we know that there is a universal
SS5c(G)-model M = 〈W,V, T 〉 and an M-assignment f that satisfy all the atomic nodes
on b. By Lemma 6.10, we can infer thatM also satisﬁes all the other nodes, including the
root node w0 : ¬¬p → ¬¬p < >, which implies that V (¬¬p → ¬¬p, f(w0)) < 1.
Let us ﬁnd such a universal SS5c(G)-model M = 〈W,V, T 〉 and M-assignment f .
Assuming that M satisﬁes all the atomic nodes on b under f , we read oﬀ of b the
following constraints on M and f :
(i) V (p, f(w1)) < f(s(t0)) , from the node w1 : p < s(t0),
(ii) V (p, f(w2)) < f(s(t1)) , from the node w2 : p < s(t0),
(iii) V (p, f(w0)) > 0 , from the node w0 : ⊥ < p,
(iv) V (p, f(w1)) > 0 , from the node w1 : ⊥ < p,
(v) V (p, f(w2)) > 0 , from the node w2 : ⊥ < p, and
(vi) f(t0) = f(t1) = 0 , from the nodes w0 : t0 ≤ ⊥ and w0 : t1 ≤ ⊥.
Let us therefore deﬁne M = 〈W,V, T 〉 and f as follows:1
• W = {x0} and f(w0) = f(w1) = f(w2) = x0,
• V (p, x0) = 12 , and
1There are of course uncountably many diﬀerent universal SS5c(G)-models M and M-assignments f
satisfying these constraints. We choose one example.
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w0 : ¬¬p→ ¬¬p < >
w0 : > < >⊗ w0 : ¬¬p < ¬¬p
w0 : ¬¬p < >
w0 : ⊥ < ¬¬p
w0 : p ≤ ⊥
w0 : ⊥ < >
w0 : p ≤ ⊥
w0 : > ≤ ⊥⊗ w0 : t0 ≤ ⊥
w1 : p < s(t0)
w0 : > ≤ ⊥⊗ w0 : t1 ≤ ⊥
w2 : p < s(t1)
1 = ¬¬p
w0 : ⊥ < 1
w0 : 1 ≤ ¬¬p
w0 : ⊥ < p
w1 : 1 ≤ ¬¬p
w1 : ⊥ < p
w2 : 1 ≤ ¬¬p
w2 : ⊥ < p
⇑
w2 : 1 ≤ ⊥⊗
w1 : 1 ≤ ⊥⊗
w0 : 1 ≤ ⊥⊗
t2 = ¬¬p
w0 : ⊥ < t2
w3 : ¬¬p < s(t2)
w3 : ⊥ < s(t2)
w3 : p ≤ ⊥
w3 : t2 ≤ ¬¬p
w3 : ⊥ < p⊗
⊥ < pw3 ≤ ⊥
w3 : t2 ≤ ⊥⊗
t2 ≤ ⊥ < t2
Figure 6.4: A Complete Open T GS5 c-Tableau
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• T = {0, 1} and f(t0) = f(t1) = 0 and f(s(t0)) = f(s(t1)) = 1.
We conﬁrm that f is an M-assignment and that M satisﬁes all the atomic nodes of b
under f . Moreover, we note that
V (¬¬p, f(w0)) =
∨
{r ∈ T | r ≤
∧
{V (¬¬p, y) | y ∈W}}
=
∨
{r ∈ {0, 1} | r ≤ ¬¬ 12}
=
∨
{r ∈ {0, 1} | r ≤ 1}
= 1 ,
V (¬¬p, f(w0)) = ¬¬
∨
{r ∈ T | r ≤
∧
{V (p, y) | y ∈W}}
= ¬¬
∨
{r ∈ {0, 1} | r ≤ 12}
= ¬¬ 0
= 0 ,
and thus
V (¬¬p→ ¬¬p, f(w0)) = V (¬¬p, f(w0))→ V (¬¬p, f(w0))
= 1→ 0
= 0
< 1 .
Soundness and Completeness
In order to prove soundness of our tableau calculus T GS5 c, we introduce the following
notions. Let M be a universal SS5c(G)-model, f an M-assignment, and b a branch of
a T GS5 c-tableau, then M is called faithful to b under f if and only if all nodes on b
are satisﬁed by M under f . For a branch b of a T GS5 c-tableau T, we say that b′ is an
extension of b if b′ is a branch of T and b is an initial segment of b′.
Lemma 6.8 (Soundness Lemma). Let T be a T GS5 c-tableau, b a branch of T, and let
M be a universal SS5c(G)-model faithful to b under some M-assignment f . If a T GS5 c-
rule is applied to a node on b, at least one extension of b, b′, is produced such that M is
faithful to b′ under some M-assignment f ′.
Proof. We will prove this lemma by considering all the diﬀerent rules of T GS5 c that
could be applied to a node on b.
First, consider the case where (→≤) is applied to a node of the form w : ϕ→ ψ ≤ χ
on b where ϕ,ψ, χ ∈ Fm. In this case, two extensions of b, b′1 and b′2, are produced:
104 CHAPTER 6. TABLEAUX CALCULI
b′1 :
...
b
...
w : > ≤ χ
b′2 :
...
b
...
w : ψ < ϕ
w : ψ ≤ χ
As M = 〈W,V, T 〉 is faithful to b under f , we know V (ϕ → ψ, f(w)) ≤ V (χ, f(w)).
Recall that
V (ϕ→ ψ, f(w)) =
1 if V (ϕ, f(w)) ≤ V (ψ, f(w))V (ψ, f(w)) if V (ϕ, f(w)) > V (ψ, f(w)),
and thus either 1 = V (ϕ → ψ, f(w)) ≤ V (χ, f(w)), in which case M is faithful to
the extension b′1 under f ′ = f , or V (ψ, f(w)) < V (ϕ, f(w)) and V (ψ, f(w)) = V (ϕ →
ψ, f(w)) ≤ V (χ, f(w)), in which case M is faithful to b′2 under f ′ = f .
When we consider the same case as above, except that χ ∈ TS, we replace all oc-
currences of V (χ, f(w)) in the above argument by f(χ) and it works the same way.
Furthermore, the other rules including propositional connectives are treated very similar.
Consider now the case where (≤) has been applied to a node on b of the form
w : ϕ ≤ ψ. We investigate ﬁrst the case (i) where ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm. In this case, two
extensions of b, b′1 and b′2, are produced:
b′1 :
...
b
...
1 = ψ
w : ϕ ≤ 1
b′2 :
...
b
...
t = ψ
w : ϕ ≤ t
v : ψ < s(t)
As M = 〈W,V, T 〉 is faithful to b under f , we know that V (ϕ, f(w)) ≤ V (ψ, f(w)).
Recall that
V (ψ, f(w)) =
∨
{r ∈ T | r ≤
∧
{V (ψ, z) | z ∈W}} .
This means that either V (ψ, x) = 1, for all x ∈ W , and thus also V (ϕ, f(w)) ≤
V (ψ, f(w)) = 1, in which case M is clearly faithful to b′1 under f ′ = f , or we have the
following: there are ai, ai+1 ∈ T = {a0, . . . , an}, with 0 = a0 < . . . < an = 1, such that
for all x ∈W (as box-formulas are invariant over worlds),
V (ϕ, f(w)) ≤ ai = V (ψ, f(w)) = V (ψ, x) and V (ψ, y) < ai+1,
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for some y ∈ W . We then deﬁne an M-assignment f ′ such that f ′(v) = y, f ′(t) = ai,
f(s(t)) = ai+1, and otherwise f ′ agrees with f (implying that f(w) = f ′(w)). It follows
that M is faithful to b′2 under f ′, as also for all x ∈W :
V (ϕ, f ′(w)) ≤ f ′(t) = V (ψ, x) and V (ψ, f ′(v)) < f ′(s(t)) .
Secondly we consider the case (ii) where ϕ ∈ TS. In this case, we replace all occurrences
of V (ϕ, f(w)) by f(ϕ) and all occurrences of V (ϕ, f ′(w)) by f ′(ϕ) in the argument
above. The argument then also goes through as now f ′(ϕ) = f(ϕ).
Let us next consider the case where (=) has been applied to a node on b of the
form γ = ψ for some world-symbol u occurring on b, noting that the only possibility is
that γ ∈ TS and ψ ∈ Fm. Then the extensions b′ of b is produced:
b′ : ...
b
...
u : γ ≤ ψ
As M = 〈W,V, T 〉 is faithful to b, we know that f(u) ∈ W and f(γ) = V (ψ, x) for all
x ∈W . It then follows that M is faithful to b′ under f ′ = f because
f(γ) = V (ψ, x) ≤
∧
{V (ψ, z) | z ∈W} ≤ V (ψ, f(u)) .
As the argument for the rule (<) is very similar to the argument for (≤) and because
the rules for diamond are exactly symmetrical to the box rules, the last rule we will
consider here is (≤). Consider the case where (≤) is applied to the node w : ϕ ≤ ψ
on the branch b, where for case (i): ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm. In this case, two extensions of b, b′1 and
b′2, are produced:
b′1 :
...
b
...
w : > ≤ ψ
b′2 :
...
b
...
w : t ≤ ψ
v : ϕ < s(t)
As M = 〈W,V, T 〉 is faithful to b under f , we know that V (ϕ, f(w)) ≤ V (ψ, f(w)).
This means that either V (ψ, f(w)) = 1, in which case M is faithful to b′1 under f ′ = f ,
or we have that there are ai, ai+1 ∈ T = {a0, . . . , an}, with 0 = a0 < . . . < an = 1, such
that
ai = V (ϕ, f(w)) ≤ V (ψ, f(w)) and V (ϕ, y) < ai+1, for some y ∈W.
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In this case, we deﬁne an M-assignment f ′ such that f ′ agrees with f except that
f ′(v) = y, f ′(t) = ai, and f ′(s(t)) = ai+1. It then follows that M is faithful to b′2 under
f ′, as also
f ′(t) ≤ V (ψ, f ′(w)) and V (ϕ, f ′(v)) < f ′(s(t)) .
In case (ii) where ψ ∈ TS, as above, we replace all occurrences of V (ψ, f(w)) by f(ψ)
and V (ψ, f ′(w)) by f ′(ψ) in the argument.
Theorem 6.9 (Soundness of T GS5 c). For all ϕ ∈ Fm, if
`T GS5 c ϕ then |=SS5c(G) ϕ .
Proof. Let 6|=SS5c(G) ϕ. Then there is a universal SS5c(G)-model M = 〈W,V, T 〉 and a
world x ∈W such that V (ϕ, x) < 1.
Now consider any complete T GS5 c-tableau T with the root w : ϕ < >. Clearly, M is
faithful to the branch b consisting only of the root node under any M-assignment f with
f(w) = x. Applying the soundness lemma, we know that M is faithful to at least one
extension b′ of b under some M-assignment f ′. Applying the soundness lemma ﬁnitely
many times, we ﬁnd a complete branch b̂ such thatM is faithful to b̂ underM-assignment
f̂ . Because a closed branch is not satisﬁed by any universal SS5c(G)-model M under
any M-assignment, it follows that b̂ must be open.
We have thus shown that any complete T GS5 c-tableau with the root w : ϕ < > must
have an open branch. Therefore, there cannot exist a closed T GS5 c-tableau with the
root w : ϕ < >, which means that 6`T GS5 c ϕ.
For the proof of completeness of T GS5 c, we make use of one more notion. Given an
open branch b on a T GS5 c-tableau, we call a universal SS5c(G)-model M = 〈W,V, T 〉
induced by b if and only if there is an M-assignment f such that each atomic node on b
is satisﬁed by M under f and for WSb = {w ∈WS | w occurs on b}, f [WSb] = W .
Lemma 6.10 (Completeness Lemma). Let b be a complete open branch of a T GS5 c-
tableau T with root of the form w : φ < >, let M = 〈W,V, T 〉 be a universal SS5c(G)-
model induced by b, and let f be an M-assignment such that each atomic node on b is
satisﬁed by M under f . Then all nodes on b are satisﬁed by M under f .
Proof. The lemma is proved by an induction on the lexicographic ordering on
{〈`(N), e(N)〉 | N is a node on b}, where for any ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm ∪ TS and any node N
of the form w : ϕC ψ or ϕ = ψ, `(N) = `(ϕ) + `(ψ) (where `(t) = 1 for all t ∈ TS) and
e(N) =
1 if N is of the form w : ϕC ψ ,0 if N is of the form ϕ = ψ .
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For the base case, consider a node N with 〈`(N), e(N)〉 = 〈2, 1〉. This is the smallest
element of the ordering deﬁned above because if it were the case that e(N) = 0, then N
must be of the form ϕ = ψ and thus either ϕ is a diamond-formula or ψ is a box-formula,
implying that `(N) ≥ 3. From 〈`(N), e(N)〉 = 〈2, 1〉 it follows that N is an atomic node
of the form w : ϕ C ψ and therefore N is satisﬁed by M under f by the deﬁnition of
induced models.
For the inductive step, consider a node N on b with 〈`(N), e(N)〉 = 〈n,m〉. There
are many diﬀerent cases to consider; let us start with the case where N is of the form
w : ϕ < ψ → χ with ϕ,ψ, χ ∈ Fm (the case where ϕ ∈ TS can be treated by replacing
V (ϕ, f(w)) by f(ϕ) in the argument below). In this case, as b is complete and open,
either (<→) has been applied to N or some other rule decomposing ϕ. For the case on
hand, we assume that (<→) has been applied to N , thus b is either of the form b1 or b2.
b1 :
...
w : ϕ < ψ → χ
...
w : ϕ < χ
...
b2 :
...
w : ϕ < ψ → χ
...
w : ψ ≤ χ
w : ϕ < >
...
In the case where b = b1, as `(χ) < `(ψ → χ) and thus 〈`(ϕ) + `(χ), e(w : ϕ < χ)〉 <
〈n,m〉, the induction hypothesis yields that w : ϕ < χ is satisﬁed by M under f and
thus V (ϕ, f(w)) < V (χ, f(w)). Then V (ϕ, f(w)) < V (χ, f(w)) ≤ V (ψ → χ, f(w)) is
established, as the latter inequality always holds in any SS5c(G)-model. We conclude
that N is satisﬁed by M under f .
If b = b2, it follows by the induction hypothesis that V (ψ, f(w)) ≤ V (χ, f(w)) and
V (ϕ, f(w)) < 1. Therefore V (ψ → χ, f(w)) = 1 and thus V (ϕ, f(w)) < V (ψ → χ, f(w)),
so N is satisﬁed by M under f .
The other cases where rules for propositional connectives are applied are very similar.
For this reason let us next consider the case where N is of the form w : ϕ ≤ ♦ψ with
ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm (while the case where ϕ ∈ TS can be treated again by replacing V (ϕ, f(w))
by f(ϕ) in the argument below). As b is complete, we assume that (≤ ♦) has been
applied to N to yield either b1 or b2:
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b1 :
...
w : ϕ ≤ ♦ψ
...
w : ϕ ≤ ⊥
...
b2 :
...
w : ϕ ≤ ♦ψ
...
w : ϕ ≤ s(t)
v : t < ψ
...
If b = b1, it follows by the induction hypothesis that V (ϕ, f(w)) = 0. In this case,
V (ϕ, f(w)) ≤ V (♦ψ, f(w)) is trivially true and thus N is satisﬁed by M under f .
If b = b2, consider T = {a0, . . . , ak} with 0 = a0 < . . . < ak = 1. Furthermore, note
that `(t) = `(s(t)) = 1 < `(♦ψ) and thus 〈`(ϕ) + `(s(t)), e(w : ϕ ≤ s(t))〉 < 〈n,m〉 >
〈`(t) + `(ψ), e(v : t < ψ)〉. It therefore follows by the induction hypothesis for some i < k,
V (ϕ, f(w)) ≤ f(s(t)) = ai+1 and ai = f(t) < V (ψ, f(v)). Therefore, ai < V (ψ, f(v)) ≤∨{V (ψ, z) | z ∈W}, and thus
V (ϕ, f(w)) ≤ ai+1 ≤
∧
{r ∈ T | r ≥
∨
{V (ψ, z) | z ∈W}} = V (♦ψ, f(w)) ,
which yields that N is satisﬁed by M under f .
Let us next consider the case where N is of the form w : ♦ϕ ≤ ψ, with ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm
(while the case where ψ ∈ TS can be treated by replacing V (ψ, f(w)) by f(ψ) in the
argument), and assume that (♦ ≤) has been applied to N to yield either b1 or b2:
b1 :
...
w : ♦ϕ ≤ ψ
...
♦ϕ = 0
w : 0 ≤ ψ
...
b2 :
...
w : ♦ϕ ≤ ψ
...
♦ϕ = s(t)
w : s(t) ≤ ψ
v : t < ϕ
...
In this case, e(N) = 1, `(♦ϕ = 0) = `(♦ϕ) + 1 ≤ `(N), and e(♦ϕ = 0) = 0 < 1 = e(N)
and thus 〈`(♦ϕ = 0), e(♦ϕ = 0)〉 ≤ 〈n, 0〉 < 〈n, 1〉 = 〈n,m〉. Therefore, if b = b1, it
follows by the induction hypothesis that V (♦ϕ, f(w)) = 0 ≤ V (ψ, f(w)) and thus N is
satisﬁed by M under f .
In the case where b = b2, it follows by the induction hypothesis that V (♦ϕ, f(w)) =
f(s(t)) ≤ V (ψ, f(w)) (and f(t) < V (ϕ, f(v))). Therefore N is satisﬁed by M under f .
As the box-rules are just symmetrical to the diamond-rules and are thus treated
similarly, we end our proof by considering the case where N is of the form ♦ϕ = γ with
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ϕ ∈ Fm and γ ∈ TS. Note that the only possibilities in which N can occur in a T GS5 c-
tableau T are either when N is the root of T or when N was produced by an application
of (♦C) to a node of the form w : ♦ϕ ≤ ψ.
The ﬁrst case does not need to be considered here, as we only consider T GS5 c-
tableaux with a root of the form w : φ < >. For the second case, there are two possible
forms of b: either γ is 0 and b = b1, or γ is s(t) and b = b2, where b1 and b2 are as follows:
b1 :
...
♦ϕ = 0
w : 0 ≤ ψ
...
u : ϕ ≤ 0
...
b2 :
...
♦ϕ = s(t)
w : s(t) ≤ ψ
v : t < ϕ
...
u : ϕ ≤ s(t)
...
Note that in both cases, as b is complete, the node u : ϕ ≤ γ occurs on b for every
world-symbol u occurring on b (including v in the case of b = b2).
If b = b1, then it follows by the induction hypothesis that V (ϕ, f(u)) = 0 for all
u ∈ WSb ∈ {u ∈ WS | u occurs on b}. This implies, as f [WSb] = W , that V (ϕ, z) = 0
for all z ∈W . Therefore, V (♦ϕ, x) = 0 for all x ∈W and N is satisﬁed by M under f .
If b = b2, considering T = {a0, . . . , ak} with 0 = a0 < . . . < ak = 1. As f [WSb] = W ,
it follows by the induction hypothesis that for some i < k, V (ϕ, z) ≤ f(s(t)) = ai+1, for
all z ∈ W , and ai = f(t) < V (ϕ, f(v)). Therefore, we have that ai <
∨{V (ϕ, z) | z ∈
W} ≤ ai+1 and thus for all x ∈W ,
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∧
{r ∈ T | r ≥
∨
{V (ϕ, z) | z ∈W}} = ai+1 = f(s(t)) ,
so N is satisﬁed by M under f .
Theorem 6.11 (Completeness of T GS5 c). For all ϕ ∈ Fm, if
|=SS5c(G) ϕ then `T GS5 c ϕ .
Proof. Let 6`T GS5 c ϕ. Then any complete T GS5 c-tableau with the root w : ϕ < > is
open. Choose one and call it T, then choose a complete open branch b of T and let
M = 〈W,V, T 〉 be a universal SS5c(G)-model induced by b. Such a model exists, as
the atomic nodes on b are jointly satisﬁable by a universal SS5c(G)-model (otherwise b
would be closed). By the completeness lemma it follows that the root node w : ϕ < > of
T is satisﬁed by M under an M-assignment f and thus V (ϕ, x) < 1, for x = f(w) ∈W .
Therefore we have established that 6|=SS5c(G) ϕ.
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6.3 Tableau Calculi for GK and GKc
In this section, we deﬁne tableau calculi for the Gödel modal logics GK and GKc which
will rely on the simpliﬁed alternative semantics of (crisp) SK(G)-models. The calculi are
more complicated, as we have to take care of the accessibility relation and the fact that
T is not a constant function, but they will be based on the same principles as T GS5 c.
Tableaux
In order to deﬁne the diﬀerent forms of nodes, we make use of some more symbols. We
still use formulas in Fm as symbols, world-symbols w ∈ WS, and the symbols ≤, <,
=, and : . Additionally, for each world-symbol w ∈ WS, we have a set bTSw of basic
T -symbols for w, denoted by t(w) ∈ bTSw, and deﬁne inductively the set TSw of T -
symbols for w such that bTSw ⊆ TSw and if γ ∈ TSw, then s(γ) ∈ TSw. We then deﬁne
TS = {0, 1} ∪⋃w∈WS TSw. Moreover, for each pair of world-symbols 〈w, v〉 ∈ WS2, we
have a relation-symbol rwv ∈ RS. Note that the sets TS and RS are distinct from each
other and the set Var of propositional variables. Nodes are then deﬁned to be a strings
of the form
w : ϕC ψ , where ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm ∪ RS ∪ TS, w ∈WS, and C ∈ {≤, <},
w : γ = ψ , where ψ ∈ Fm, γ ∈ TS, and w ∈WS, or
w : ♦ϕ = γ , where ϕ ∈ Fm, γ ∈ TS, and w ∈WS.
Nodes of the form w : ϕCψ, where ϕ,ψ ∈ {⊥,>}∪Var∪RS∪TS, will be called atomic.
A tableau is now deﬁned to be a tableau 〈D,E〉 as deﬁned in the last section, except
that the D is a set of nodes as deﬁned just above. The rules of T GK are displayed in
Figure 6.5, where C ∈ {<,≤}, t(w) is a new basic T -symbol, and v is a new world-
symbol. The instruction (u occurs on b) means that the rule can be applied for any
world-symbol u that occurs anywhere on the current branch b. Note that the rules for
propositional connectives are exactly the same as in T GS5 c, except that the symbols ϕ,
ψ, and χ can now also stand for relation-symbols.
A T GK-tableau is a tableau that is built top-down (starting with the root) according
to the rules in T GK without repetition, that is, to each node of the form w : ϕ C ψ,
for ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm ∪ RS ∪ TS, a rule is applied at most once and to nodes w : γ = ψ
and w : ♦ϕ = γ the rules (=) and (♦=) are applied at most once per world-symbol
occurring on the current branch.
Remark 6.12. T GK-tableaux are ﬁnite for the same reasons as those ensuring that
T GS5 c-tableaux are ﬁnite.
Obviously, we again have the derived rules in Figure 6.6.
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(∧C) : w : ϕ ∧ ψ C χ
w : ϕC χ w : ψ C χ
(C∧) : w : ϕC ψ ∧ χ
w : ϕC ψ
w : ϕC χ
(∨C) : w : ϕ ∨ ψ C χ
w : ϕC χ
w : ψ C χ
(C∨) : w : ϕC ψ ∨ χ
w : ϕC ψ w : ϕC χ
(→C) : w : ϕ→ ψ C χ
w : >C χ w : ψ < ϕ
w : ψ C χ
(C→) : w : ϕC ψ → χ
w : ϕC χ w : ψ ≤ χ
w : ϕC>
(C) : w : ϕC ψ
w : >C ψ w : t(w)C ψ (t(w) new)
v : ϕ < rwv (v new)
v : ϕ < s(t(w))
(C♦) : w : ϕC ♦ψ
w : ϕC⊥ w : ϕC s(t(w)) (t(w) new)
v : t(w) < rwv (v new)
v : t(w) < ψ
(C) : w : ϕCψ
w : 1 = ψ
w : ϕC 1
w : t(w) = ψ (t(w) new)
w : ϕC t(w)
v : ψ < rwv (v new)
v : ψ < s(t(w))
(♦C) : w : ♦ϕC ψ
w : ♦ϕ = 0
w : 0C ψ
w : ♦ϕ = s(t(w)) (t(w) new)
w : s(t(w))C ψ
v : t(w) < rwv (v new)
v : t(w) < ϕ
(=) : w : γ = ψ
(u occurs on b)
u : γ ≤ ψ u : rwu ≤ ψ
(♦=) : w : ♦ϕ = γ
(u occurs on b)
u : rwu ≤ γ u : ϕ ≤ γ
Figure 6.5: T GK-Rules
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(¬¬≤) : w : ¬¬ϕ ≤ ψ
w : > ≤ ψ w : ϕ ≤ ⊥
(≤¬¬) : w : ϕ ≤ ¬¬ψ
w : ⊥ < ψ w : ϕ ≤ ⊥
(¬¬<) : w : ¬¬ϕ < ψ
w : ⊥ < ψ
w : ϕ ≤ ⊥
(<¬¬) : w : ϕ < ¬¬ψ
w : ⊥ < ψ
w : ϕ < >
Figure 6.6: Derived T GK-Rules for Double Negation
Tableaux Satisfaction and Proofs
For an SK(G)-model M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉, we deﬁne a mapping f : WS ∪ RS ∪ TS →
W ∪ [0, 1], called an M-assignment, that assigns to each world-symbol w ∈WS a world
x ∈ W , to each relation-symbol rwv ∈ RS the value Rf(w)f(v) ∈ [0, 1], and to each
T -symbol γ ∈ TSw a value ai ∈ T (f(w)) = {a0, . . . , an} (where 0 = a0 < . . . < an = 1)
for some i ≤ n, such that if i < n, then f(s(γ)) = ai+1, otherwise f(s(γ)) = 1, and
always f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1.
A node of the form w : ϕCψ is called satisﬁed by an SK(G)-model M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉
under an M-assignment f if
V (ϕ, f(w))C V (ψ, f(w)), if ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm,
V (ϕ, f(w))C f(ψ), if ϕ ∈ Fm and ψ ∈ RS ∪ TS,
f(ϕ)C V (ψ, f(w)), if ϕ ∈ RS ∪ TS and ψ ∈ Fm, or
f(ϕ)C f(ψ), if ϕ,ψ ∈ RS ∪ TS.
Nodes of the form w : γ = ψ or w : ♦ϕ = γ are called satisﬁed by an SK(G)-model
M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉 under M-assignment f if, respectively, f(γ) = V (ψ, f(w)) or
V (♦ϕ, f(w)) = f(γ).
A branch b of a tableau is called (crisply) closed if the atomic nodes on b cannot
all be jointly satisﬁed by any (crisp) SK(G)-model M under any M-assignment f , i.e.
the atomic nodes on b represent some contradicting series of inequalities. We will again
indicate that a branch is (crisply) closed by a
⊗
and might write the contradicting series
of inequalities just below. A branch that is not (crisply) closed we call (crisply) open,
and if no more rules can be applied to nodes of a branch, the branch is called complete.
Remark 6.13. Note that if a branch is closed, it is also crisply closed, and if a branch
is crisply open, it is also open. In both cases, the reverse direction does not hold.
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As in Section 6.2, a tableau is called closed if all its branches are closed and it is called
open otherwise. Furthermore, a tableau is called crisply closed if all its branches are
crisply closed and it is called crisply open otherwise. A tableau is called complete, if each
of its branches is either a closed branch, a crisply closed branch, or a complete crisply
open branch. A formula ϕ ∈ Fm is called provable in T GK, abbreviated by `T GK ϕ, if
there is a closed T GK-tableau with the root w : ϕ < >, for some world-symbol w and ϕ is
called provable in T GKc if there is a crisply closed T GK-tableau with the root w : ϕ < >,
for some world-symbol w, written `T GKc ϕ,
Remark 6.14. Note, as in Remark 6.4, that a branch of a T GK-tableau is complete
if and only if to each non-atomic node of the form w : ϕ C ψ a rule has been applied
exactly once and to each node of the form w : γ = ψ or w : ♦ϕ = γ the rule (= )
or (♦ =), respectively, has been applied exactly once for each world-symbol occurring
on the branch. We also note that each T GK-tableau can be extended to a complete
T GK-tableau.
Again, we will prove soundness (Theorem 6.19) and completeness (Theorem 6.21) be-
low for the tableau calculi T GK and T GKc with respect to validity in GK and GKc
respectively. In fact, the completeness lemma (Lemma 6.20) implies for each complete
(crisply) open T GK-tableau with the root w : ϕ < > and complete (crisply) open branch
b, the existence of a (crisp) SK(G)-model 〈W,V,R, T 〉 satisfying each node on b and thus
V (ϕ, x) < 1 for some world x ∈W . Recalling that each T GK-tableau is ﬁnite, we obtain
the following decision procedure:
Theorem 6.15 (Decision Procedure). Let ϕ ∈ Fm and let T be a complete T GK-tableau
with root w : ϕ < >, then
(a) if T is (crisply) closed then ϕ is valid in GK (GKc),
(b) if T is (crisply) open then ϕ is not valid in GK (GKc).
Example 6.16. Figure 6.7 is an example of a closed T GK-tableau. It establishes that
`T GK ¬¬p → ¬¬p and thus ¬¬p → ¬¬p is valid in GK. Obviously, this also
means that it is a crisply closed tableau and therefore ¬¬p→ ¬¬p is also GKc-valid.
We ﬁrst use the rule (→<) on the root node and then (<¬¬) on the node w0 : ¬¬p <
¬¬p. Subsequently, we use (<) on the lower occurrence of w0 : ¬¬p < >, producing
two branches of which the left closes immediately while on the right, we introduce the new
world-symbol w1. Furthermore, we apply (¬¬<) to w1 : ¬¬p < rw0w1 and subsequently
split the branch in two by using (<) on the node w0 : ⊥ < p (on the fourth line),
introducing the new world-symbol w2 on the resulting right branch. On the resulting left
branch, we apply (=) to w0 : 1 = p for the world-symbol w1 and obtain two branches
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w0 : ¬¬p→ ¬¬p < >
w0 : > < >⊗ w0 : ¬¬p < ¬¬p
w0 : ¬¬p < >
w0 : ⊥ < p
w0 : ¬¬p < >
w0 : > < >⊗ w0 : t0(w0) < >
w1 : ¬¬p < rw0w1
w1 : ¬¬p < s(t0(w0))
w1 : ⊥ < rw0w1
w1 : p ≤ ⊥
w0 : 1 = p
w0 : ⊥ < 1
w1 : 1 ≤ p⊗
1 ≤ pw1 ≤ ⊥
w1 : rw0w1 ≤ p⊗
⊥ < rw0w1 ≤ pw1 ≤ ⊥
w0 : t1(w0) = p
w0 : ⊥ < t1(w0)
w2 : p < rw0w2
w2 : p < s(t1(w0))
w1 : t1(w0) ≤ p⊗
⊥ < t1(w0) ≤ pw1 ≤ ⊥
w1 : rw0w1 ≤ p⊗
⊥ < rw0w1 ≤ pw1 ≤ ⊥
Figure 6.7: A Closed T GK-Tableau
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that close immediately. For the right branch, we use (=) on the node w0 : t1(w0) = p
with the world-symbol w1 to obtain two branches that both close immediately.
Example 6.17. In Figure 6.8, we present an example of a complete open T GK-tableau
for the formula ¬¬♦p→ ♦¬¬p, the distinguishing formula between GK and GKc, estab-
lishing that 6`T GK ¬¬♦p→ ♦¬¬p and thus ¬¬♦p→ ♦¬¬p is not valid in GK.
On the other hand, the tableau is in fact crisply closed, as all open branches (marked
by ⇑1 and ⇑2) are crisply closed. Therefore, `T GKc ¬¬♦p → ♦¬¬p and thus ¬¬♦p →
♦¬¬p is valid in GKc.
In the tableau, we ﬁrst use (→<) on the root node, followed by (<¬¬) on w0 : ♦¬¬p <
¬¬♦p and (<♦) on w0 : ⊥ < ♦p, resulting in a split into two branches of which the
left branch closes immediately and on the right branch we introduce the new symbols
s(t0(w0)), w1, t0(w0), and rw0w1. We subsequently use (♦<) on the lower occurrence of
w0 : ♦¬¬p < ⊥, resulting again in a split into two branches, b1 on the left and b2 on the
right, where the new symbols s(t1(w0)), w2, t1(w0), and rw0w2 occur.
On b1, we use (♦=) on the node w0 : ♦¬¬p = 0 for the world-symbol w1, resulting
in a split of which the left branch closes immediately while on the right branch we apply
(¬¬≤). Both resulting branches close immediately as well.
On b2, we ﬁrst use (<¬¬) on w2 : t1(w0) < ¬¬p. We then use (♦=) on w0 : ♦¬¬p =
s(t1(w0)) for the world-variable w2, resulting in a split into two branches. On the right
branch, we use (¬¬≤) and both resulting branches close. We then repeat applying (♦=)
to w0 : ♦¬¬p = s(t1(w0)) for the world-variables w1 and w0, and also repeat using (¬¬≤)
on the resulting right branch.
We now have two open branches, marked by ⇑1 and ⇑2, to which no more rules can
be applied. As the rest of the branches are closed, we have obtained a complete open
tableau, establishing that 6`T GK ¬¬♦p→ ♦¬¬p.
Note that strictly speaking, the tableau T in Figure 6.8 is not complete. We have
not applied any rule to the upper most occurrence of the node w0 : ♦¬¬p < ⊥. However,
for simplicity, we ignore this node and abuse notation in calling the branches marked by
⇑1 and ⇑2 complete. We do this because the node has an identical twin two lines below,
to which a rule has been applied. For this reason, we do not lose any information by
ignoring the node, as clearly any SK(G)-model M and M-assignment f satisfying all
other nodes on a complete open branch of T will satisfy also the upper most occurrence
of the node w0 : ♦¬¬p < ⊥, as it satisﬁes its twin.
As in Example 6.7, we know for example the branch b marked by ⇑2 that there is
an SK(G)-model M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉 and an M-assignment f that satisfy all the atomic
nodes on b, i.e. Mis induced by b. By Lemma 6.20, we can infer that M also satisﬁed
all the other nodes, including the root node w0 : ¬¬♦p → ♦¬¬p < >, which implies
that V (¬¬♦p → ♦¬¬p, f(w0)) < 1. Let us give an example of such an SK(G)-model
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w0 : ¬¬♦p→ ♦¬¬p < >
w0 : > < >⊗ w0 : ♦¬¬p < ¬¬♦p
w0 : ♦¬¬p < >
w0 : ⊥ < ♦p
w0 : ♦¬¬p < >
w0 : ⊥ < ⊥⊗ w0 : ⊥ < s(t0(w0))
w1 : t0(w0) < rw0w1
w1 : t0(w0) < p
w0 : ♦¬¬p = 0
w0 : 0 < >
w1 : rw0w1 ≤ 0⊗ w1 : ¬¬p ≤ 0
w1 : p ≤ ⊥⊗
t0(w0) < pw1 ≤ ⊥
w1 : > ≤ 0⊗
w0 : ♦¬¬p = s(t1(w0))
w0 : s(t1(w0)) < >
w2 : t1(w0) < rw0w2
w2 : t1(w0) < ¬¬p
w2 : ⊥ < p
w2 : t1(w0) < >
w2 : rw0w2 ≤ s(t1(w0))
w1 : rw0w1 ≤ s(t1(w0))
w0 : rw0w0 ≤ s(t1(w0))
⇑1
w0 : ¬¬p ≤ s(t1(w0))
w0 : > ≤ s(t1(w0))⊗
> ≤ s(t1(w0)) < ⊥
w0 : p ≤ ⊥
⇑2
w1 : ¬¬p ≤ s(t1(w0))
w1 : > ≤ s(t1(w0))⊗ w1 : p ≤ ⊥⊗
t0(w0) < pw1 ≤ ⊥
w2 : ¬¬p ≤ s(t1(w0))
w2 : > ≤ s(t1(w0))⊗ w2 : p ≤ ⊥⊗
Figure 6.8: A Complete Open T GK-Tableau
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M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉 and M-assignment f . Omitting some redundant requirements, we
obtain from the atomic nodes on b the following constraints on M and f :
(i) Rf(w0)f(w1) > f(t0(w0)) , from the node w0 : t0(w0) < rw0w1,
(ii) Rf(w0)f(w2) > f(t1(w0)) , from the node w2 : t1(w0) < rw0w2,
(iii) Rf(w0)f(w2) ≤ f(s(t1(w0))) , from the node w2 : rw0w2 ≤ s(t1(w0)),
(iv) Rf(w0)f(w1) ≤ f(s(t1(w0))) , from the node w1 : rw0w1 ≤ s(t1(w0)),
(v) V (p, f(w2)) > 0 , from the node w2 : ⊥ < p,
(vi) V (p, f(w0)) = 0 , from the node w0 : p ≤ ⊥,
(vii) V (p, f(w1)) > f(t0(w0)) , from the node w1 : t0(w0) < p,
(viii) f(s(t0(w0))) > 0 , from the node w0 : ⊥ < s(t0(w0)),
(ix) f(s(t1(w0))) < 1 , from the node w0 : s(t1(w0)) < >,
(x) f(t1(w0)) < 1 , from the node w2 : t1(w0) < >.
There are uncountably many diﬀerent SK(G)-modelsM andM-assignments f satisfying
these constraints. Let e.g. M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉 be deﬁned by
• W = {x0, x1},
• Rx0x0 = Rx0x1 = 12 and Rx1x0 = Rx1x0 = 0,
• V (p, x0) = 0 and V (p, x1) = 12 , and
• T (x0) = {0, 14 , 34 , 1} and T (x1) = {0, 1}.
Furthermore, let f be a mapping f : WS ∪ RS ∪ TS→W ∪ [0, 1] that satisﬁes
• f(w0) = x0, f(w1) = f(w2) = x1,
• f(rx0x0) = f(rx0x1) = f(rx0x2) = 12 , and
• f(t0(w0)) = f(t1(w0)) = 14 and f(s(t0(w0))) = f(s(t1(w0))) = 34 .
We notice that f is anM-assignment and thatM satisﬁes all the atomic nodes of b under
f , meaning that M is induced by b. Moreover, we note that
V (¬¬♦p, f(w0)) = ¬¬
∧{r ∈ T (f(w0)) | r ≥ ∨{Rf(w0)y ∧ V (p, y) | y ∈W}}
= ¬¬∧{r ∈ T (x0) | r ≥ ∨{Rx0y ∧ V (p, y) | y ∈W}}
= ¬¬∧{r ∈ {0, 14 , 34 , 1} | r ≥ (12 ∧ 0) ∨ (12 ∧ 12)}
= ¬¬∧{r ∈ {0, 14 , 34 , 1} | r ≥ 12}
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= ¬¬ 34
= 1 ,
V (♦¬¬p, f(w0)) =
∧{r ∈ T (f(w0)) | r ≥ ∨{Rf(w0)y ∧ V (¬¬p, y) | y ∈W}}
=
∧{r ∈ T (x0) | r ≥ ∨{Rx0y ∧ V (¬¬p, y) | y ∈W}}
=
∧{r ∈ {0, 14 , 34 , 1} | r ≥ (12 ∧ ¬¬ 0) ∨ (12 ∧ ¬¬ 12)}
=
∧{r ∈ {0, 14 , 34 , 1} | r ≥ 12}
= 34 ,
and thus
V (¬¬♦p→ ♦¬¬p, f(w0)) = V (¬¬♦p, f(w0))→ V (♦¬¬p, f(w0))
= 1→ 34
= 34
< 1 .
Finally, note that the following collection of inequalities cannot be satisﬁed by a crisp
SK(G)-model M under any M-assignment f : t1(w0) < rw0w2 ≤ s(t1(w0)) < >. That
is, the atomic nodes on the branches marked by ⇑1 and ⇑2 cannot be jointly satisﬁed by
a crisp SK(G)-model, and therefore these branches are crisply closed. This means that
the tableau is crisply closed and thus `T GKc ¬¬♦p→ ♦¬¬p.
Soundness and Completeness
In order to prove soundness and completeness of the tableau calculi T GK and T GKc
with respect to validity in GK and GKc, respectively, we need to adapt the notions of
faithfulness and inducement, introduced in Section 6.2, to SK(G)-models. Let M be an
SK(G)-model, f an M-assignment, and b a branch of a T GK-tableau, then M is called
faithful to b under f if and only if all nodes on b are satisﬁed byM under f . For a branch
b of a T GK-tableau T, we again say that b′ is an extension of b if b′ is a branch of T and
b is an initial segment of b′.
Furthermore, let b be a open branch of a T GK-tableau. We denote the ﬁnite set of
all world-symbols occurring on b by WSb and call an SK(G)-model M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉
induced by b if and only if there is an M-assignment f such that each atomic node on b
is satisﬁed by M under f and f [WSb] = W .
Lemma 6.18 (Soundness Lemma). Let b be a branch of a T GK-tableau and let M be an
SK(G)-model faithful to b under some M-assignment f . If a T GK-rule is applied to a
node on b, at least one extension of b, b′, is produced such that M is faithful to b′ under
some M-assignment f ′.
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Proof. Similarly to Lemma 6.8, this lemma is proved by considering all the diﬀerent
rules of T GK that could be applied to a node on b. As the rules for the propositional
connectives are the same as in T GS5 c, we just consider the rules for , the rules for ♦
being treated similarly.
We ﬁrst consider the case where (≤) has been applied to a node on b of the form
w : ϕ ≤ ψ and investigate the subcase (i) where ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm. In this case, two extensions
of b, b′1 and b′2, are produced:
b′1 :
...
b
...
w : 1 = ψ
w : ϕ ≤ 1
b′2 :
...
b
...
w : t(w) = ψ
w : ϕ ≤ t(w)
v : ψ < rwv
v : ψ < s(t(w))
As M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉 is faithful to b under f , we know that f(w) ∈ W , let us call it
x, and V (ϕ, x) ≤ V (ψ, x). In the case where V (ψ, x) = 1, we note that V (ϕ, x) ≤
V (ψ, x) = 1 and thus M is clearly faithful to b′1 under f ′ = f . Let us thus assume that
V (ψ, x) < 1. Recalling that
V (ψ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T (x) | r ≤
∧
{Rxz → V (ψ, z) | z ∈W}} ,
we note that there must be a world y ∈ W and values ai, ai+1 ∈ T (x) = {a0, . . . , an},
with 0 = a0 < . . . < an = 1, such that
ai = V (ψ, x) ≤ Rxy → V (ψ, y) and Rxy → V (ψ, y) < ai+1 .
This implies also that V (ψ, y) < Rxy and V (ψ, y) < ai+1. We then deﬁne an M-
assignment f ′ such that f ′(v) = y, f ′(t(w)) = ai, f(s(t(w))) = ai+1, and otherwise
agrees with f (implying that f(w) = f ′(w) = x and f ′(rwv) = f(rwv) = Rxy). It
follows that M is faithful to b′2 under f ′, as
• f ′(t(w)) = ai = V (ψ, x) = V (ψ, f ′(w)) ,
• V (ϕ, f ′(w)) = V (ϕ, x) ≤ V (ψ, x) = f ′(t(w)) ,
• V (ψ, f ′(v)) = V (ψ, y) < Rxy = f ′(rwv) , and
• V (ψ, f ′(v)) = V (ψ, y) < ai+1 = f ′(s(t(w))) .
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In order to treat the case (ii) where ϕ ∈ RS ∪ TS, we replace all occurrences of
V (ϕ, f(w)) and V (ϕ, x) in the argument above by f(ϕ) and also replace all oc-
currences of V (ϕ, f ′(w)) by f ′(ϕ). The argument then also goes through as now
f ′(ϕ) = f(ϕ).
Let us consider next the case where (=) has been applied to a node on b of the form
w : γ = ψ for some world-symbol u occurring on b, noting that the only possibility is
that γ ∈ TS and ψ ∈ Fm. Then the extensions b′1 and b′2 of b are produced:
b′1 :
...
b
...
u : γ ≤ ψ
b′2 :
...
b
...
u : rwu ≤ ψ
As M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉 is faithful to b, we know that f(w) = x and f(u) = y for some
x, y ∈W , and that f(γ) = V (ψ, x). It follows that
f(γ) = V (ψ, x) ≤
∧
{Rxz → V (ψ, z) | z ∈W} ≤ Rxy → V (ψ, y) ,
and we either have Rxy > V (ψ, y) or Rxy ≤ V (ψ, y). In the former case, f(γ) ≤ Rxy →
V (ψ, y) = V (ψ, y) = V (ψ, f(u)), and thus M is faithful to b′1 under f ′ = f . In the latter
case, M is faithful to b′2 under f ′ = f , as f(rwu) = Rxy ≤ V (ψ, y) = V (ψ, f(u)).
As the argument for the rule (<) is very similar to the argument for (≤), the last
rule we will consider here is (≤). Consider the case where (≤) is applied to the node
w : ϕ ≤ ψ on the branch b, where for case (i): ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm. In this case, two extensions
of b, b′1 and b′2, are produced:
b′1 :
...
b
...
w : > ≤ ψ
b′2 :
...
b
...
w : t(w) ≤ ψ
v : ϕ < rwv
v : ϕ < s(t(w))
As M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉 is faithful to b under f , we let f(w) = x ∈ W and infer that
V (ϕ, x) ≤ V (ψ, x). This means that either V (ψ, x) = 1, in which case M is faithful
to b′1 under f ′ = f , or we have that there are ai, ai+1 ∈ T (x) = {a0, . . . , an}, with
0 = a0 < . . . < an = 1, such that
ai = V (ϕ, x) ≤ V (ψ, x) and Rxy → V (ϕ, y) < ai+1, for some y ∈W.
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In this case, Rxy > V (ϕ, y) < ai+1 and we deﬁne anM-assignment f ′ such that it agrees
with f except that f ′(v) = y, f ′(t(w)) = ai, and f ′(s(t(w))) = ai+1. It then follows that
M is faithful to b′2 under f ′, as also
• f ′(t(w)) = ai = V (ϕ, x) ≤ V (ψ, x) = V (ψ, f ′(w)) ,
• V (ϕ, f ′(v)) = V (ϕ, y) < Rxy = f ′(rwv) , and
• V (ϕ, f ′(v)) = V (ϕ, y) < ai+1 = f ′(s(t(w))) .
In case (ii) where ψ ∈ TS, as above, we replace all occurrences of V (ψ, x) by f(ψ)
and V (ψ, f ′(w)) by f ′(ψ) in the argument.
Theorem 6.19 (Soundness of T GK and T GKc). For all ϕ ∈ Fm,
if `T GK ϕ then |=SK(G) ϕ and if `T GKc ϕ then |=SKc(G) ϕ .
Proof. For the ﬁrst implication, let 6|=SK(G) ϕ. Then there is an SK(G)-model M =
〈W,R, V, T 〉 and a world x ∈W such that V (ϕ, x) < 1.
Now consider any complete T GK-tableau T with the root w : ϕ < >. Clearly, M is
faithful to the branch b consisting only of the root node under any M-assignment f with
f(w) = x. Applying the soundness lemma repeatedly, we ﬁnd a complete branch b′ such
that M is faithful to b′ under M-assignment f ′. Because a closed branch is not satisﬁed
by any SK(G)-model M under any M-assignment, it follows that b′ must be open.
This means that any complete T GK-tableau with the root w : ϕ < > must have an
open branch. Therefore, there is no closed T GK-tableau with the root w : ϕ < >, which
means that 6`T GK ϕ.
For the second implication, replace SK(G) by SKc(G), closed by crisply closed,
and open by crisply open in the argument above and it works in the same way.
Lemma 6.20 (Completeness Lemma). Let b be a complete (crisply) open branch of a
T GK-tableau with root of the form w : φ < >, let M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉 be a (crisp) SK(G)-
model induced by b, and let f be an M-assignment such that each atomic node on b is
satisﬁed by M under f . Then all nodes on b are satisﬁed by M under f .
Proof. Similarly to the proof of the completeness lemma for T GS5 c, this lemma will be
proved by an induction on the lexicographic ordering on {〈`(N), e(N)〉 | N is a node on b},
where for any ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm ∪ RS ∪ TS and any N of the form w : ϕ C ψ or w : ϕ = ψ,
`(N) = `(ϕ) + `(ψ) (where `(χ) = 1 for all χ ∈ RS ∪ TS) and
e(N) =
1 if N is of the form w : ϕC ψ ,0 if N is of the form w : ϕ = ψ .
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For the base case, consider a node N with 〈`(N), e(N)〉 = 〈2, 1〉. This implies that N is
an atomic node of the form w : ϕCψ and thus is satisﬁed byM under f by the deﬁnition
of induced models.
For the inductive step, consider a node N on b with 〈`(N), e(N)〉 = 〈n,m〉. There
are many diﬀerent cases to consider, let us start with the case where N is of the form
w : ϕ → ψ < χ with ϕ,ψ, χ ∈ Fm (the case where χ ∈ RS ∪ TS can be treated by
replacing V (χ, f(w)) by f(χ) in the argument below). In this case, as b is complete,
either (→≤) has been applied to N or some other rule decomposing χ. For the case on
hand, we assume that (→≤) has been applied to N , thus b is either of the form b1 or b2.
b1 :
...
w : ϕ→ ψ ≤ χ
...
w : > ≤ χ
...
b2 :
...
w : ϕ→ ψ ≤ χ
...
w : ψ < ϕ
w : ψ ≤ χ
...
In the case where b = b1, as `(>) < `(ϕ → ψ) and thus 〈`(>) + `(χ), e(w : > ≤ χ)〉 <
〈n,m〉, the induction hypothesis yields that w : > ≤ χ is satisﬁed byM under f and thus
V (χ, f(w)) = 1. Then clearly V (ϕ→ ψ, f(w)) ≤ V (χ, f(w)) and so N is satisﬁed by M
under f .
If b = b2, it follows by the induction hypothesis that V (ψ, f(w)) < V (ϕ, f(w))
and V (ψ, f(w)) ≤ V (χ, f(w)). Therefore we can conclude that V (ϕ → ψ, f(w)) =
V (ψ, f(w)) ≤ V (χ, f(w)) and N is satisﬁed by M under f .
The other cases where rules for propositional connectives are applied are very similar.
For this reason let us next consider the case whereN is of the form w : ϕ ≤ ♦ψ with ϕ,ψ ∈
Fm (while the case where ϕ ∈ RS ∪ TS can be treated again by replacing V (ϕ, f(w))
and V (ϕ, x) with f(ϕ) in the argument below). We assume that (≤ ♦) has been
applied to N to yield either b1 or b2:
b1 :
...
w : ϕ ≤ ♦ψ
...
w : ϕ ≤ ⊥
...
b2 :
...
w : ϕ ≤ ♦ψ
...
w : ϕ ≤ s(t(w))
v : t(w) < rwv
v : t(w) < ψ
...
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If b = b1, it follows by the induction hypothesis that V (ϕ, f(w)) = 0. In this case,
V (ϕ, f(w)) ≤ V (♦ψ, f(w)) is trivially the case and thus N is satisﬁed by M under f .
For b = b2, note that `(ϕ) ≥ `(t(w)) = `(s(t(w))) = `(rwv) = 1 < `(♦ψ), and thus it
follows by the induction hypothesis that the nodes w : ϕ ≤ s(t(w)), v : t(w) < rwv, and
v : t(w) < ψ are satisﬁed by M under f . Considering f(w) = x and f(v) = y for some
x, y ∈W and T (x) = {a0, . . . , ak} with 0 = a0 < . . . < ak = 1, we can infer that for some
i < k, V (ϕ, x) ≤ f(s(t(w))) = ai+1, ai = f(t(w)) < f(rwv) = Rxy, and ai < V (ψ, y). It
follows that ai < Rxy ∧ V (ψ, y) ≤
∨{Rxz ∧ V (ψ, z) | z ∈W}, and thus
V (ϕ, x) ≤ ai+1 ≤
∧
{r ∈ T | r ≥
∨
{Rxz ∧ V (ψ, z) | z ∈W}} = V (♦ψ, x) .
It follows that N is satisﬁed by M under f .
Let us next consider the case where N is of the form w : ♦ϕ ≤ ψ, with ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm
(while the case where ψ ∈ RS ∪ TS can be treated by replacing V (ψ, f(w)) by f(ψ)
in the argument), and we assume that (♦≤) has been applied to N to yield either b1 or
b2:
b1 :
...
w : ♦ϕ ≤ ψ
...
w : ♦ϕ = 0
w : 0 ≤ ψ
...
b2 :
...
w : ♦ϕ ≤ ψ
...
w : ♦ϕ = s(t(w))
w : s(t(w)) ≤ ψ
v : t(w) < rwv
v : t(w) < ϕ
...
In this case, `(w : ♦ϕ = 0) = `(♦ϕ) + 1 ≤ `(N) = n, and e(w : ♦ϕ = 0) = 0 < 1 = e(N)
and thus 〈`(w : ♦ϕ = 0), e(w : ♦ϕ = 0)〉 ≤ 〈n, 0〉 < 〈n, 1〉 = 〈n,m〉. Therefore, if b = b1,
it follows by the induction hypothesis that V (♦ϕ, f(w)) = 0 ≤ V (ψ, f(w)), thus N is
satisﬁed by M under f .
In the case where b = b2, it follows by the induction hypothesis, among other facts,
that V (♦ϕ, f(w)) = f(s(t(w))) ≤ V (ψ, f(w)) and thus N is satisﬁed by M under f .
Notice that the satisfaction of the other nodes on b2 is only needed when we consider the
rule (♦=).
As the box-rules are just symmetrical to the diamond-rules and are thus treated
similarly, we end our proof by considering the case where N is of the form w : ♦ϕ = γ
with ϕ ∈ Fm and γ ∈ TS. Note that the only possibilities in which N can occur in a
T GK-tableau are either when N is the root or when N was produced by an application
of (♦C) (where C ∈ {<,≤}).
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The ﬁrst case does not need to be considered here, as the T GK-tableau considered
has a root of the form w : ϕ < ⊥. For the second case, there are two possible forms of b:
either γ is 0 and b = b1, or γ is s(t(w)) and b = b2, where b1 and b2 are as follows:
b1 :
...
w : ♦ϕC ψ
...
w : ♦ϕ = 0
w : 0C ψ
...
b2 :
...
w : ♦ϕC ψ
...
w : ♦ϕ = s(t(w))
w : s(t(w))C ψ
v : t(w) < rwv
v : t(w) < ϕ
...
Furthermore, in case b = b1, as b is complete, there is for each u ∈ WSb = {u ∈
WS | u occurs on b} either the node u : rwu ≤ 0 or the node u : ϕ ≤ 0 on b. As for
any u ∈ WSb, `(rwu) + `(0) = 2 ≤ `(ϕ) + `(0) < `(♦ϕ) + `(0), it follows by the
induction hypothesis that for each u ∈ WSb either Rf(w)f(u) = 0 or V (ϕ, f(u)) = 0.
As f [WSb] = W , this implies that Rf(w)z ∧ V (ϕ, z) = 0 for all z ∈ W . Therefore,
V (♦ϕ, f(w)) = 0 and N is satisﬁed by M under f .
If b = b2, we consider f(w) = x and f(v) = y for some x, y ∈ W and T (x) =
{a0, . . . , ak} with 0 = a0 < . . . < ak = 1. It follows by the induction hypothesis that for
some i < k,
ai+1 = f(s(t(w))) C V (ψ, x) , ai = f(t(w)) < Rxy , and ai < V (ϕ, y) .
Moreover, similar to the case where b = b1, there is for each u ∈ WSb either the node
u : rwu ≤ s(t(w)) or the node u : ϕ ≤ s(t(w)) on b = b2. As f [WSb] = W , we therefore
have by the induction hypothesis that Rxz∧V (ϕ, z) ≤ f(s(t(w))) = ai+1 for each z ∈W .
As from the above it also follows that ai < Rxy ∧ V (ϕ, y), we can therefore infer that
ai <
∨{Rxz ∧ V (ϕ, z) | z ∈W} ≤ ai+1 and thus
V (♦ϕ, x) =
∧
{r ∈ T (x) | r ≥
∨
{Rxz ∧ V (ϕ, z) | z ∈W}} = ai+1 .
It follows that N is satisﬁed by M under f .
Theorem 6.21 (Completeness of T GK and T GKc). For all ϕ ∈ Fm,
if |=SK(G) ϕ then `T GK ϕ and if |=SKc(G) ϕ then `T GKc ϕ .
Proof. For the ﬁrst implication, we assume that 6`T GK ϕ. Then any complete T GK-
tableau with the root w : ϕ < > is open. Choose one, then choose a complete open
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branch b on it, and let M = 〈W,R, V, T 〉 be an SK(G)-model induced by b. By the
completeness lemma it follows that the root node w : ϕ < > of T is satisﬁed by M under
some M-assignment f and therefore V (ϕ, x) < 1, for x = f(w) ∈ W . Thus we have
that 6|=SK(G) ϕ.
For the second implication, simply replace SK(G) by SKc(G) and open by
crisply open in the argument above.
Chapter 7
Neighbourhood Semantics for
Many-Valued Modal Logics
In classical modal logic, neighbourhood semantics, introduced independently by Richard
Montague in [97] and Dana Scott in [115], is a more general and thus more ﬂexible frame-
work than Kripke-style relational semantics that provides semantics for a broader class
of modal logics, including modal logics strictly weaker than K. It is a framework in which
a plethora of diﬀerent notions can be modelled as modal connectives, such as know-
ledge, obligation, belief, evidence, high probability, and even negation and generalized
quantiﬁers (see e.g. [105]). For a recent introduction with motivating examples, see [103].
The goal in the present chapter is to propose a form of neighbourhood semantics
(as already considered in [110, 111] by Rodríguez and Godo) that provides semantics
for a broad class of many-valued modal logics, namely the class of axiomatic extensions
of MTL. After recalling the main notions from the classical case and some notation
inspired by fuzzy class theory in Section 7.1, we introduce neighbourhood frames for
many-valued logics in Section 7.2. We then show how such frames relate to Kripke frames
in Section 7.3 and we obtain an axiomatization of the logics given by all neighbourhood
frames in Section 7.4.
The content of this chapter originates from joint work of the author of this dissertation
with Petr Cintula and Carles Noguera [43].
7.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we brieﬂy introduce classical neighbourhood semantics and some helpful
notation inspired by the syntax of fuzzy class theory (see e.g. [11]). First, we ﬁx the
algebraic language L = {∧,∨,&,→,,>} and let L = L ∪ {}.1 We will drop the
subscript from the set of formulas FmL and FmL if the language is clear from the
context.
1Recall that in the absence of double-negation elimination, as is the case for MTL, the diamond
modality ♦ is not deﬁnable from the box .
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Classical Neighbourhood Semantics
In the classical setting, a neighbourhood model, or SM-model, is a tripleM = 〈W,N, V 〉,
where W is a non-empty set of worlds and N is a function N : W → P(P(W )) (P
denoting the powerset operator) that assigns to each world x ∈ W a set of subsets
N(x) ⊆ P(W ), called the neighbourhood of x. V is a valuation V : Var ×W → {0, 1}
that is extended to all formulas inductively as in classical propositional logic (where &
and ∧ coincide and both denote classical conjunction), while for a box-formula:
V (ϕ, x) = 1 iﬀ [[ϕ]]M ∈ N(x) ,
where [[ϕ]]M = {y ∈W | V (ϕ, y) = 1}, the set of worlds where ϕ is true.
We say that a formula ϕ ∈ Fm is valid in an SM-modelM = 〈W,N, V 〉 if V (ϕ, x) = 1
for all x ∈ W (which we can equivalently formulate as [[ϕ]]M = W ), writtenM |=SM ϕ.
For a set of formulas Γ ⊆ Fm, we use the shorthand notationM |=SM Γ, if for all ψ ∈ Γ,
M |=SM ψ. Furthermore, a formula ϕ ∈ Fm is called an SM-consequence of a set of
formulas Γ ⊆ Fm, if for all SM-modelsM, such thatM |=SM Γ, alsoM |=SM ϕ, written
Γ |=SM ϕ.2 If ∅ |=SM ϕ, we write |=SM ϕ and say that ϕ is valid in SM.
We note that a classical Kripke model, or shortly K-model, is a K(A)-model (as
deﬁned in Chapter 2) where A is the two-element Boolean algebra. Recall that R[x] =
{y ∈W | Rxy} and V is extended box-formulas as follows:
V (ϕ, x) = 1 iﬀ V (ϕ, y) = 1, for all y ∈ R[x] .
Note that we can equivalently write this condition as R[x] ⊆ [[ϕ]]M, where [[ϕ]]M is deﬁned
as in the case of the SM-semantics.
It is not hard to see, that given any K-modelM = 〈W,R, V 〉, we obtain an SM-model
MM = 〈W,NR, V 〉 by setting for all x ∈W ,
NR(x) = {X ∈P(W ) | R[x] ⊆ X} .
Conversely, given any SM-model M = 〈W,N, V 〉, we can deﬁne a K-model MM =
〈W,RN , V 〉 by setting for all x, y ∈W ,
RNxy iﬀ y ∈ X, for each X ∈ N(x) .
Note that this entails that RN [x] =
⋂
N(x) =
⋂
X∈N(x)X. However, in order to pre-
serve valid formulas in the latter case (i.e. ensuring that for all ϕ ∈ Fm, M |=SM ϕ iﬀ
MM |=K ϕ), we need the original SM-model M to satisfy the following two additional
conditions for each x ∈W :
2Note that we consider the so-called global consequence relations. The reformulations of all our
deﬁnitions to the local variant is straightforward.
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• N(x) contains its core, i.e. the set (⋂X∈N(x)X) ∈ N(x),
• N(x) is closed under taking supersets, i.e. if X ∈ N(x) and X ⊆ Y , then Y ∈ N(x).
In this case, M is called augmented. The following results about these transitions and
the axiomatization can be found for example in [32] or [103].
Theorem 7.1.
(a) Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a K-model. Then RNR = R and M = 〈Ŵ ,NR, V̂ 〉, where
Ŵ = W and V̂ = V , is an augmented SM-model, and for all ϕ ∈ Fm and x ∈W ,
V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) .
(b) Let M = 〈W,N, V 〉 be an augmented SM-model. Then NRN = N and M = 〈Ŵ ,
RN , V̂ 〉, where Ŵ = W and V̂ = V , is a K-model, and for all ϕ ∈ Fm and x ∈W ,
V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) .
Corollary 7.2. For any subset Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ |=K ϕ iﬀ M |=SM ϕ for all augmented SM-modelsM such that M |=SM Γ .
Furthermore, let CL denote any Hilbert-style axiomatization of classical propositional
logic CL, and deﬁne the following rule:
ϕ↔ ψ
(E)
ϕ↔ ψ .
Letting SM = CL ∪ {(E)}, we obtain the following completeness result:
Theorem 7.3. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm, then
Γ `SM ϕ iﬀ Γ |=SM ϕ .
Fuzzy Sets and Notation
In order to formulate neighbourhood semantics over MTL-algebras, rather than the two-
element Boolean algebra, we need to talk about fuzzy subsets of worlds and fuzzy sets
of fuzzy subsets. To do this eﬃciently, we introduce a convenient notation, inspired by
the syntax of fuzzy class theory (see e.g. [11]), where what we call third-order formulas
will denote functions into a given MTL-chain. This notation considerably improves the
readability of the proofs in the following sections and makes the connections to the
classical setting more obvious.
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Recall that an MTL-algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 is deﬁned for the language L.
Let L4 = L ∪ {4} be the algebraic language L with an additional unary connective 4,
which will be interpreted by the Delta operation, also called the Baaz-Monteiro operation.
An algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,4,⊥,>〉 for L4 will then be called an MTL4-chain if its
L-reduct 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 is an MTL-chain and for all a ∈ A:
4a =
> if a = > ,⊥ otherwise,
By A4, we denote the algebra resulting from adding 4 to the MTL-chain A and say
that A4 is the 4-expansion of A. Furthermore, we will call A4 a complete MTL4-chain
if it is the 4-expansion of a complete MTL-chain A (i.e. ∨B and ∧B are in A for all
B ⊆ A).
Given a complete MTL4-chain A4 = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,4,⊥,>〉 and a (classical) set
of worlds W , a fuzzy subset X of W is deﬁned as a function X : W → A. Intuitively,
a world x ∈ W is a member of X to the degree X(x) ∈ A, for this reason, we also
write x εX to denote the value X(x) in A. A fuzzy set X of fuzzy subsets of W is a
function X : AW → A and, for all X ∈ AW , we also write X εX for the value X (X)
in A. We use lower case letters x, y, z, . . . to denote members of W , upper case letters
X,Y, Z, . . . to denote members of AW and upper case calligraphic letters X ,Y,Z, . . . to
denote members of AA
W
.
Note that we can view expressions like x εX and X εX , ﬁguratively speaking, as
atomic formulas of some third-order language (with just one binary predicate symbol ε )
where x, X, and X act as free variables, also called ﬁrst-order variables, second-order
variables, and third-order variables, respectively. We then use the connectives in L4
to form more complicated third-order formulas, e.g. x εX → X εX , and quantiﬁer
symbols (∀x), (∀X), (∃x) and (∃X) to bind ﬁrst-order variables and second-order
variables.
For an MTL4-chain A4 and a (classical) set of worlds W , we will interpret the
connectives in L4 by the corresponding operations of A4, and the quantiﬁers ∀ and ∃
stand for inﬁma and suprema, respectively. In this sense, third-order formulas are just
short-hand notations for functions mapping into A where free ﬁrst-order variables x, y,
and z are argument-positions for worlds in W , free second-order variables X, Y , and
Z are argument-positions for fuzzy subsets in AW , and free third-order variables X , Y,
and Z are argument-positions for fuzzy sets of fuzzy subsets in AAW . If all variables are
bound by a quantiﬁer symbol, the third-order formulas stands for a constant function
into A, that is, an element of A. For example, the third-order formula (∀X)(x εX)
stands for the function
f : W → A deﬁned by f(x) =
∧
X∈AW
X(x) ,
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and the third-order formula (∀X)(∃Y )(∀x)(x εX → x ε Y ) stands for the following
constant function into (or element of) A:∧
X∈AW
∨
Y ∈AW
∧
x∈W
(X(x)→ Y (x)) .
Furthermore, given a third-order formula ϕ where the only free variable (if there is
one) is a ﬁrst-order variable (recall that in this case, ϕ stands for a function ϕ : W → A),
we deﬁne a fuzzy set X = {x | ϕ(x)} ∈ AW to which each world x ∈ W belongs exactly
to the same degree as is the value of ϕ(x) in A, i.e. for all x ∈W :
ϕ(x) = x ε {x | ϕ(x)} = X(x) .
Using the same idea, we introduce fuzzy sets of fuzzy subsets of W by comprehension
terms, i.e. for a third-order formula where the only free variable (if there is one) is
a second-order variable (recall that then ϕ stands for a function ϕ : AW → A), we let
X = {X | ϕ(X)} ∈ AAW denote the fuzzy set of fuzzy sets such that for all X ∈ AW :
ϕ(X) = X ε {X | ϕ(X)} = X (X) .
Finally, for ﬁxed fuzzy subsets X,Y ∈ AW , we write X v Y to denote the third-order
formula (∀x)(x εX → x ε Y ), which stands for ∧x∈W (X(x)→ Y (x)), which in this case,
as X and Y are ﬁxed, is a constant function into (or element of) A.
7.2 Many-Valued Neighbourhood Semantics
Let us ﬁx an MTL-chain A for L, recalling that 4 /∈ L. We deﬁne an A-neighbourhood
frame (for short: SM(A)-frame) to be a pair 〈W,N〉 such that W is a non-empty (clas-
sical) set of worlds while N is a function N : W → AAW that assigns to each world x ∈W
a fuzzy set of fuzzy subsets of W , called the A-neighbourhood of x ∈W .
We deﬁne an A-neighbourhood model (short: SM(A)-model) to be a triple M =
〈W,N, V 〉, where 〈W,N〉 is an SM(A)-frame and V is an A-valuation V : Var×W → A
that is extended to formulas ϕ ∈ Fm inductively as follows: for all n-ary connectives
? ∈ L and all ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ϕ ∈ Fm:
V (?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), x) = ?(V (ϕ1, x), . . . , V (ϕn, x)) ,
V (ϕ, x) = [[ϕ]]M εN(x) ,
where [[ϕ]]M denotes the fuzzy subset ofW to which y ∈W belongs to the degree V (ϕ, y),
i.e. the fuzzy subset {y | V (ϕ, y)} ∈ AW .
Furthermore, if A is a complete MTL-chain, recall that an A-frame (we will also call
it a K(A)-frame) is a pair 〈W,R〉 such that W is a non-empty (classical) set of worlds
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while R is a function R : W ×W → A (see Chapter 2). For any x ∈ W we deﬁne the
fuzzy subset R[x] = {y | Rxy} ∈ AW , i.e. the fuzzy subset of W to which y belongs to
the degree Rxy. Also recall that a K(A)-model is a triple M = 〈W,R, V 〉, where 〈W,R〉
is a K(A)-frame and V is an A-valuation V : Var ×W → A that extends to formulas
ϕ ∈ Fm inductively as follows:
V (?(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn), x) = ?(V (ϕ1, x), . . . , V (ϕn, x)) ,
V (ϕ, x) =
∧
{Rxy → V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W} .
Note that when we deﬁne the fuzzy subset [[ϕ]]M = {y | V (ϕ, y)} ∈ AW , the value∧{Rxy → V (ϕ, y) | y ∈ W} in A can also be expressed by the constant function
denoted by the third-order formula R[x] v [[ϕ]]M. We can thus easily recognize the
tight connection to the classical setting.
Given an SM(A)-modelM = 〈W,N, V 〉, a formula ϕ ∈ Fm is valid inM, if V (ϕ, x) =
> for all x ∈ W , written M |=SM(A) ϕ. For a subset Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm, we say that ϕ is
an SM(A)-consequence of Γ, written Γ |=SM(A) ϕ, if for all SM(A)-modelsM such that
M |=SM(A) Γ, also M |=SM(A) ϕ. The notions of validity in a K(A)-model and K(A)-
consequence (Γ |=K(A) ϕ) are deﬁned in Chapter 2. The logics deﬁned by the consequence
relations |=SM(A) and |=K(A) will be denoted by SM(A) and K(A), respectively.
Given a complete MTL-chain A, an SM(A)-frame 〈W,N〉 will be called A-augmented
if the function faug : W → A, represented by the third-order formula
(∃X)4(∀Y )(X v Y ↔ Y εN(x)) ,
maps each x ∈W to > in the 4-expansion A4 of A.
Remark 7.4. Note that for a given world x ∈ W , faug(x) = > means that there is a
fuzzy subset Cx ∈ AW such that (Cx v Y ) = (Y εN(x)) for every Y ∈ AW . This implies
that (Cx εN(x)) = >, because for each fuzzy subset X ∈ AW we have (X v X) = >.
Furthermore, if there would be two such fuzzy subsets Cx, C ′x ∈ AW , we would have
Cx = C
′
x for the following reason: consider X = Cx and Y = C
′
x, and vice-versa,
implying that (Cx v C ′x) = > = (C ′x v Cx). This fuzzy subset Cx, for a given x, is
called the core of N(x). Clearly, an SM(A)-frame 〈W,N〉 is A-augmented if and only if
for each world x ∈W , N(x) has a core.
Example 7.5. Let us consider a simple example. We deﬁne an SM(A)-frame 〈W,N〉
for A = G, the standard Gödel algebra, by setting W = {x} and for each fuzzy subset
X ∈ [0, 1]W of W :
(X εN(x)) = (x εX) .
In fact, there is exactly one fuzzy subset X ∈ [0, 1]W for every real number r in [0, 1],
thus, let Xr denote the fuzzy subset such that (x εXr) = r. In this case, (Xr εN(x)) = r
for each r ∈ [0, 1].
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We note that 〈W,N〉 is G-augmented with the core Cx of N(x) being X1. For this,
note ﬁrst that for each r ∈ [0, 1], (X1 v Xr) = (x εX1 → x εXr) = 1→ r = r, and thus
4(∀Y )(X1 v Y ↔ Y εN(x)) = 4 (
∧
r∈[0,1]
(X1 v Xr ↔ Xr εN(x)))
= 4 (
∧
r∈[0,1]
(r ↔ r))
= 4 1
= 1 .
In order to show that X1 is the unique core of N(x), let us suppose for a contradiction
that there is an s ∈ [0, 1), such that (∀Y )(Xs v Y ↔ Y εN(x)) = 1. In this case, there
is a t ∈ [0, 1], such that s < t < 1, and
(Xs v Xt) = (x εXs → x εXt) = s→ t = 1 > t = (x εXt) = (Xt εN(x)) ,
contradicting the assumption that
∧
r∈[0,1](Xs v Xr ↔ Xr εN(x)) = 1.
Finally, let us point out that in fact this examples works the same way for any
standard MTL-chain A, not just G.
7.3 Relating Neighbourhood and Kripke Semantics
For this section, let A be a complete MTL-chain for L. We show that also in the many-
valued setting, there is, analogously to the classical case, a close relationship between
many-valued neighbourhood semantics and many-valued Kripke semantics. While the
(many-valued) neighbourhood function N allows more ﬂexibility, it becomes equival-
ent to the more restricted (many-valued) binary relation R when it is required to be
(A-)augmented.
Similarly to the classical case, given a K(A)-frame 〈W,R〉, we deﬁne an SM(A)-frame
〈W,NR〉 as follows. For all x ∈W let
NR(x) = {X | (∀y)(Rxy → y εX)} .
and notice that for all x ∈W and X ∈ AW , (∀y)(Rxy → y ∈ X) = (R[x] v X). On the
other hand, given an SM(A)-frame 〈W,N〉, we deﬁne a K(A)-frame 〈W,RN 〉 as follows:
RN [x] = {y | (∀X)(X εN(x)→ y εX)} .
Example 7.6. Recall Example 7.5, where we considered the SM(G)-frame 〈W,N〉 with
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W = {x} and (Xr εN(x)) = r for all r ∈ [0, 1]. In this case,
RN [x] = {y | (∀X)(X εN(x)→ y εX)}
= {y |
∧
r∈[0,1]
(Xr εN(x)→ y εXr)}
= {y |
∧
r∈[0,1]
(r → r)}
= {y | 1}
= X1 ,
which means that RNxx = (x εRN [x]) = (x εX1) = 1.
As in the classical case, the goal is to prove that for any K(A)-frame 〈W,R〉, we have
RNR = R, and if an SM(A)-frame 〈W,N〉 isA-augmented, then NRN = N . These proofs
follow the same ideas as in the classical case (see e.g. [103]), but obviously an adaptation
to deal with fuzzy sets of fuzzy subsets of W is needed.
Lemma 7.7. Let 〈W,N〉 be an A-augmented SM(A)-frame, x ∈ W , and let Cx be the
core of N(x). Then Cx = RN [x].
Proof. We prove that Cx = RN [x] by showing that for all y ∈W , (y εRN [x]) ≤ (y εCx)
and (y εCx) ≤ (y εRN [x]). First note that because Cx is the core of N(x), it is the case
that (Cx εN(x)) = > (see Remark 7.4). Fixing a world y ∈W , it follows that
(y εRN [x]) = (∀Y )(Y εN(x)→ y ε Y )
≤ (Cx εN(x)→ y εCx)
= (y εCx) ,
as (∀Y ) stands for ∧Y ∈AW and its instantiation by Cx ∈ AW is greater. The last equality
is justiﬁed by the fact that the equation > → a = a is satisﬁed in any MTL-algebra.
For the other inequality, note ﬁrst that for all y ∈W and all Y ∈ AW ,
(Cx v Y ) = (∀z)(z εCx → z ε Y ) ≤ (y εCx → y ε Y ) .
By residuation and commutativity of the & operation, it follows that
(y εCx & Cx v Y ) = (Cx v Y & y εCx) ≤ (y ε Y ) ,
for all y ∈W and Y ∈ AW , and thus, by residuation again,
(y εCx) ≤ (Cx v Y → y ε Y ) .
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From this, the fact that Cx is the core of N(x) (and thus (Cx v Y ) = (Y εN(x)) for all
Y ∈ AW ), and by the deﬁnition of RN , we can complete the proof using the following
chain of (in)equalities
(y εCx) = (∀Y )(y εCx)
≤ (∀Y )(Cx v Y → y ε Y )
= (∀Y )(Y εN(x)→ y ε Y )
= (y εRN [x]) .
Lemma 7.8. If 〈W,R〉 is a K(A)-frame, then the SM(A)-frame 〈W,NR〉 isA-augmented.
Proof. We prove that for each world x ∈ W , R[x] is the core of NR(x) and so 〈W,NR〉
is A-augmented. We ﬁx a world x ∈ W and, recalling that (R[x] v Y ) = (∀y)(Rxy →
y εX), we note that
(Y εNR(x)) = (Y ε {X | (∀y)(Rxy → y εX)}) = (R[x] v Y ) .
Thus, we obtain for X = R[x] ∈ AW :
4(∀Y )(X v Y ↔ Y εNR(x)) = > .
Theorem 7.9. Let 〈W,N〉 be an SM(A)-frame. Then 〈W,N〉 is A-augmented iﬀ
NRN = N .
Proof. For the direction from left to right, let 〈W,N〉 be an A-augmented SM(A)-frame.
Then notice for all x ∈W :
NRN (x) = {Y | (∀y)(RNxy → y ε Y )} (22)
= {Y | RN [x] v Y } (23)
= {Y | Cx v Y } (24)
= {Y | Y εN(x)} (25)
= N(x) . (26)
While the ﬁrst two and the last equalities are just notational facts, step (23) to (24) is
justiﬁed by Lemma 7.7, and we get from (24) to (25) by Remark 7.4. The right to left
direction is an easy consequence of Lemma 7.8.
Theorem 7.10. If 〈W,R〉 is a K(A)-frame, then RNR = R.
Proof. Let 〈W,R〉 be a K(A)-frame and ﬁx an x ∈W , then
RNR [x] = {y | (∀Y )(Y εNR(x)→ y ε Y )}
= {y | (∀Y )(Y ε {Z | (∀y)(Rxy → y εZ)} → y ε Y )}
= {y | (∀Y )(Y ε {Z | R[x] v Z} → y ε Y )}
= {y | (∀Y )(R[x] v Y → y ε Y )} .
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It then remains to be shown that for all worlds y ∈ W , (∀Y )(R[x] v Y → y ε Y ) =
(y εR[x]). For this, note ﬁrst that for all y ∈W and all Y ∈ AW ,
(R[x] v Y ) = (∀z)(z ∈ R[x]→ z ε Y ) ≤ (y εR[x]→ y ε Y ) .
By residuation and commutativity of the & operation, we obtain (y εR[x]) ≤ (R[x] v
Y → y ε Y ) for all y ∈W and Y ∈ AW , and thus also for all y ∈W ,
(y εR[x]) ≤ (∀Y )(R[x] v Y → y ε Y ) .
On the other hand, by instantiation,
(∀Y )(R[x] v Y → y ε Y ) ≤ (R[x] v R[x]→ y εR[x]) = (y εR[x]) ,
and thus RNR [x] = {y | (∀Y )(R[x] v Y → y ε Y )} = {y | y εR[x]} = R[x].
Having established a tight connection between A-neighbourhood and A-Kripke frames,
the extension of this connection to the level of models does not come as a surprise.
Theorem 7.11.
(a) Given a K(A)-model M = 〈W,R, V 〉, deﬁne the SM(A)-model M = 〈Ŵ , N̂ , V̂ 〉
with Ŵ = W , N̂ = NR, and V̂ = V . Then for all ϕ ∈ Fm and x ∈W :
V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) .
(a) Given an A-augmented SM(A)-model M = 〈W,N, V 〉, deﬁne the K(A)-model
M = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 with Ŵ = W , R̂ = RN , and V̂ = V . Then for all ϕ ∈ Fm and
x ∈W :
V̂ (ϕ, x) = V (ϕ, x) .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of the formula ϕ ∈ Fm. For (a) and (b),
the case where ϕ ∈ Var or ϕ is a constant follows by the deﬁnition of V̂ while the case
where ϕ is not a box-formula follows trivially from the induction hypothesis (as only
box-formulas depend on R or N). Let ϕ = ψ for some ψ ∈ Fm.
For (a), note that by the induction hypothesis, for any x ∈ Ŵ = W ,
V̂ (ψ, x) = ([[ψ]]M εNR(x))
= ([[ψ]]M ε {Y | (∀y)(Rxy → y ε Y )})
= (∀y)(Rxy → y ε [[ψ]]M)
=
∧
y∈Ŵ
(Rxy → V̂ (ψ, y))
=
∧
y∈W
(Rxy → V (ψ, y))
= V (ψ, x) .
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For (b), we ﬁrst note that for any x ∈ Ŵ = W , RN [x] is the core of N(x) by Lemma 7.7
(and thus (RN [x] v Y ) = (Y εN(x)) for all Y ∈ AW ), as M is A-augmented. We can
then use the induction hypothesis to conclude the proof by the following equalities:
V (ψ, x) = ([[ψ]]M εN(x))
= (RN [x] v [[ψ]]M)
= (∀y)(y εRN [x]→ y ε [[ψ]]M)
=
∧
y∈W
(RNxy → V (ψ, y))
=
∧
y∈Ŵ
(RNxy → V̂ (ψ, y))
= V̂ (ψ, x) .
Corollary 7.12. For all sets of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ |=K(A) ϕ iﬀ M |=SM(A) ϕ for all A-augmented SM(A)-modelsM
such that M |=SM(A) Γ .
Proof. For the contraposition of the right-to-left direction, let us assume Γ 6|=K(A) ϕ,
that is, there is a K(A)-model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 such that V [Γ,W ] = {V (ψ, x) | ψ ∈
Γ, x ∈ W} ⊆ {>} and V (ϕ, y) < >, for some world y ∈ W . Deﬁne an SM(A)-model
M = 〈Ŵ , N̂ , V̂ 〉 by Ŵ = W , N̂ = NR, and V̂ = V and notice that by Lemma 7.8,
M is A-augmented, and thus for all x ∈ W and all ψ ∈ Fm, V̂ (ψ, x) = V (ψ, x), by
Theorem 7.11(a). It therefore follows that V̂ [Γ, Ŵ ] = V [Γ,W ] ⊆ {>} and V̂ (ϕ, y) =
V (ϕ, y) < > and thus the right-hand side of the claim is false.
For the contraposition of the left-to-right direction, let us assume that there is an A-
augmented SM(A)-modelM = 〈W,N, V 〉, such that V [Γ,W ] ⊆ {>} and V (ϕ, y) < >,
for some world y ∈ W . Deﬁne the K(A)-model M = 〈Ŵ , R̂, V̂ 〉 by Ŵ = W, R̂ = RN ,
and V̂ = V and notice that for all x ∈ W and all ψ ∈ Fm, V̂ (ψ, x) = V (ψ, x), by
Theorem 7.11(b). It therefore follows that V̂ [Γ, Ŵ ] = V [Γ,W ] ⊆ {>} and V̂ (ϕ, y) =
V (ϕ, y) < > and thus Γ 6|=K(A) ϕ.
7.4 An Axiomatization of SM(A)
For the current section, let us denote by L an axiomatic extension of MTL, that is, L
is either MTL, BL, L, P, G, or some other logic axiomatized by adding axioms to the
Hilbert-style calculusMTL.
For a Hilbert-style calculus L for the language L that axiomatizes L, we deﬁne the
Hilbert-style calculus LSM = L ∪ {(E)} for the language L, recalling that (E) is the
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following rule:
ϕ↔ ψ
(E)
ϕ↔ ψ .
Let us deﬁne the modal logic LSM in the language L by setting LSM = `LSM.
We recall that we call an axiomatic extension L of MTL, axiomatized by L, (ﬁnitely)
strongly complete with respect to an L-chain C if for every (ﬁnite) set of formulas Γ ∪
{ϕ} ⊆ FmL: Γ `L ϕ iﬀ Γ |=C ϕ.
Our goal in this section is to prove the following statement: if L is (ﬁnitely) strongly
complete with respect to an L-chain C then LSM is (ﬁnitely) strongly complete with
respect to the class of all SM(C)-models. In order to reach this goal, we need to recall
some facts and deﬁnitions from (abstract) algebraic logic.
Firstly, we have seen in Chapter 2 that MTL (and hence any axiomatic extensions
L of MTL) is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi's [17] (see also [42]), which
means, in loose terms, that it has an algebraic semantics in (a subvariety) of MTL.
Furthermore, from the fact that L is algebraizable it follows that LSM is algebraizable,
as (E) clearly ensures the preservation of the congruence law (see [42]), that is, the
presence of (E) lets us infer from the fact that for all non-modal formulas ϕ,ψ, χ ∈ FmL,
{ϕ ↔ ψ} `L χ(ϕ) ↔ χ(ψ), we also have that for all modal formulas ϕ′, ψ′, χ′ ∈ FmL ,
{ϕ′ ↔ ψ′} `LSM χ′(ϕ′)↔ χ′(ψ′), where χ(ϕ) stands for χ where a speciﬁc propositional
variable has been uniformly substituted by ϕ. It therefore makes sense to speak of LSM-
algebras in the language L, i.e. algebras A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,,⊥,>〉 such that for all
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL : Γ |=A ϕ whenever Γ `LSM ϕ. We then obviously have that LSM is
strongly complete with respect to the class of all LSM-algebras and for each LSM-algebra
〈A,∧,∨,&,→,,⊥,>〉, the L-reduct 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,⊥,>〉 is an L-alegbra.
Furthermore, as L is an axiomatic extension of MTL and thus satisﬁes prelinearity, we
have that every L-algebra A is representable as a subdirect product of L-chains (see [54]
and e.g. [37]), that is, there is a family of L-chains {Ai}i∈I and an embedding α : A →∏
i∈I Ai such that (pii ◦α)[A] = Ai, where
∏
i∈I Ai denotes the direct product and pii the
i-th projection.
Moreover, for two MTL-algebras A and B, we will say that A partially embeds into
B, if for each ﬁnite subset F ⊆ A, there is a one-to-one mapping hF : F → B, called a
partial F -embedding, such that for all n-ary connectives ? ∈ L and all a1, . . . , an ∈ F :
hF (?
A(a1, . . . , an)) = ?
B(hF (a1), . . . , hF (an)) .
Finally, we recall two facts about L-chains that we will be crucial in the completeness
prove below (see [37, Theorems 3.5 and 3.8]).
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Theorem 7.13 ((Partial) Embeddability of Chains [37]). For any axiomatic extension
L of MTL and any L-chain C :
(a) L is strongly complete with respect to C if and only if every countable L-chain
embeds into C.
(b) L is ﬁnitely strongly complete with respect to C if and only if every L-chain partially
embeds into C.
We now have everything we need to prove the following completeness theorem.
Theorem 7.14. Let L be an axiomatic extension of MTL, let L be a Hilbert-style calculus
axiomatizing L, and let C be an L-chain. If L is (ﬁnitely) strongly complete with respect
to C, then for each (ﬁnite) Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL we have:
Γ `LSM ϕ iﬀ Γ |=SM(C) ϕ .
Proof. For the left-to-right directions, we only need to check the soundness of the rule
(E). Let us assume that for some SM(C)-model M = 〈W,N, V 〉 and some formulas
ψ, χ ∈ FmL , M |=SM(C) ψ ↔ χ, then
M |=SM(C) ψ ↔ χ ⇒ V (ψ, x) = V (χ, x), for all x ∈W,
⇒ [[ψ]]M = [[χ]]M
⇒ ([[ψ]]M εN(x)) = ([[χ]]M εN(x)), for all x ∈W,
⇒ V (ψ, x) = V (χ, x), for all x ∈W,
⇒ M |=SM(C) ψ ↔ χ.
For the reverse implication in the ﬁnite strong completeness case, assume that Γ 0LSM ϕ
for a ﬁnite set Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ FmL . By the algebraizability of LSM, there is an LSM-
algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,,⊥,>〉 and an A-evaluation e : FmL → A such that
e[Γ] ⊆ {>A} and e(ϕ) 6= >A . In this case, the L-reduct of A, denoted by A, is
an L-algebra. A is therefore representable as a subdirect product of L-chains {Ai}i∈I ,
denoting the embedding involved by α. Moreover, because L is ﬁnitely strongly complete
with respect to C, we have that each Ai partially embeds into C by Theorem 7.13(b).
Let Σ be the ﬁnite set of the subformulas of Γ ∪ {ϕ}. In this case, also the subsets
e[Σ] ⊆ A, (α ◦ e)[Σ] ⊆ ∏i∈I Ai, and (pii ◦ α ◦ e)[Σ] =: Bi ⊆ Ai are ﬁnite for all i ∈ I.
By partial embeddability of Ai into C, it follows that for each i ∈ I there is a partial
Bi-embedding hBi : Bi → C. For notational convenience, let us ﬁnally deﬁne, for each
i ∈ I, a map fi : Σ→ C such that fi(ψ) = (hBi ◦ pii ◦ α ◦ e)(ψ) for all ψ ∈ Σ.
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Now we have all the ingredients to build the SM(C)-counter-modelM = 〈W,N, V 〉.
Let W = I and for all p ∈ Var and j ∈W :
V (p, j) =
fj(p) if p ∈ Σ,⊥C otherwise,
(〈ai〉i∈W εN(j)) =
fj(ψ) if there is a ψ ∈ Σ s.t. 〈ai〉i∈W = 〈fi(ψ)〉i∈W ,⊥C otherwise.
Note that if for two formulas ψ,ψ′ ∈ Σ it holds that ψ,ψ′ ∈ Σ and 〈fi(ψ)〉i∈W =
〈fi(ψ′)〉i∈W , it follows by the deﬁnition of fi that e(ψ) = e(ψ′). By the validity of the
rule (E) in A, this implies that e(ψ) = e(ψ′) and thus also fj(ψ) = fj(ψ′) for
each j ∈ I. Therefore, the neighbourhood function N above is well-deﬁned.
We prove that V (ψ, j) = fj(ψ) for all ψ ∈ Σ and j ∈ W by an induction on the
length of ψ. The base case follows immediately by deﬁnition.
For the induction step, let for the ﬁrst case ψ = ψ1 ? ψ2 for some binary ? ∈ L. In
this case, we have the following series of equalities:
fj(ψ1 ? ψ2) = hBj (pij(α(e(ψ1 ? ψ2)))) (27)
= hBj (pij(α(e(ψ1) ?
A e(ψ2)))) (28)
= hBj (pij(α(e(ψ1)) ?
∏
i∈I Ai α(e(ψ2)))) (29)
= hBj (pij(α(e(ψ1))) ?
Aj pij(α(e(ψ2)))) (30)
= hBj (pij(α(e(ψ1)))) ?
C hBj (pij(α(e(ψ2)))) (31)
= fj(ψ1) ?
C fj(ψ2) (32)
= V (ψ1, j) ?
C V (ψ2, j) (33)
= V (ψ1 ? ψ2, j) . (34)
The steps from (27) to (31) are justiﬁed, respectively, by the facts that e is an A-
evaluation, α is an embedding, pij is a projection and thus a homomorphism, and hBj is a
partial Bj-embedding and clearly pij(α(e(ψ1))) and pij(α(e(ψ2))) are in (pii◦α◦e)[Σ] = Bj .
Furthermore, the step from (32) to (33) follows by the induction hypothesis.
For the second case, let ψ = χ. By the induction hypothesis and the deﬁnition of
N(j), we justify the following chain of equalities and thus the induction is ﬁnished:
V (χ, j) = ([[χ]]M εN(j))
= (〈V (χ, j)〉i∈W εN(j))
= (〈fi(χ)〉i∈W εN(j))
= fj(χ) .
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Therefore, we have that M |=SM(C) Γ because for each ψ ∈ Γ, e(ψ) = >A , and so for
each j ∈W :
V (ψ, j) = fj(ψ) = (hBj ◦ pij ◦ α ◦ e)(ψ) = >C.
On the other hand, it is also true that M 6|=SM(C) ϕ. This is because e(ϕ) 6= >A and
therefore there has to be a world j ∈W such that pij(α(e(ϕ))) 6= >Aj and so
V (ϕ, j) = fj(ϕ) = (hBj ◦ pij ◦ α ◦ e)(ϕ) 6= >C.
The proof of the right-to-left direction for the strong completeness case is very similar.
Note that the set Σ of all subformulas in Γ∪{ϕ} is countable and thus, for each i ∈ I, by
restricting the L-chain Ai to the universe (pii◦α◦e)[Σ] =: Bi ⊆ Ai, we obtain a countable
subalgebra Bi of Ai which is itself an L-chain. It then follows by Theorem 7.13(a) that
for each i ∈ I the countable L-chain Bi embeds into the L-chain C. If we denote the
resulting embedding by hBi , then the argument above establishes also the right-to-left
direction for the strong completeness case, only that we now justify the step from (30)
to (31) by the fact that hBj is an embedding from Bj into C.
Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we present a short summary of the results achieved in this thesis and
recall which questions listed in the introduction (Chapter 1) we were able to (partially)
answer. We will also mention some other problems that are left open and give some
suggestions on how they might be tackled. Furthermore, some connections to other
logics and other ﬁelds are drawn and ideas are given on how our results might be applied
and extended in those settings.
8.1 Summary of the Thesis
In this work, we have mainly considered many-valued logics based on order-based algebras
A, i.e. subalgebras of G = 〈[0, 1],min,max,→G, 0, 1〉1 with additional operations deﬁned
based only on the order, and their expansions with the modal connectives  and ♦,
interpreted over the class of all K(A)-models (yielding the logics K(A)), the class of all
crisp K(A)-models (yielding the logics Kc(A)), and the class of all crisp K(A)-models
where the accessibility relation is an equivalence relation (yielding the logics S5c(A)).
The investigation of these logics was motivated by the questions (2), (3), (4), and
(7) formulated in Chapter 1. Moreover, the methodology we have used was inspired
by the fact that decidability was already established for Gödel modal logics based on
witnessed K(G)-models, i.e. K(G)-models 〈W,R, V 〉 where for each world x ∈ W , box-
formula ϕ, and diamond-formula ♦ψ, there are (witnessing) worlds y, z ∈W such that
V (ϕ, x) = Rxy → V (ϕ, y) and V (♦ϕ, x) = Rxz ∧ V (ϕ, z) (see e.g. [18]). Despite the
fact that GK is not complete with respect to witnessed K(G)-models (e.g. the formula
¬¬p→ ¬¬p is valid in all witnessed K(G)-models, but not in GK (see Theorem 3.9)),
there is something to learn from the witnessed case. This lead to the idea of restricting the
1Note that order-based algebras were deﬁned in Chapter 3 as sublattices of 〈[0, 1],min,max, 0, 1〉 with
additional order-based operations. In fact, however, we have subsequently only considered order-based
algebras containing the Gödel implication (as we have used it to deﬁne the interpretation of  and ♦).
This is why we just mention expanded subalgebras of G here.
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values of box- and diamond-formulas such that a world y witnesses the value V (ϕ, x) if
the value Rxy → V (ϕ, y) is merely suﬃciently close to the value V (ϕ, x). This idea was
realized by the introduction of FK(G)-models and the proof that these models determine
the same set of valid formulas as K(G)-models. There are two main ingredients essential
for this completeness that can be isolated (cf. the proof of Lemma 4.10):
(1) In a K(G)-modelM, we can move values of propositional variable around without
changing the set of valid formulas inM, as long as the relative order is not changed
and certain inﬁnite meets and joins are preserved (see Lemma 3.10).
(2) InG, each interval can be squeezed into a smaller interval by an order-embedding
(see Lemma 4.9). This property is captured by the deﬁnition of local homogeneity.
The isolation of these two properties made it possible to generalize our results to the
much larger class of order-based modal logics, as long as the underlying order-based
algebra is locally homogeneous. These logics of order represent natural antagonists to
logics of magnitude, of which Łukasiewicz logic and product logic are two main examples,
and thus are of great interest when it comes to applications where the relative order of
values is the essential factor.
In Chapters 4 and 5, we have shown that for validity in some order-based modal
logic, we can restrict to FK(A)-models, where the values assigned to box- and diamond-
formulas are restricted to certain subsets of A and can therefore be witnessed more
easily. More precisely, we have proved that if A is locally homogeneous, then the lo-
gics K(A), Kc(A), and S5c(A) enjoy the ﬁnite model property with respect to FK(A)-,
FKc(A)-, and FS5c(A)-models, respectively, using our result that the classes FK(A),
FKc(A), and FS5c(A) validate the same formulas as the classes K(A), Kc(A), and
S5c(A), respectively (see Theorems 4.11 and 5.6). Taking advantage of the fact that
the size of the ﬁnite models involved in testing a formula ϕ for validity can be bounded
by a function on the length of ϕ, we have provided algorithms that decide validity in
certain cases. In particular, for the case where the order-based locally homogeneous al-
gebra A is either G, G↓, or G↑ (or some other algebra for which a speciﬁc consistency
problem is decidable (see Remark 4.17)), we have proved that the validity problem for
K(A) and Kc(A) is PSPACE-complete (Theorem 4.16) and for S5c(A) coNP-complete
(Corollary 5.9). Using the fact that the Gödel modal logic GS5c corresponds to the one-
variable fragment of ﬁrst-order Gödel logic (Theorem 5.12), we have been able to present
the following major consequences of our results.
• The validity problems for the Gödel modal logics GK and GKc are PSPACE-
complete (cf. Theorem 4.16).
• The validity problems for the Gödel modal logic GS5c and the one-variable fragment
of ﬁrst-order Gödel logic are coNP-complete (see Corollary 5.9 and Theorem 5.13).
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With this, we have answered positively questions (2) and (4) posed in the introduction
and have given positive answers to question (7) for the case of Gödel logic. In particular,
we note that the second result above solves a long-standing open problem that was ﬁrst
explicitly formulated by Hájek in [67, Problem (13)].
Furthermore, using the ﬁnite model property with respect to the alternative se-
mantics, we have presented tableau calculi in Chapter 6 for the cases GK, GKc, and
GS5c, thus answering positively question (3) of the introduction. Even though these
calculi do not deliver optimal complexity, they provide useful decision procedures that
are easy to handle and are suitable for implementation.
In Chapter 7, we have considered the box-fragment of many-valued modal logics
over MTL-chains based on neighbourhood semantics. Firstly, for any complete MTL-
chain A, we have presented a correspondence between K(A)-frames (Kripke frames) and
A-augmented SM(A)-frames (neighbourhood frames) (Theorems 7.9 and 7.10). Further-
more, given a Hilbert-style axiomatization L of an axiomatic extension L ofMTL, we have
proved by algebraic methods that for the rule
ϕ↔ ψ
(E) ϕ↔ ψ ,
LSM = L ∪ {(E)} (ﬁnitely) strongly completely axiomatizes the box-fragment of the
many-valued modal logic determined by the class of all SM(C)-models, if C is an L-chain
such that L is (ﬁnitely) strongly complete with respect to C (Theorem 7.14).
With our results and methods in Chapter 7, we have answered questions (9) and (10)
posed in Chapter 1, which are based on three questions formulated by Rodríguez and
Godo in [110], one of the ﬁrst studies of neighbourhood semantics in the setting of MTL.
Neighbourhood semantics provide a more general and thus more ﬂexible framework
for modal logics, a framework in which a plethora of diﬀerent notions can be modelled as
modal connectives, including the notions of knowledge, obligation, belief, evidence, and
high probability (see e.g. [103]). In fact, even negation and generalized quantiﬁers have
been modelled as modal connectives in this setting (see e.g. [105]). With our study of
these semantics in the setting of MTL and its axiomatic extensions, we have thus taken a
further step towards a more general theory of many-valued modal logics, which is a very
promising ﬁeld, especially when we look at how far modal logics have been developed in
the classical setting.
8.2 Open Problems and Further Work
To add to the unanswered questions listed in the introduction, that is, questions (1),
(5), (6), (7) (partially answered), (8) and (11), we now sketch some of the problems
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that are left open by our work and speculate how they might be tackled, possibly using
approaches developed in previous chapters.
Consequence Relations
In Chapters 4 and 5, we proved decidability and complexity results for the validity
problems for K(A), Kc(A), and S5c(A) for certain order-based algebras A. We did not,
however, consider the problems of consequence (or entailment). This is because our
results do not always easily extend to these problems. Nevertheless, we will discuss the
consequence relations of the considered logics roughly below.
There are two diﬀerent natural consequence relations deﬁned over K(A)-models that
are often considered in the literature. Given an order-based algebra A, a K(A)-model
M = 〈W,R, V 〉, a set of formulas Γ ⊆ Fm, and a world x ∈W , let M, x |=K(A) Γ denote
the fact that V [Γ, x] ⊆ {1}, and let us write M |=K(A) Γ to denote the fact that for all
x ∈ W , M, x |=K(A) Γ. For a set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm, we then deﬁne global and
local consequence as follows:
• ϕ is a global K(A)-consequence of Γ, written Γ |=gK(A) ϕ, if M |=K(A) {ϕ} for all
K(A)-models M such that M |=K(A) Γ.
• ϕ is a local K(A)-consequence of Γ, written Γ |=lK(A) ϕ, if M, x |=K(A) {ϕ} for all
K(A)-models M = 〈W,R, V 〉 and all x ∈W such that M, x |=K(A) Γ.
These two consequence relation are identical when we restrict to empty sets of premises
(i.e. if Γ = ∅), that is, they produce the same set of valid formulas. However, in general,
the local consequence relation is strictly stronger than the global one, i.e. |=lK(A) ( |=gK(A)
(see e.g. [21]). Note also that the logics we have called K(A), Kc(A), and S5c(A) are all
determined by a global consequence relation.
In the case where A is G, we have the deduction theorem for |=lK(A) (see [29]), i.e.
for any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ Fm:
Γ ∪ {ϕ} |=lK(G) ψ iﬀ Γ |=lK(G) ϕ→ ψ .
From our results about validity in GK, we can thus directly infer decidability and PSPACE-
completeness for the problem of ﬁnite local consequence for GK, i.e. where the set of
premises is ﬁnite. In fact, this result can even be extended to countable local con-
sequence. This is due to the strong completeness of the axiomatization presented in [29]
with respect to countable sets of premises.
While these results certainly extend to axiomatic extensions of GK, such as, GT, GS4,
and GS5 (see [29]), we also expect them to extend to the crisp counterparts of these logics
and to the case where underlying order-based algebra is not G (at least with respect to
ﬁnite sets of premises). For these cases, however, no axiomatizations have been found
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and thus it is not immediately clear how the deduction theorem in this strong form can
be established. Nevertheless, semantic arguments might establish the deduction theorem
in these cases (cf. [8]).
For the global consequence relation, the deduction theorem in the strong form above
generally fails, even in the case of classical modal logics (i.e. when A is the two-element
Boolean algebra; see e.g. [15]). Extending our results to ﬁnite global consequence might
therefore be more challenging. To achieve it, we might consider again the alternative
semantics deﬁned in Chapters 4 and 5 and check whether for ﬁnite set of formulas Γ ∪
{ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Γ |=gFK(A) ϕ iﬀ Γ |=gK(A) ϕ .
While the left-to-right direction follows easily from the fact every K(A)-model 〈W,R, V 〉
can be understood as an FK(A)-model 〈W,R, V, T, T♦〉 by setting T(x) = T♦(x) = A
for all x ∈ W , the right-to-left direction is slightly less obvious. We are conﬁdent,
however, that by a careful analysis of the proof of Lemma 4.10 this direction could be
obtained as well. If this is possible, we would then need to check whether our techniques
for proving decidability and PSPACE-completeness extend to global consequence as well.
We expect this to be straightforward for ﬁnite sets of premises. Nevertheless, working
out the details for this and other cases (including GKc and GS5c) has to be left for future
work.
Order-Based Modal Logics Over Other Classes of Frames
In this thesis, we focused on order-based modal logics over the class of all K(A)-models,
the class of all crisp K(A)-models, and the class of all crisp K(A)-models where accessib-
ility is an equivalence relation. However, it would also be interesting to investigate other
classes of K(A)-models, as was done extensively for classical modal logics. Interesting
classes of K(A)-models include the following (cf. Section 2.3):
• T(A) (Tc(A)) is the class of all (crisp) K(A)-models where the accessibility relation
is reﬂexive (i.e. Rxx = 1),
• S4(A) (S4c(A)) is the class of all (crisp) K(A)-models where the accessibility
relation is reﬂexive and transitive (i.e. Rxy ∧Ryz ≤ Rxz), and
• S5(A) (S5c(A)) is the class of all (crisp) K(A)-models where the accessibility
relation is reﬂexive, transitive, and symmetric (i.e. Rxy = Ryx).
Let T(A) = |=T(A), Tc(A) = |=Tc(A), S4(A) = |=S4(A), S4c(A) = |=S4c(A), S5(A) =
|=S5(A), and S5c(A) = |=S5c(A) (the global consequence relations). It is straightforward
to adopt our techniques from Chapter 4 to establish PSPACE-completeness of the validity
problem for T(A) and Tc(A) (if certain consistency problems for A are in PSPACE (cf.
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Remark 4.17)), as slight changes to the proofs (and the deﬁnition of a K(A)-tree-model)
can assure the preservation of reﬂexivity in Lemmas 4.4, 4.6, and 4.10.
When it comes to transitivity or symmetry, an adaptation of our techniques seem to
be less straightforward. To prove the correspondence between K(A)- and FK(A)-models
as well as PSPACE-completeness of the validity problem for K(A), we relied heavily
on the (bounded) tree-model property of K(A) (Lemma 3.6). While clearly no K(A)-
model in T(A), S4(A), or S5(A) is a K(A)-tree-model, it is easy to suitably adjust the
deﬁnition of a K(A)-tree-model for T(A) and Tc(A) (just allow nodes in a tree to be
connected to themselves). Whether this is possible also for S4(A), S4c(A), S5(A), or
S5c(A) are interesting questions that remain to be answered.
On a larger scale, it would be useful to develop a more general approach, perhaps using
the alternative semantics developed in Chapter 4, to investigate questions of decidability
for order-based modal logics over diﬀerent subclasses of K(A).
Order-Based Multi-Modal Logics
We have only focussed on the expansions by the unary modal connectives  and ♦ in
this dissertation. It would also be interesting to investigate order-based modal logics (or
others) expanded by an arbitrary number of modal connectives of any ﬁnite arity.
Let L?m = L ∪ , where  is a set of modal connectives of ﬁnite arity and let Fm?
denote the set of formulas deﬁned inductively in L?m over Var. For convenience, we
will assume that the modal connectives in  come in pairs of the same arity, i.e. let
 = {[d], 〈d〉 | d ∈ I}, for some non-empty index-set I, and let d? ∈ N denote the arity
of [d] and 〈d〉.
A way to generalize K(A)-models to accommodate for such expansions is the follow-
ing. A K?(A)-model for L?m is a triple 〈W, {Rd}d∈I , V 〉 whereW is a set of worlds, for each
d ∈ I, Rd is a (d?+ 1)-ary A-accessibility relation, i.e. it is a function Rd : W (d?+1) → A,
and V is an A-valuation V : Var ×W → A. V is then extended to Fm? as for K(A)-
models except that for every d ∈ I:
V ([d]ϕ, x) =
∧
{Rdxy1 . . . yd? →
∧
i≤d?
V (ϕ, yi) | y1, . . . , yd? ∈W} ,
V (〈d〉ϕ, x) =
∨
{Rdxy1 . . . yd? ∧
∧
i≤d?
V (ϕ, yi) | y1, . . . , yd? ∈W} .
It is an open question whether order-based modal logics for L?m based on K?(A)-models
are decidable. Noting that for classical modal logic, many important notions easily
generalize to the multi-modal case (cf. [15]), we expect that our approach to order-based
modal logics, i.e. restricting the possible truth values of box- and diamond-formulas,
generalizes without much diﬃculty to order-based multi-modal logics also. We thus
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expect that our approach might be useful for answering questions of decidability for
many of these logics.
Order-Based Description Logics
The special cases of order-based multi-modal logics where all modal connectives are
unary are of particular interest, as they are closely related to fuzzy description logics.
Fuzzy description logics generalize (classical) description logics, a family of knowledge
representation formalisms (for an overview, see e.g. [4] for classical description logics
and [18] for fuzzy description logics). Languages for (fuzzy) description logics are based
on individuals, concepts, and roles, which are interpreted semantically as elements of
a domain, (fuzzy) subsets of the domain, and (fuzzy) binary relations on the domain,
respectively. Complex concepts can be built from atomic concepts via concept construct-
ors, often including intersection, union, complementation, implication, value restriction,
and existential quantiﬁcation (the last two making use of roles).
For a suitable L?m = L ∪  with  = {[d], 〈d〉 | d ∈ I and d? = 1}, a K?(A)-model
〈W, {Rd}d∈I , V 〉 for L?m is a natural interpretation of a (fuzzy) description language,
where W is the domain, individuals are interpreted as worlds, atomic concepts as pro-
positional variables (such that an individual belongs to the atomic concept to the degree
the propositional variable is true at the corresponding world), and roles as binary A-
accessibility relations. Concept constructors are then interpreted by the propositional
and modal connectives in L?m, e.g. intersection by ∧, union by ∨, complementation by ¬,
implication by →, and for each role interpreted by an A-accessibility relations Rd, the
value restriction using this roles is interpreted by [d] and the existential quantiﬁcation
using it by 〈d〉. In this sense, an individual belongs to a complex concept to the degree
the corresponding formula is true at the corresponding world.
For order-based description logics where the implication constructor is removed from
the language or if they are restricted to witnessed K?(A)-models, many decision problems
(including the problems of validity, satisﬁability, and subsumption) are known to be
decidable and in EXPTIME, as they can be reduced (in linear time) to the respective
problem in the classical setting via crispiﬁcation by a double-negation interpretation (see
e.g. [18, 19]).2 Order-based description logics based on all K?(A)-models are generally
not complete with respect to witnessed K?(A)-models, however, and→ usually cannot be
deﬁned by the other connectives. As mentioned above, it is exactly the former deﬁciency
we work around with the approach in Chapter 4 of restricting the truth values a box-
or diamond-formula can be assigned. In this approach, it is enough for a world y to
witness the value of V (ϕ, x) if the value Rxy → V (ϕ, y) is just merely close enough
2In fact, these problems have only been considered forA = G, but we expect them to easily generalize
to any order-based algebra A for the language L = {∧,∨,→,⊥,>}.
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to V (ϕ, x).
In order to adapt our approach to the case at hand, we deﬁne an FK?(A)-model, for
a locally homogeneous order-based algebra A, to be a ﬁve-tuple 〈W, {Rd}d∈I , V, T, T♦〉
such that for each d ∈ I, 〈W,Rd, V, T, T♦〉 is an FK(A)-model and for each x ∈W :
V ([d]ϕ, x) =
∨
{r ∈ T(x) | r ≤
∧
{Rdxy → V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}} ,
V (〈d〉ϕ, x) =
∧
{r ∈ T(x) | r ≥
∨
{Rdxy ∧ V (ϕ, y) | y ∈W}} .
It is then possible to minimally change the proofs in Chapter 4 to accommodate K?(A)-
and FK?(A)-models instead of K(A)- and FK(A)-models. For example, the deﬁnition
of a tree-model needs adjusting, that is, a K?(A)-model 〈W, {Rd}d∈I , V 〉 or an FK?(A)-
model 〈W, {Rd}d∈I , V, T, T♦〉 is called a tree-model, if 〈W,
⋃
d∈I R
+
d 〉 is a tree, recalling
that for each d ∈ I, R+d = {〈x, y〉 ∈W 2 | Rdxy > 0}.
It is then straightforward to infer the ﬁnite model property with respect to FK?(A)-
models as well as PSPACE-completeness of the validity problems for order-based multi-
modal logics with only unary modal connectives (in case certain consistency problems for
A are in PSPACE (cf. Remark 4.17)).3 In particular, this implies PSPACE-completeness
of the validity problem of Gödel multi-modal logic expanded with arbitrarily many unary
modal connectives and of fuzzy description logics based on Gödel semantics (see e.g. [18]).
As they are usually motivated by speciﬁc applications, researchers working in the ﬁeld
of fuzzy description logics are typically more interested in the problem of satisﬁability
of speciﬁc sets of formulas (called knowledge bases), the problem of consequence (or
entailment), and other decision problems. In the case of order-based description logics
based on all K?(A)-models, decidability and complexity results for the validity problem
cannot always be easily transferred to these problems and thus they are still open in
most cases (depending on the expressivity of the description language).
Order-Based Epistemic Logics
The notion of knowledge is often modelled by multi-modal logics, so-called epistemic
logics, where there is a set I of agents, and for each agent d ∈ I, there are two unary
modal connectives [d] (d knows that . . . ) and 〈d〉 (d considers it possible that . . . ).
To model the notion of knowledge appropriately, these multi-modal logics are often based
on class of Kripke models where each accessibility relation is an equivalence relation (see
e.g. [49]).
If we want to study many-valued epistemic logics based on an order-based algebra
A, we might consider K?(A)-models 〈W, {Rd}d∈I , V 〉 where for each d ∈ I, Rd is a
3We note that if there are inﬁnitely many modal connectives in L?m, even a ﬁnite K?(A)-model for L?m
is an uncomputable object. However, when testing a formula for validity, we can restrict to the modal
connectives occurring in that formula.
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crisp equivalence relation. In this case, we expect that our approach from Chapter 5
would work to tackle open problems of decidability for such order-based epistemic logics.
However, as we cannot restrict our attention to universal models, adapting the approach
might not be entirely straightforward.
Optimizing and Extending the Tableau Calculi
We already mentioned that the algorithms provided by the tableau calculi for GK, GKc,
and GS5c in Chapter 6 are not of optimal complexity. As also the usual tableau calculi
for the classical modal logic K do not provide algorithms of optimal complexity (see
e.g. [107]), we do not expect there to be easy adaptations of our tableau calculi T GK
and T GKc that provide PSPACE-algorithms. In the case of GS5c, however, it would be
rather straightforward to remedy this deﬁciency. Note that the major problem in this
case lies in rules like the following:
(≤∧) : w : ϕ ≤ ψ ∧ χ
w : ϕ ≤ ψ
w : ϕ ≤ χ
By applying the rule (≤∧), we decompose the formula ψ ∧χ is decomposed, but we also
repeat the formula ϕ twice. This has the eﬀect that in a complete tableau, the formula
ϕ would have to be decomposed twice, making the tableau larger without adding more
information.
This could, for example, be remedied by introducing a new propositional variable p
(not occurring anywhere above on the branch) which at w gets assigned the same value
as ϕ and replaces ϕ in the two resulting nodes. That is, an alternative rule might look
like this:
(≤∧)′ : w : ϕ ≤ ψ ∧ χ
w : ϕ = p (p new)
w : p ≤ ψ
w : p ≤ χ
Because in this case ϕ only needs to be decomposed once and p does not need to be
decomposed at all, the resulting tableau would be smaller. To work out the details of
this approach is left for future work.
Furthermore, for stepping from the calculus T GK to the calculus T GKc, we have
adjusted the closure conditions for a branch of a T GK-tableau to the class of all crisp
SK(G)-models. Note that we could have instead added the following rule to the set
T GK:
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(CR) : (rwv occurs on b)
rwv ≤ ⊥ > ≤ rwv
The set of rules in Figure 6.5 together with (CR) provides a calculus that is sound and
complete with respect to validity in GKc, no matter whether we deﬁne the closure of a
branch with respect to all SK(G)-models or with respect to SKc(G)-models.
Moreover, if we add the following rule to T GK, the resulting tableau calculus 
depending on the deﬁnition of the closure of a branch  is sound and complete with
respect to GT and GTc:
(RE) : (u occurs on b)
> ≤ ruu
We might also want to consider tableau calculi for order-based modal logics based on
algebras other thanG. For example ifA isG↓ orG↑, we would have to work with FK(A)-
models (as opposed to SK(A)-models) and thus would need to distinguish between T -
symbols for T and T♦. We do not expect major diﬃculties with such an approach, but
the more complicated formalisms still need to be worked out.
Finally, it would be interesting to implement these calculi in order to obtain auto-
mated decision procedures for the order-based modal logics in question.
Many-Valued Neighbourhood Semantics
In Chapter 7, we study the box-fragments of many-valued modal logics overMTL-algebras
based on A-neighbourhood models.
We ﬁrst note that we did not consider issues of decidability and complexity for these
logics. However, given how weak the modal counterpart LSM of a logic L is, we expect
that in many cases, decision problems for LSM are PTIME-reducible to corresponding
problems in L, which would yield the same complexity bounds as in L. Working out the
details of this is left for future work, however.
Furthermore, in contrast to the classical case, ♦ cannot suitably be deﬁned by ¬¬.
It is therefore an interesting question how to interpret a formula ♦ϕ based on some sort
of SM(A)-like models such that the meaning of ♦ reﬂects that of ♦ in classical modal
logics based on neighbourhood frames (where ♦ is deﬁned by ¬¬).
One way to do this, as was done by Rodríguez and Godo in [111], is to extend
SM(A)-model with an extra neighbourhood function P . That is, an SM♦(A)-model is
a quadruple M = 〈W,N,P, V 〉 where 〈W,N, V 〉 is an SM(A)-model and P is an A-
neighbourhood function P : W → AAW , which is then used to interpret ♦ in the same
way as , i.e.
V (♦ϕ, x) = [[ϕ]]M ε P (x) .
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This approach has the drawback that if we consider all SM♦(A)-models,  and ♦ are
completely independent, which does not reﬂect the classical case. In fact, ♦ can then be
understood just as another box-connective. Moreover, in this case, it is unclear how a
connection between classes of SM♦(A)-models and K(A)-models can be established.
In [111], this drawback is remedied by restricting to SM♦(A)-models that satisfy
certain conditions. Unfortunately, the conditions given are just trivial rewritings of the
desired axioms and do not provide deeper information on the SM♦(A)-models considered.
It would therefore be interesting to ﬁnd more semantical conditions onN and P that are
needed to obtain a suitable interpretation of ♦. In fact, it would be even more desirable
to ﬁnd an interpretation of ♦ that relies on N rather than P , such that Theorem 7.11
can be extended to a modal language including  and ♦.
It might also be fruitful to study the connections between A-augmented SM(A)-
frames and K(A)-frames more deeply. The goal would be to ﬁnd conditions on A-
augmented SM(A)-frames to obtain correspondences between certain classes of A-aug-
mented SM(A)-frames with interesting classes of K(A)-frames, such as Kc(A), T(A),
Tc(A), S4(A), S4c(A), S5(A), and S5c(A). More generally, we might be interested
in classes of SM(A)-frames (not necessarily A-augmented) that correspond to desirable
properties of  and ♦. While some of these questions are considered and answered in
[110, 111], there are still very many interesting open questions in this area of many-valued
modal logics.
Fragments of Many-Valued First-Order Logics
As mentioned before, one of the most important reasons why propositional modal logics
grew so popular is that they provide an excellent compromise between expressivity and
computability. While propositional logics are usually decidable but not very expressive
and ﬁrst-order logics are very expressive but usually undecidable, modal logic are fairly
expressive and decidable in very many cases.
In the classical setting, it is well-known that modal propositional logics represent cer-
tain fragments of ﬁrst-order logic. For example, the classical modal logic S5 corresponds
to the one-variable fragment of ﬁrst order logic, a fact that we reﬂected in Chapter 5
in the setting of order-based logics. The classical modal logic K, on the other hand,
embeds into the two-variable fragment of ﬁrst-order logic (cf. [59]) by translating box-
and diamond formulas as follows:
pi(ϕ) = (∀y)(Rxy → pi(ϕ)(y)) and pi(♦ϕ) = (∃y)(Rxy ∧ pi(ϕ)(y))
As it was known that (satisﬁability in) the two-variable fragment of ﬁrst-order logic is
decidable and NEXPTIME-complete (see e.g. [1]), it was held that it is the inclusion of
modal logics in the two-variable fragment that makes modal logics so robustly decidable.
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It was later argued, however, that this robustness in decidability rather stems from the
tree-model property (cf. [119]), which is a powerful tool when it comes to designing
eﬃcient algorithms (see [108]).
Furthermore, van Benthem's Characterization Theorem tells us that the modal logic
K corresponds to the bisimulation invariant fragment of ﬁrst-order logic (see [13, 14]).
A bisimulation is a binary relation connecting elements of two ﬁrst-order structures
(or two Kripke models) where the same unary predicates are satisﬁed (where the same
propositional variables are true), and certain back-and-forth conditions concerning a
binary relation on the structures (the accessibility relation) are fulﬁlled.
Moreover, it was shown that modal logics embed into the so-called guarded fragment of
ﬁrst-order logic (see [1]), where quantiﬁcation is only allowed when it is guarded by some
relation-symbol in much the same way as the translations above. The guarded fragment
enjoys nice computational properties, e.g. it has the ﬁnite model property and a tree-
model-like property, and is decidable and 2EXPTIME-complete (see [65]). Noting that
the guarded fragment is not restricted to a certain number of variables, the satisfaction of
these computational properties contrasts with the fact that the ﬁnite-variable fragments
of ﬁrst-order logic are undecidable for a number of variables ≥ 3 (see e.g. [1]).
With these useful connections between modal logics and fragments of ﬁrst-order logic
in mind, it is natural to ask how such connections can been drawn in the setting of
many-valued logics and which fragments of many-valued ﬁrst-order logics are decidable
(see question (8) in the introduction).
In [67], Hájek embeds many-valued crisp S5 logics based on continuous t-norms into
the monadic fragments of their ﬁrst-order counterparts, where the monadic fragments
restricts the ﬁrst-order language to unary predicate symbols and no function symbols
(but allows arbitrarily many variables). While the monadic fragment is decidable in
the classical setting, it is undecidable for ﬁrst-order Łukasiewicz, product, and Gödel
logic (see e.g. [73]). On the other hand, the many-valued crisp S5 logics over complete
MTL-algebras correspond to the one-variable fragments of their ﬁrst-order counterparts,
for which decidability of the validity problem is known for the standard Łukasiewicz
algebra Ł (see [67]) and now also for the standard Gödel algebra G (and other order-
based algebras; see Chapter 5). Decidability issues for the one-variable fragment of the
ﬁrst-order product logic remain open, however.
Concerning decidability issues for the two-variable fragments or the guarded frag-
ments of many-valued ﬁrst-order logics, very little is known. While it is clear that the
standard translation between a many-valued modal logic with K-like modalities and its
ﬁrst-order counterpart works in the same fashion as in the classical setting, there is only
very limited literature on how the connections between many-valued modal logics and
fragments of many-valued ﬁrst-order logics might be exploited to obtain more insights
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into either of these topics. One of the ﬁrst studies in this direction, providing an ini-
tial step towards a van Benthem-style characterization theorem, is Michel Marti and
George Metcalfe's [92], where the Hennessy-Milner property (relating modal equivalence
and bisimulations) is studied for the many-valued modal logics based on (image-ﬁnite)
Kc(A)-models, where A is a complete MTL-chain, and some classiﬁcation results are
obtained.
It is therefore an interesting question whether our approach to order-based modal
logics, i.e. restricting truth values of box- and diamond-formulas, extends to order-based
ﬁrst-order logics, where the truth values of quantiﬁed formulas are restricted. If it does,
it might be useful in dealing with certain decidability issues of fragments of order-based
ﬁrst-order logics, e.g. the two-variable fragment or the guarded fragment. The question
whether such an extension of our approach is possible and how it might be achieved will
have to be left open here.
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